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Improvement of freshwater quality within New Zealand poses a threat not only to the 
country’s treasured and pristine waterways, but the culturally and economically dominant 
agricultural sector as well. Encompassing the nation’s largest lake, the Lake Taupō 
catchment is considered a national treasure and supports a large tourism industry. After 
discovering a decline in water clarity in 1999 due to excess nitrogen (N) leaching, the 
Waikato Regional Council worked with stakeholders to cap the total amount of N in the 
catchment, implement a cap and trade programme, and create a quasi-government 
institution to reduce N outputs by 20%. Farmers in the catchment were, for first time in 
the country’s history, treated in a formal regulatory context as polluters rather than solely 
agricultural producers. They were also instrumental in creating a new and experimental 
market based regulatory regime.  Using a governmentality approach, this Master’s 
research will focus on the situated and contextual nature of Lake Taupō farmers’ 
experiences in this market-based environmental governance system. With this 
methodology, I examine how we think about governance and government. I focus on the 
people within, and thought behind, the market-based environmental governance 
occurring within the Lake Taupo catchment.  I investigate farmer characterizations of self 
and focus on how the farming community questioned the way things were and how they 
came to be. I do not evaluate the environmental outcomes of the program. Rather, I have 
investigated how the market-based tool privileged certain ‘rational’ actions, how its 
practices came to be contested, and how its logics have potentially become solidified 
within the community. To inform this case study, interviews with eighteen farmers and 
seven other stakeholders in March of 2015 were analysed and coded using a Foucauldian 
discourse analysis.  This research concludes that over the fifteen years of policy 
negotiation and implementation, farmer in the catchment transitioned over time from 
being constituted as ‘producers’, to ‘polluters’, to ‘nitrogen managers’. The market based 
tool that was implemented did not necessarily change farmers’ environmental beliefs but 
did require an ‘environmental’ concern to become centralized in farmers’ businesses. 
This research offers insight into the relevance of farmers’ subjectivities to understand the 
dynamics and outcomes of a market based policy instrument to manage pollution from 
agricultural sources.
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The case study of nutrient management in Lake Taupō has become a world-
recognised exemplar of a successful market-based approach to environmental 
management. This thesis will tell a complex story of the creation and pathways towards 
the realization of this initiative. To tell this story, three starting points are required. First, 
there’s a brief introduction to the scheme itself. Second, it presents opening observations 
that farmers and farmer subjectivities are an under-explored element in the narratives of 
market-based instruments’ use in environmental management. Third, it includes some 
introductory remarks on market-based instruments in the context of neoliberal 
governance. 
In 1999, Environment Waikato1 scientists condemned agricultural production in 
the Lake Taupō catchment for a decline of lake water quality. This claim identified  
farmers as responsible for the excess nutrient leaching affecting the lake’s quality. 
Consultation with the community started in the early-2000s and a policy plan was 
designed in the mid-2000s. The solution put forward in 2008 as part of the Waikato 
Regional Council’s (WRC) Regional Plan included a ‘cap and trade’ programme. The 
programme set limits on the total amount of nutrient leaching allowed in the catchment, 
created an $81 million fund to reduce leaching by 20% and set up a trading platform to 
allow for nitrogen leaching credits to be sold to the highest bidder. The programme was 
fully implemented in 2011 after extensive Environment Court negotiations and, in June 
of 2015, the goal of 20% nutrient leaching reduction by 2018 had been achieved three 
years ahead of time. The Lake Taupō approach is highlighted by policymakers in 
Aotearoa New Zealand and across the world as an exemplary model for other policy 
makers to follow (Shortle, 2012). Throughout this 15-year period, it became clear that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 After 2008, the name of the Regional Council was changed to “Waikato Regional Council” referred to 
from  now on as WRC.   
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real issue at hand was not lake water quality decline. Instead, the issue was that farming 
operations, and therefore farmers, were the cause.  
Taupō farmers were the first in the nation to formally reckon with the 
inconvenient truth that food production is largely responsible for non-point source water 
pollution. This form of water pollution comes from diffuse sources originating from 
multiple locations and occurs through surface runoff or groundwater leaching (Ribauldo, 
Horan, & Smith, 1999). Non-point source pollution coming from agricultural landscapes 
is a particularly challenging problem in Aotearoa New Zealand. Agricultural production 
holds a significant place in the nation’s economy, culture, and history. Pollution from 
agricultural land not only poses a threat to the nation’s ecology, but also its economy and 
farming identity.  
The policy approach chosen to address this problem in the Lake Taupō catchment 
was the first of its kind in the world (Duhon, McDonald, & Kerr, 2015; Shortle, 2012; 
Yerex, 2009; Young, 2007). The way people were governed, and the problem trying to be 
addressed, however, was not unusual. The logics and rationales behind the market based 
approach used in the Taupō catchment are deeply embedded in the way that governance 
occurs, and is occurring, under neoliberalism2. The need to manage complex common or 
open resource problems, such as non-point source water pollution, global climate change 
or over-extraction is paramount. To do so, we must understand why certain potentially 
‘neoliberal’ policy solutions seem rational and what impact these programmes have on 
the communities they operate within.  
This thesis will use a ‘sociological lens’ to examine the problem of non-point 
source nutrient pollution within the Lake Taupō catchment along with the implemented 
solution. I focus specifically on the farmers’ experience in this experimental 
environmental governance regime.  
1.1 The Lake Taupō Policy Context 
	  
 To commence this narrative, it is useful to outline the basic elements of what 
occurred. To begin, Lake Taupō is a national icon and the country’s largest lake. It is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  See section 1.3 of this introduction for a description and definition of neoliberalism.  
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holiday destination, trout fishery and considered taonga (a treasure) by Ngati 
Tuwharetoa3. It is 30km wide, 40km long and can be 160m deep in parts (Yerex, 2009). 
The catchment surrounding the lake is about 5.7 times the area of the lake itself and is 
mostly comprised of undeveloped land, indigenous forest and exotic plantation forest. 
Less than 20% of the remaining land is used for pastoral (mostly sheep and beef) farming 
and semi-urban and urban development (Barns, McKay & Fleming, 2013, p 5).  
Figure 1: Map of catchment with land use 





















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ngāti Tuwharetoa are the iwi (Māori tribe) who are the Kaitiaki (traditional stewards or guardians) of the 
land and life within the catchment.  
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Concern regarding the lake’s water quality first began in the 1960s (Forsyth & 
Howard-Williams, 1983). Scientists measured high levels of naturally occurring 
Phosphorus (P) in the Lake due to the catchment’s volcanic history. If another nutrient, 
Nitrogen (N), were to be added to the lake, there would be a corresponding growth in 
algae. “Its like a garden, if you then add one limiting nutrient to a vegetable garden, you 
get massive growth” (Barton quoted in Morgan, 2015). 
To prevent an increase of nitrogen leaching through groundwater, undeveloped 
land in the catchment (totalling 18.601ha) was put into reserve as part of the Taupō Lake 
Shore Reserves Scheme in 1968. The purpose of the reserve was to prevent further land 
development in the catchment. Any change from native bush to a more ‘productive’ 
landscape increases the input of N into the lake through groundwater leaching. 
Recommendations to increase the size of the reserve were never fully recognized 
however, due to dwindling support and funding from the central government (Taupō 
District Council, 2014).   
This scheme was not the only effort to protect the catchment from farmland 
development, fertilizer runoff, erosion and overall nutrient enrichment. In the 1980s, the 
Waikato Valley Authority Catchment Control Scheme assisted landowners in “planting, 
fencing, and retiring nearly all river and stream beds in the catchment” (Yerex, 2009). In 
1983, scientists concluded that: 
 
. . . intensified use of land, whether it be with farming, forestry, or urban development, 
will inevitably lead to increased losses of nutrients to the waters draining into Lake 
Taupō… The contribution from increased agricultural activity seems likely to pose the 
greatest threat and it is here that future attention should be focused (Forsyth & Howard-
Williams, p. 152).  
 
Even after it was recommended that further land use intensification be 
discouraged, the central government initiated policies that aimed to stimulate farm 
development. The Bureau of Land Management encouraged potential farmers to settle 
within the catchment through the allocation of Ballot farms. In this process, land was 
developed by the Bureau and then on-sold to individuals interested in farming the land. 
The Lake Taupō area was one of the last areas of the country to be converted to farms via 
ballot allocation. As part of taking on a Ballot farm, landowners had to fence off or 
riparian plant all of their rivers and streambeds (Interview with Farmer114, March 2015). 
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To give one an idea of the scale of intensification, between 1955 and 1973, the land in 
pasture within the catchment increased from 160km2 to 470km2. By 2002, the total land 
in pasture was 525km2 (Young, 2007).  
Between the late 1980s and late 1990s, farming landscapes were developed in the 
catchment and many farmers worked to grow their businesses. In 1999, however, the 
WRC scientists measured a statistically significant decline in water quality around the 
edges of the lake. A decision was made to notify the area’s population of this problem via 
the local newspaper (Petch, Young, and Thorrold, & Vant, 2002). Although the lake 
water quality was almost pristine at the time (clarity was 8m deep in the centre of the 
lake), concern over the potential impact of half a century of land use change and 
population growth came to a head (Vant et al., 2008). The community’s treasured lake, 
thought to be safe from pollution, was in trouble again.   
 Increasing amounts of nitrogen leaching into groundwater sources was still the 
biggest threat to the lake’s clarity and quality (Vant et al., 2008). Due to the area’s 
groundwater hydrology however, there is a time lag of 50-80 years between a given 
activity’s occurrence and its impact on the lake (Morgenstern, 2008 in Barns et al., 2013 
p 13). There are numerous sources of nitrogen (N) in the catchment, including naturally 
occurring runoff, wastewater systems, urban runoff and pastoral farming (Young, 2007). 
To prevent any further deterioration the regional council needed to find a way to limit the 
amount of N entering into the lake. Agricultural production and urban expansion were 
identified as the manageable causes of the present water quality decline (Elliot and 
Stroud, 2000).  
 In a survey conducted by the regional council in 1998, over 90% of the 
catchment residents considered the lake water quality of high importance. With public 
support behind them (Stewart, 2000), the economic stability of the tourism industry in 
question (Yerex, 2009), scientists’ concerns over agricultural impact on water quality 
(Vant et al., 2000), and a growing threat of dairy farming intensification (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, 1997) the regional council felt they could not delay any more in 
taking action (Environment Waikato, 2003). While the farming community assumed, in 
1999, that their previous efforts to reduce nitrogen influx into the lake were already 
sufficient, emerging evidence suggested otherwise. Farming landscapes represented only 
Chapter 1: Introduction    
 6 
20% of the catchment area but the regional council concluded that agricultural production 
represented the largest (93%) source of ‘manageable’ nitrogen going into the lake. 
‘Manageable’ sources of non-point source N pollution came from human, rather than 
naturally occurring, sources4.  
After almost 12 years of work by the Regional Council, the farming community 
and outside experts, a major regulatory and market-based reform was introduced in 2011 
to manage agricultural non-point source pollution. The strategy Protecting Lake Taupō 
was implemented through a change in the Waikato Regional Council’s regional plan – a 
statutory plan under the Resorce Management Act (Waikato Regional Council B, n.d.). 
Known as ‘Variation 5’, the plan change created a limit on the total amount of N leaching 
allowed within the catchment, created a third party organization tasked with reducing the 
total amount of N leaching into the lake by 20% by 2018, and introduced a ‘cap and trade’ 
programme to allow landowners to trade N discharge credits amongst themselves. This 
three-pronged approach can be summarized as capping, reducing, and trading.  
Table 1: Timeline for the Lake Taupō catchment 













	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Chapter 4.2 for a discussion of this term. 
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As part of the first component of the plan, all land in the catchment was required 
to be assessed for nutrient leaching and then placed under nutrient limits.   Many 
agricultural areas were required to have resource consent from the WRC to operate if 
production was above a given level.5 This meant that under the existing structure of the 
Resource Management Act (RMA), most farming businesses were required to disclose 
information relating to their input of N fertilizers, number of animals, stock type, stock 
age, etc. and then gain permission for their level of activity. This information would 
determine the Nitrogen Discharge Allowance (NDA) given to each piece of land in the 
catchment.  
When deciding how to allocate these allowances to landowners, there were a 
number of options proposed. Parties supporting the forestry industry preferred a process 
of “averaging” allocation across the catchment. As part of this strategy, landowners 
would have the same allotted amount of N per ha regardless of historical land use. As 
such, a hectare of forestry would have the same N allowance as a hectare of animal 
livestock production. Parties supporting the farming interests preferred a “grandfathering” 
approach however. This strategy would allocate NDAs to landowners based on their 
historical land uses. Thus, land use at the time of allocation could continue in the same 
form of production. To put this in perspective, a forestry block may be allocated around 
3kg of N per ha, a sheep and beef farm could be allocated 12-18kg of N per ha while 
dairy farms may be allocated 24-36kg of N per ha.  
Before an ‘accurate’ limit on N could be placed on the catchment, however, the 
total amount of N, and the potential sources, had to be modelled. Nitrogen leaching from 
agriculture comes from animal urine but can also be applied as fertilizer for grass or 
crops. However, assessing the impact of diffuse nitrogen sources can be challenging. A 
tool called OVERSEER® was used to estimate the output of N from a given hectare (ha) 
given the area’s soil type and the farming operation’s stock type, breed, sex, and quantity. 
Although there was confirmation that the model predicted N leaching results comparable 
to on-field testing within the catchment, the tool was not originally designed neither to 
measure N outputs nor to be used for regulatory purposes. Instead, it was marketed as 
increasing nitrogen application efficiency and has an average of a 20-30% margin of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See the WRC diagram in Appendix One outlining who needs to apply for a consent.	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error that complicates its ability to be used in a regulatory context (Duncan, 2014; 
Ledgard et al., 2008; Shepherd et al., 2013).  
On top of placing a limit on the input of N, the WRC decided that in order to 
prevent future decline of lake water quality, they also needed to reduce present inputs of 
‘manageable’ N by 20% annually. The initial estimate of the total N that needed to be 
reduced was 153 tons of N by 2018, which was revised upward to 172 tons of N after 
benchmarking6 in 2008/2009 and a formal review within the Environment Court gave a 
better estimate of N leakage within the catchment (Barns et al., 2013). This upward 
revision still represented a 20% reduction from the total amount of N leaching within the 
catchment.  
To reduce N down to 2001 levels, WRC, Taupō District Council, and the central 
government (as represented by the Ministry for the Environment) came together to create 
the Lake Taupō Protection Trust (LTPT). This Trust is tasked with reducing N discharge 
in the catchment as well as facilitating landowners’ education regarding low nutrient 
leaching land use activities within the catchment. Their $81.5 million endowment to 
accomplish this task comes from the central government (45% of the fund), the WRC 
(33% of the fund), and the Taupō district council (22% of the fund) (Lake Taupō 
Protection Trust, n.d.). The LTPT purchased NDAs, termed ‘credits’, as well as entire 
farming blocks that would be converted to lower N use landscapes like forestry. The 
LTPT originally bought entire farms, NDAs and all, but found this to be too costly over 
time due to a change in the calculation of land values in the catchment (Barns et al., 
2013). 
Trading is the third component of the Regional Plan Variation 5. The central idea 
behind this kind of policy mechanism was that N credits allocated to landowners under 
the total limit or ‘cap’ for the catchment can be traded. This provides an incentive to 
participants in the ‘market’ have to measure, streamline, and reduce their pollution (N) 
over time. Landowners in the catchment who were allocated a NDA were allowed to buy 
or sell part of their allowances to others who wanted to increase production. This allowed 
landowners who wanted to expand production to go above their allocated NDAs without 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Benchmarking is defined as “the processing of [putting a farmers’] farm data through OverseerTM to 
establish a nitrogen discharge allowance (NDA)” (Waikato Regional Council B, n.d.).	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increasing total N input into the lake. Additionally, it allowed the LTPT to purchase 
pollution credits from landowners and act as the main buyer in the newly created ‘market’ 
for N. Credits purchased by the LTPT were retired and much of the land converted to 
lower N usages like forestry operations. The majority of trades in the catchment have 
been instigated by the LTPT and most of the sellers have been Māori trusts or 
incorporations (Duhon et al., 2015). All landowners in the catchment were able to buy 
and sell their N credits, but to date there have only been two buyers of credits in the 
catchment, the LTPT itself and a large dairy farmer who began operations in 2008 
(Duhon et al., 2015). 
At the time (and in later evaluative assessments), the strategy incorporating a 
market based cap and trade scheme was considered the most efficient option that could be 
used by the regional council (Young and Kaine, 2010). As of June 2015, N reduction 
goals were achieved 3 years ahead of time and on budget. The approach taken in Lake 
Taupō has been highlighted across the country and internationally as a model for others 
to follow (Barns et al., 2013).  
1.2 A Focus on Farmers’ Perspectives 
 
The previous section focused on the role of regulatory agencies and the different 
policy components of the solution put forward. It is important to identify that farmers, 
both individually and collectively, were heavily involved in this policy process: after all, 
their livelihoods depended on the outcomes. To ensure their voice was heard, farmers 
created Taupō Lake Care (TLC) in the early 2000s. This group is comprised of 
landowners in the catchment who elect a formal representative body to advocate for their 
interests in any consultation process with the Regional Council.7 They worked with the 
WRC to ensure that their organization’s mission to maintain farm ‘flexibility and 
viability’ was incorporated into any solution proposed.  
For 15 years, the farmers in the Taupō community have taken an active role in the 
policy design, implementation, and evaluation. In the early 2000s, farmers worked to 
create the rules that would govern them. In the mid-2000s, allocation of credits and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The group was able to be formally recognized in the council’s obligatory consultation process under the 
Resource Management Act 1991. 
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first formal rules were released. Between 2008 and 2011, farmers were in limbo due to 
ongoing negotiations regarding the legality of the rules. Negotiations between the 
Regional Council and other parties8 within the Environment Court concluded in 2011 and 
formalized the water quality rules (known as Variation 5) as a result. Throughout this 
time, farmers were heavily involved in the policy process and had a large influence on the 
outcomes in the Lake Taupō Catchment.  Taupō farmers’ voice was active during the 
policy’s gestation and thus must be included in its evaluation.  
The cap on nitrogen, and the allowances given to landowners, represented a major 
change in the way that farmers were regulated, not just in the catchment but also in the 
country. For the first time in New Zealand, farmers were required to disclose their 
nitrogen effluent and were restricted to only emit as much as they were allocated. These 
actions challenged not only farming practice but understandings of the good farmer 
within the country. Farmers were now polluters, and had they had to pay. This thesis will 
go on to explore is how shifting farmers’ subjectivities9 are an under-recognised element 
in leading to these kinds of new outcomes and practices. 
1.3 N Discharges and the Solution of Cap and Trade 
	  
 Management of excess nutrients from agricultural sources is a challenge 
worldwide and the claims of success arising from the Taupō case are considered to be 
without parallel globally (Shortle et al., 2012). Consequently, many pieces of both 
scholarly and grey literature have been published regarding its design and 
implementation (Bartle, 2011; Duhon et al., 2015; Kerr, Greenhalgh, and Simmons 2015; 
Shortle, 2012; Yerex, 2009). The management of an open-pool (or common) resource, 
that is, lake water quality, using a market like tool is clearly novel. However, it also is 
being positioned in policy debates as a vindication of market based approaches to 
environmental management. So, the final element of this introduction is to provide a very 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Parties included Carter Holt Harvey Ltd and Environmental Defence Society, Federated Farmers of New 
Zealand, Lake Taupō Forest Trust, Lake Rotoaira forest trust and Lake Taupō forest management ltd, 
Taupō Lake Care, Tuwharetoa Māori trust board. Appellants: Fonterra co-operative group ltd, Ngāti 
Tuwharetoa agricultural group, Lakes and Waterways action group, Taumata plantations limited, and CGE 
Burgess family.	  
9 Section 2.1 and 3.5 focus on subjectivities which include an individual’s perception of self as partially 
influenced by others’ or societies expectations or influence. 
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brief sketch of why market-based instruments are so interesting – particularly as they are 
linked to the wider neoliberalisations (to be explored much more fully in Chapter 3). 
Within environmental policy, one set of tools that provide private property rights in 
exchange for environmental goods is described using the term market-based instruments 
(MBIs). These tools consider ecological systems and their functions to be exchangeable 
entities, rather than just resources for, or externalities of, production. MBIs are used 
widely within environmental governance and one kind of instrument is what is termed an 
‘emissions trading scheme’. The central idea behind this policy mechanism is to place a 
limit or “cap” on the amount of pollution allowed within a given ecological system and 
then allow trading to occur amongst market participants to create market incentives to 
stay within the cap.  
First, a cap is identified and polluters are allocated a specific pollution allowance 
within the bounds of the cap. Then, polluters are allocated “credits” which they can trade 
depending on their ability to either reduce or emit excess pollution. As a result, polluters 
who incur high costs in reducing their pollution can purchase credits from other polluters 
or the government. This allows them to continue profitable production while the amount 
of total pollution is limited up to the level of available credits. If firms or individuals emit 
less than their allocation within the cap, they can sell their excess credits in a market, 
gaining a reward for their pollution reduction ability. This market structure allows an 
agreed upon pollution level to remain or become reduced over time and provides the 
opportunity and incentives for polluters to lower their costs of compliance.   
This solution is embedded within traditional notions of the ‘tragedy of the commons.’ 
This term describes a situation in which individuals acting in their own self-interest can 
create a negative effect on a communal or collective resources and cause potential harm 
to themselves as a result of continuing to exploit that resource because if they do not, 
their competitors will. Garret Hardin’s (1968) original conclusion that conferring private 
property rights on a resource provides sufficient incentive to protect the long term value 
of the resource as  the best solution to the ‘tragedy of the commons’ has been critiqued by 
many scholars (e.g. Ostrom, 2014; Agrawal, 2014). Nevertheless, establishing property 
rights continues as the key rationale of MBIs. Another critique of MBIs is that, when 
confronting the effects of intensification, MBIs endeavour to subject the natural world to 
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the same rationales that caused its deterioration in the first place. Although the 
implementation of these tools has rapidly expanded globally since the 1990s, numerous 
fields including political ecology, ecological economics, rural sociology, and critical 
geography have critiqued the application of these pollution reduction tactics associated 
with ‘market environmentalism’ largely due to a hesitation towards the expansion of 
capitalism into ever new or natural domains. (Castree, 2008; Castree, 2010a; Bakker, 
2005; Gomez-Baggathun, De Groot, Lomas, & Montes, 2014; Mariola, 2011; Cooper and 
Rosin, 2014).  
In light of these critiques, the Lake Taupō case is particularly interesting due to the 
apparent success of the program. In part of this thesis I examine what logics and 
assumptions are made when implementing a market based instrument (MBI) in 
environmental governance (See Chapter 3.1, 3.2, and Chapter 4). Additionally, I discuss 
why scholars in many fields including ecological economics, critical geography, and 
political ecology are critical of the application of these tools. Their critiques concentrate 
on the logistical and ethical problems encountered in the application of MBIs.  Most 
importantly, the water quality trading programme (WQTP) implemented in Taupō, fits 
within the rationalities associated with both ‘market environmentalism’ and is 
characteristic of the rise of wider dynamics of neoliberalism (Bartle, 2011).  The 
relationship between MBIs and neoliberalism forms a key starting point of the narrative 
in this thesis. 
For this thesis, I argue that neoliberalism, first and foremost, is an ideology but 
also a set of practices incorporated within a distinct political economy (Larner, 2000). 
Associated with the reduced barriers to trade, a lesser role of the state, increased focus on 
the use of free-markets, and centralization of the individual as self-entrepreneurial, 
neoliberalism presents a distinct way of thinking about government and governance 
(Harvey, 2005; Foucault, 2008). The application of MBIs through the neoliberalisation of 
environmental policy poses a novel rationale and management strategy towards the 
effects of production. Rather than a coherent, hegemonic ideology that shapes all market 
sectors in a consistent fashion however, “neoliberalism takes on specific forms when it 
engages with natural resource industries” (Mansfield, 2004, p 565). The processes, and 
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effects of neoliberalism are situated, multiple, and varied: there are no singular forms or 
results.  
The above definitions of neoliberalism, while loose, reflects the fact that scholars’ 
interpretations of neoliberalism have shifted since the first critical response to the 
application of its forms of governance in the 1980s.  As a result, new ways of 
approaching neoliberalism have been highlighted to better understand the systems in the 
present. Instead of assuming that a ‘neoliberal’ tool equates to a ‘neoliberal’ outcome, a 
governmentality approach asks scholars to question the assumptions and rationalities 
applied within a given space and time (Agrawal, 2005; Bakker 2009; Larner, 2000) and 
this is the approach that I employ in this research and explain in Chapter 2.  
As such, the application of a cap and trade programme within a country that is 
already known as the ‘neoliberal experiment’ provides an excellent case study (Cooper 
and Rosin, 2014; Kelsey, 1995; Stock and Forney, 2014). Not only is New Zealand 
highly neoliberalised, it is also strongly oriented towards agriculture. New Zealand is a 
developed western nation that, unlike other similar nations, gains much of its economic 
security from export markets mostly from agricultural goods. In recent years, the effects 
of agricultural production have begun to impact not only the treasured waterways of the 
country, but its ‘clean and green’ image as well. Hence, water quality decline is 
problematic for ecological, economic, and social forms of governance within the country. 
The solution posed within Taupō tried to address this problem through a new form of 
market oriented governance focusing on changing land use within the catchment.  
This thesis examines this as both a policy governance programme as well as an 
exercise in the operation of governmentalities: through a change in on-farm behaviour 
and potentially farmer beliefs and subjectivities. Although the programme design is well 
documented in the grey literature (Anastasiadis et al. 2014; Barry, King, Larson, & 
Lennox, 2010; Connor, MacDonald, Morrison, & Cast, 2009; Corrales, Melodie Naja, 
Rivero, Miralles-Wilhelm, & Bhat, 2013; Greenhalgh & Selman, 2012; Kerr, 2013; 
OECD, 2015; Selman, Greenhalgh, Branosky, Jones & Guiling, 2009; Shortle, Ribaudo, 
Horan, & Blandford, 2012), I suggest that farmers’ voices also ought to be considered. 
The stories of who is a good farmer in Aotearoa New Zealand have potentially shifted in 
order to accommodate for the inconvenient truth of agricultural pollution. To fully grasp 
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what has happened around Lake Taupō we need more than just a narrative about 
neoliberal policy. We need to understand changing farmer subjectivities in relation to 
neoliberal governmentalities. 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
	  
This thesis will examine farmers’ engagement in the creation and implementation 
of a novel water quality trading programme occurring within the Lake Taupō Catchment 
of Aotearoa New Zealand. In this thesis I use a methodology grounded within a 
governmentalities approach to examine how we think about governance and government. 
Specifically, I examine the people within, and thought behind, market-based 
environmental governance. I focus on farmers’ engagement with, and market rationalities 
behind, the water quality trading programme in the Lake Taupō Catchment. 
As part of my examination of this environmental policy programme, much wider 
questions must be confronted. I focus on the stories we are told and tell ourselves about 
the individuals within this particular neoliberal form of governance. An understanding of 
these stories requires me to question the way that individuals conform with, adapt to, 
resist, and/or create novel forms of governance. My critique of the practices and 
subjectivities embedded and emerging within the water quality trading programme within 
the Taupō catchment provides a situated context to ground interpretations of much wider 
issues of neoliberalism and the neoliberalisation of nature10.    
 As part of my application of a governmentality approach I focus on the questions 
of how we govern and are governed.  In this case study, each of these questions 
centralizes a different perspective: namely policy rationality and farmer experience.  
	  
My two research questions are: 
1) How are new regimes of practices made to ‘work’ within a water quality 
trading programme in the Lake Taupō catchment of Aotearoa New Zealand? 
2) How are farmer subjectivities constituted, altered, contested, and created as 
part of the water quality governance within the Lake Taupō catchment?  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See Chapter 3.2 for a description of the term ‘neoliberalisation of nature’ 
Chapter 1: Introduction    
 15 
Chapter 2: Governmentality as a Methodology  
To begin, I outline the use of governmentality as both a theoretical approach and 
methodology and document how I have used Dean’s (1999) suggestions to structure my 
research questions and methods. I define ‘governmentality’ in Section 2.2 and outline 
how I discuss the mentality of governance regarding the ‘logical’ environmental policy 
programme created in the Lake Taupō Catchment. This ‘environmentality’ is deeply 
connected with discourses surrounding the preferred individual within a neoliberal 
governmentality. I describe the specific structure that I use to document my results in 
Section 2.3 and outline my methods of data collection and analysis in Section 2.4. I end 
with a discussion of my positionality in Section 2.5 and conclude that although there is no 
‘one way’ to use a governmentality approach, my work is comfortably situated within a 
growing body of literature using this approach.   
 
Chapter 3: Literature Review 
To frame each of my research questions I begin with a literature review in 
Chapter 3. This chapter investigates the relationship between market based instruments, 
agri-environmental governance, and farmer subjectivities. I argue that an understanding 
of both political economy as well as subjectivities is important in order to interpret the 
large shift in governance occurring within the Taupō Catchment. In the chapter, I first 
outline the design, implementation, and logics within market based mechanisms and then 
summarize critical scholars’ contributions to the evaluation of market based tools and 
discuss how these policy tools are situated within agri-environmental governance 
(Sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3). I then review literature that discusses how farmers’ beliefs or 
identities may dictate their behaviour in an environmental programme that occurs in an 
agricultural economy and landscape (Section 3.3.1). I then discuss how these tools fit 
within New Zealand as the ‘neoliberal experiment’ and summarize the problem and 
previous solutions to water quality decline within the country (Section 3.4). Lastly, I 
focus on the importance of understanding farmer subjectivities in agri-environmental 
governance and summarise previous research investigating farmer subjectivities in 
Aotearoa New Zealand (Section 3.5).  
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Chapter 4: The Regime of Practices in the Lake Taupō WQTP 
In Chapter 4 I discuss my first set of results from the Lake Taupō catchment. I ground 
my findings in Dean’s (1999) framing of a ‘regime of practices’ and answer my first 
research question: How is a new regime of practices made to ‘work’ within a water 
quality trading programme in the Lake Taupō catchment of Aotearoa New Zealand? In 
turn, I consider what we govern (section 4.3.1), how we govern (section 4.3.2), why we 
govern (section 4.3.3) and lastly, I focus on who we govern (section 4.3.4) and the 
environmentalities associated with the  ‘environmental subjects’ within the catchment.  In 
this chapter, I build upon literature that centralizes the rationale and designs of market 
based programmes and discuss the constituted, contextual, and contested systems that are 
present in the market based instrument implemented within Taupō. I conclude that this 
policy programme aims to change farmer behaviour, but does not dwell on changing 
farmers’ environmental beliefs. I argue that under a neoliberal environmentality, moral 
responsibilisation is suggested but not required. Additionally, I argue that a ‘neoliberal’ 
market based tool is only as good as its ability to shape ‘neoliberal’ subjects who 
participate in it. In a way, the hammer is only as good as the nail. I then discuss how this 
potentially contradicts Agrawal’s (2005) suggestion that environmental subjects come to 
care about their environment through decentralized and empowering environmental 
governance.  
 
Chapter 5: Farmers’ Subjectivities  
In Chapter 5, I build on discussions in Chapter 3 investigating how a farmer’s 
beliefs or identity may dictate their behaviour in an environmental programme that occurs 
in an agricultural landscape. I answer my second research question of: how are farmer 
subjectivities constituted, altered, contested, and created as part of the water quality 
governance within the Lake Taupō catchment? I predominantly use data gathered from 
semi-structured interviews conducted with farmers in the Lake Taupō catchment. In this 
chapter, I pay attention to farmer’s experiences, and thus voices, in the implementation of 
the water quality trading programme. I particularly examine how they questioned the way 
that the government, or they themselves, went about managing water pollution.  I outline 
how farmers’ experience is partially dictated by their existing and expected beliefs of 
Chapter 1: Introduction    
 17 
what it means to be a ‘good farmer’ in New Zealand. I conclude that farmers within the 
Lake Taupō catchment have potentially shifted subjectivities from producers, to polluters, 
to Nitrogen managers.  
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Throughout this thesis, I focus on the participants in this market based programme. 
Farmers within the Lake Taupō catchment were instrumental to the programme’s 
implementation and acceptance.  I conclude that a combination of existing beliefs and 
expected behaviours created a new identity for farmers in the catchment: a Nitrogen 
Manager. This new identity builds upon, and adds a new dimension to, what it means to 
be a ‘good farmer’ in New Zealand. The policy tool implemented within Taupō is 
embedded within a neoliberal governmentality but is not necessarily, ‘neoliberal.’ In 
order to create spaces for alternatives, we must first understand where we are at present.	  
	   	  
Chapter 2: Methodology and Methods   
 18 
Chapter 2  
Methodology and Methods 
2.0 Introduction 
	  
As a methodological approach, governmentality has taken a foothold in critical 
academic fields. In this thesis, I adopt governmentality as a methodology that implies a 
particular constructivist epistemology and a set of ways of thinking, key questions, and 
tools for analysis that are useful to unpicking the effects of governance regimes, 
particularly as they shape and are shaped by subjectivities. It might therefore be possible 
to argue that governmentality is an epistemology in itself (see Ettlinger, 2011). At its core 
it is “concerned with how thought operates within our organized ways of doing things, 
our regimes of practices, and with its ambitions and effects” (Dean, 1999, p 17). It allows 
researchers to call into question how we rationally govern or are governed. Discussed by 
Michael Foucault during his lectures at Collége de Paris, governmentality fits within his 
larger discussions of power, rule, and domination. Scholars have noted how it provides 
“methodological devices through which the publicly observable rationalities, procedures, 
techniques of state and non-state actors can be read as proxies for processes of subject-
formation” (Barnett, Clark, Cloke & Malpass,, 2008, p 625). As a result, the approach 
allows one to focus on the subject positions and subjectivities embedded within our 
established ways of doing things (Kelly, 2016).  
Governmentality can also describe the emergence of a distinctly new form of 
thinking about and exercising power in certain societies. Foucault used it to denote the 
changing form of governance associated with the rise of liberalism. Although he was 
unable to fully develop his thoughts on the present form of liberalism, that of 
neoliberalism, his approach is still very insightful (Kelly, 2016). Even still, the present 
era is concerned with a new reality, (the economy) and a new object (the population).11  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The explicit term given by Foucault to this new focus on the population’s wellbeing is termed biopower.  
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For this thesis, I adopt the methodological approach outlined by Mitchell Dean 
(1999) to investigate how we govern and are governed in relation to the ‘environment’. 
This chapter is separated into 6 parts. First, in section 2.1, I outline some starting 
definitions such as governance, mentality, and subjectivity and outline what 
‘governmentality’ and a ‘governmentality approach’ are in practice. In section 2.2, I 
discuss how others have found governmentality especially useful when applying the 
approach to our relationship and management of the ‘environment’. I then describe in 
section 2.3 the distinct methods and processes of how to conduct research using a 
governmentality approach as outlined by Dean (1999) and describe how I have used this 
to inform my own research questions and methods in section 2.4. Lastly, I outline my 
positionality in relation to this research in section 2.5 and conclude in section 2.6 that 
although there is more than one way to deploy a ‘governmentality’ approach my research 
might add a small contribution to the elaboration of governmentalities within the field of 
environmental management.  
2.1 What is Governmentality?  
 
Foucault first gave a lecture with the title ‘governmentality’ while teaching at the 
College de France. Since the lecture’s publication, other works of Foucault’s have been 
translated which provide a more nuanced perspective on this central approach (Lemke, 
2002; Binkley & Capetillo, 2009). Given the staggered nature of Foucault’s teachings and 
the immense interest in his approaches, there are a number of leading scholars in wide 
ranging fields who have written and rewritten their thoughts on governmentality’s 
application in their fields (Dean 1999; Enroth 2014; Larner 2000; Lemke, 2002; Li, 2007; 
Miller & Rose, 1990). This has led to many different disciplinary interpretations that can 
be a bit overwhelming for a budding scholar. To limit the scope here and avoid 
epistemological cracks, I have found it useful to rely on a keystone work by Mitchell 
Dean published in 1999. Dean’s (1999; 2010) work is particularly useful for this research 
because of the clarity provided in how to examine the relationship between governance 
processes and subject formation processes.  His book ‘Governmentality’ (1999; 2010) has 
continued to be the first source for many using a governmentality approach and provides 
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a series of useful definitions and methods for scholars to guide their work by. The 
following definitions draw largely from Dean’s work. 	  
Foucault defines government: 
any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of 
authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, 
that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and 
beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable 
consequences, effects and outcomes (Foucault, 1982, p 221).  
Government does not have to be the same as the ‘state’ nor be organized in a formal 
institution as such. As a short hand, government can be described as the ‘conduct of 
conduct.’ Individuals and institutions are able to manage multiple and various facets of 
conduct, be it their own or others. This management is a moral activity that “encompasses 
not only how we exercise authority over others, or how we govern abstract entities such 
as states and populations, but how we govern ourselves” (Dean, 1999, p 12). Government 
relates to how an individual comes to question, or problematize, their conduct in order for 
it to be governed.  
Now that we have outlined a definition of government, we must define what 
Foucault means by a ‘mentality’. A mentality is more than just one person’s views; it 
relates to a shared knowledge and thus is “not usually opened to questioning by its 
practitioners” (Dean, 1999, p 16). It is a set of shared beliefs, knowledges and opinions 
that the minds or consciousness of individuals are, or can be, immersed within (Dean, 
1999, p 16). A mentality is the normalized way of going about or doing things in a 
common sense or rational manner (Durkheim, 1992; Mauss, 1978; Dean, 1999, p 16).   
Combining these shared bodies of knowledge with the idea of the ‘conduct of 
conduct’ we arrive at the concept of governmentality. For Foucault, the project of 
governmentality can be defined as “…the different modes by which, in our culture, 
human beings are made subjects,” in connection with regimes of power/knowledge 
(Foucault, 1982, p 208). An application of the approach allows us to investigate how 
things came to be, how they are, and how or if they are questioned. Central to addressing 
these questions is an exploration of how individuals practice governing themselves and 
others.  
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2.1.1 Power, Subjects and Subjectivities  
	  
Governmentality is highly focused on the subject and an individual’s subjectivity 
in relation to the larger systems of power and knowledge in which one exists (Read, 2009. 
It is important to note that Foucault’s approach to the subject is quite distinct from earlier 
notions (Read, 2009). This is rooted in Foucault’s understanding of power. For Foucault 
power: 
doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but… it traverses and produces 
things, its induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to 
be thought of as a productive network which runs through the whole social body 
(Foucault, 1980, p 119).   
 
Many different things and people are capable of being powerful in many different spaces 
and at varying scales. For the subject, this understanding of power allows one to see that 
man as a knowing subject produces both nature and history (Simmel, 1977). In other 
words, people are acted upon by power but also capable of exercising it.  
A subject position is created for individuals to inhabit when exercising power or 
agency. This position does not have to come from a singular source of authority such as 
‘the state’ and instead is determined by discourses and practices. An individual’s 
fulfilment of this expectation (and potential ownership of it) is one’s subjectivity. The 
process in which power may elicit a person to become a subject is subjectivation. 
However, a subject is also capable of their own subjectivation: As Foucault (1979) puts 
it:  
he [sic] who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes 
responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon 
himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays 
both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection (p 202-203). 
 
	   For Foucault, institutions and individuals are equally capable of governing beliefs 
or behaviour. A governmentality approach allows us to focus on how the relationships of 
individuals within structures and systems, may vary over time so that we can question 
how things are at present. At present, neoliberalism is the form of governance that New 
Zealand is currently experiencing as a nation and has for the last 30 years (Kelsey, 
2015).12 Some scholars within New Zealand suggest that a governmentality approach can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See Section 3.4 for a discussion of neoliberalism within agricultural and environmental management.  
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be used to understand how we manage our ‘environmental’ problems within the country 
(Cooper & Rosin 2014; Haggerty, Campbell, & Morris, 2009; Larner, 2000).  
2.1.2 Neoliberalism as governmentality  
	  
Since governmentality can be a useful way to question the everyday nature of our 
thoughts, actions, or policies, a number of scholars have used it to examine neoliberalism. 
Larner (2000) classifies neoliberalism as a policy programme, an ideology, as well as a 
new mentality of governance with five values at the core: the individual; freedom of 
choice; market security; laissez faire, and minimal government (Larner, 2000). This art of 
governing emerged in the 1980s and has spread through many nations and places 
including New Zealand. The process and effects of neoliberalism have been widely 
critiqued over the last 30 years and many suggest that it has become entrenched in our 
stories, and the stories we are told (Larner, 2000; Kelsey, 1995; Harvey, 2005; Dean, 
1999) 
In this thesis, I apply a governmentality framework to examine neoliberalism, not 
simply as a way to refer to potentially hegemonic discourses or as a way to provide 
structured resistance to them. Instead, I use it as a way to examine a “particular 
production of truth,” how subject positions within neoliberalism are structured, and how 
people come to fulfil these positions or not (Read, 2009, p 12). As Lemke (2001) argues, 
governmentality allows us to see neoliberalism as “a political project that endeavours to 
create a social reality that it suggests already exists” (p 203). Interpreting the changing 
and grounded nature of neoliberalism is needed in order to understand and critique it 
(Larner, 2000).  
Understandings and critiques of neoliberalism have become quite nuanced over 
the last decades. Scholars suggest that instead of one singular practice or process there 
are varied and multiple neoliberalisations which comprise the larger ‘neoliberal’ project 
(Gibson-Graham, 2008; Larner, 2000). A governmentality approach allows researchers to 
investigate neoliberal processes and logics as applied in the extremely varied places and 
contexts in which actors are involved. Neoliberalisation is not necessarily deregulation or 
the “roll back” of the state; instead it is the reregulation of the conduct of conduct (Dean 
1999; Enroth, 2014; Larner, 2011; Peck & Tickell, 2002). A governmentality approach 
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allows researchers to investigate the “actually existing” forms of neoliberalism or 
neoliberal governance in all of its diverse forms, both “temporally and spatially” (Larner, 
2000, p 323). To give a governmentality approach ‘legs’ scholars must examine a 
specific context and situation where the conduct of conduct has come to be questioned 
(Larner, 2011; Mansfield, 2006)  
A ‘neoliberal’ governmentality acts on the conditions of actions and as its “power 
becomes less restrictive, less corporeal, it also becomes more intense, saturating the field 
of actions and possible actions” (Read, 2009, p 6).  Under neoliberalism, “to govern is no 
longer to engage in the conduct of conduct of populations, but rather to engage with 
transcendent problems of human existence and coexistence” (Enroth, 2014, p 69). These 
diffuse problems of human existence include climate change, terrorism and financial 
crises whose impetus and required solutions distort the traditional relationships between 
the governor and the governed (Enroth, 2014). Many problems in the dominant neoliberal 
discourses are thought of in terms of interests, freedoms and risks that impact the conduct 
of individuals competing with each other in a given population (Barnett et al., 2008, p 
625). This competition frames the problems of governance as the resulting failures of full 
market incorporation, thus the task is to adjust governance to better incentivise, monitor, 
and manage individual’s decision-making calculus in ‘markets.’  In this thesis, I examine 
the everyday manner “in which individualised/market based solutions appear in lieu of 
collective political solutions” (Read, 2009, p 12). 
2.2 Rationale for the use of Governmentality in 
examining Environmental Governance: 
	  
For this research, I will focus my attention on the subjects elicited and potentially 
produced as subjectivities under a ‘neoliberal’ market based environmental governance 
structure. To date, there have been arguably three discernable, yet overlapping, 
approaches discussing the mentality behind environmental governance: green 
governmentality, (see Luke 1999a; Luke 1999b; Rutherford 1999; Neumann 2001; 
Peluso & Watts 2001; Sundar 2001), environmentality (Agrawal 2005, Haggerty, 2007, 
Li, 2007), and neoliberal environmentality (Fletcher, 2010; Cooper & Rosin, 2014). 
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 Hobson (2013, p 57) describes a green governmentality approach as asking “what 
sorts of environmental citizens are being ‘worked up,’ through what means and to what 
ends?” Much of this literature has focused on conservation oriented environmental 
governance and asks how an environmental ethic can be created through specific 
programmes. Central to this line of thought is Agrawal’s (2005) use of ‘environmentality’ 
to ask how human-environment relationships are constituted by the shifting grounds of 
politics, institutions, and subjectivities. Agrawal’s (2005, 2010) investigation of the 
changing subjectivities of Indian peasants is instructive when applying a governmentality 
approach to environmental governance. For Robbins (2012), Agrawal’s use of 
environmentality is used “to explain the way people’s environmental actions and 
identities fit together, and the way these are together the products of power” (p 76).  
Environmental governance has been heavily influenced over the last 30 years 
through the emergence of neoliberalism (Bakker, 2009; Mansfield, 2006; Castree 2008). 
Fletcher (2010) notes an emerging ‘neoliberal environmentality’ which is “an effort to 
combat environmental degradation in the interest of biopower through the creation of 
incentive structures intended to influence individuals’ use of natural resources by altering 
the cost-benefit ratio of resource extraction so as to encourage in situ preservation” (p 
176). There are three central components in a neoliberal environmentality: 1) incentive 
structures are created to motivate individuals to act in a ‘conservation-friendly’ way, 2) 
environmental problems are framed as problems of inadequate ‘cost-benefit’ analysis on 
an individual level and 3) policies are centralized around economic growth as a means to 
combine concerns for natural or resource conservation and social justice (Fletcher, 2010, 
p 176). For this case study, this approach is adopted to examine the potentially ‘neoliberal’ 
forms of rationality and practices that are embedded and emerging within the Lake Taupō 
water quality trading programme (See Chapter 4).   
Environmentality as the central analytical approach is mostly used to examine 
more traditional resource use or preservation as compared to open resource degradation 
(Luke, 1999a; Rutherford, 1999; Neumann 2001; Peluso & Watts 2001; Agrawal 2005; 
Agrawal et al., 2005; Agrawal 2014). However, previous research conducted by Haggerty 
(2007) notes how environmentality “with its focus on the links between environmental 
politics, local institutions, and subject formation in the context of devolved resource 
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management” can be especially insightful when investing the decentralized resource 
management and environmental governance approach present in New Zealand (p 224). 
Thus, a ‘neoliberal environmentality’ is a useful lens to examine the market based trading 
scheme occurring within the Lake Taupō catchment in Aotearoa New Zealand.  
2.3 How to use governmentality as a methodology: 
from analysis to analytics 
	  
Although there are a number of ways to use a governmentality approach, Dean 
(1999) suggests an analysis of governance: an analytics. An analytics of governance is 
“an analysis of the specific conditions under which particular entities emerge, exist, and 
change” (Dean, 1999, p 20). This methodological approach asks one to examine “thought 
as it becomes linked to and is embedded in technical means for the shaping and reshaping 
of conduct and in practices and institutions” (Dean, 1999, p 18). When conducting an 
analytics of governance, Dean (1999) suggests that one first identifies a 
‘problematisation.’ A ‘problematisation’ occurs when the everyday nature of something 
has come to be questioned. Second, once a situation is identified, Dean (1999) 
encourages researchers to focus on how questions. Two how questions that are central to 
Foucault’s work are how do we govern and how are we governed.  Lastly, Dean (1999) 
suggests that as part of an analytics of governance, researchers investigate the regime of 
practices that are present. A ‘regime of practice’ defined by Dean (1999) is a ‘historically 
constituted assemblage through which we do things like cure, care, and council’ (p 30). 
Within a regime of practice there are four distinct points of focus: what is governed, why 
it is governed, how it is governed and who is being governed or governing (Dean, 1999, p 
30-31). Formally put, an analytics of governance tries to find the logics in a given regime 
of practices through an investigation of the fields of visibility, the teleology of 
governance, the technical aspects of governance, and the identities that governance 
creates or acts within (Dean, 1999, p 30-32).   
In conducting an analytics of governance as suggested by Dean (1999) I will be 
following these same three distinct steps. First, I have identified a problematisation that 
occurred, and is occurring, in the Lake Taupō catchment. In Chapter 1, I outlined the 
problem of water quality decline in the Lake Taupō catchment and the way in which 
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farmers were problematised as having a role in causing and remediating non-point source 
nutrient pollution.  
I have oriented my research questions around the two central questions in 
governmentality: how do we govern and how are we governed. In contextualizing and 
answering these questions, I “attend to the practices of government that form the basis on 
which problematisations are made and what happens when we govern and are governed” 
(Dean, 1999, p 28). These practices are dictated by discourse that is situated within and 
outside of formal regulatory bodies.  
I investigate the forms of governance and the question of ‘how do we govern’ by 
describing the regime of practices present in the Lake Taupō water quality trading 
programme (Chapter 4). I connect these findings to the next question of ‘how are we 
governed’ by paying attention to farmers experience and subjectivities and in Chapter 5 
document how identities and agencies were drawn upon or created in this environmental 
governance programme.  As part of this I concentrate on how “agents come to experience 
themselves through such capacities, qualities and statuses” as outlined for them by the 
potentially ‘neoliberal’ cap and trade water quality trading programme (Dean, 1999, p 32). 
Foucault’s governmentality does not suggest that one’s subject position will 
necessarily lead to a specific action. Nor, that a specific action creates a specific subject. 
He does not ignore “the sense in which practices of the self are relatively independent of 
practices of government of others or of the state” (Dean, 1999, p 13). Yet many forms of 
governing (explicit regulation or not) seek to change behaviour and thus action by 
making conduct (un)acceptable as part of one’s proper or civic duties. 
 I discuss how existing farmer subjectivities were drawn upon, co-mingled, or 
were constituted by the market based policy mechanism used to address the problem of 
non-point source water pollution in the catchment. Within the literature investigating the 
application of these kinds of policy tools, however, there has been little discussion about 
who or what is the preferred subject and how individuals come to see themselves in these 
programmes (Cooper, 2011). In addition, research that aims to understand how these 
subjects would actually, rather than theoretically, engage in a ‘neoliberal’ environmental 
governance system is severely lacking (McKee, 2008). Given Taupō farmers’ 
instrumental influence in the creation, design, and implementation of the water quality 
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management strategy used within the area, I investigate their perspectives and 
experiences using this governmentality approach. I focus on the subjectivities of farmers 
as they engage with this novel cap and trade programme to manage non-point source 
water pollution into Lake Taupō. Using a governmentality approach to do so is especially 
useful when interpreting how individuals come to think or act in different ways as part of 
their participation in this environmental policy process. 
An understanding of a particular problematisation or a regime or practices will not 
determine the forms of subjectivity that emerge. Instead, through the combination of 
multiple practices and forms of governance, subjectivities can be elicited, promoted, 
facilitated, or fostered given the various capacities, qualities and statuses attributed to 
particular agents (Dean, 1999, p 32).  A governmentality approach does not evaluate a 
policy programme’s ‘success’ in producing the subjectivities it fosters nor ‘success’ 
achieving its stated goals. Instead it employs a critique that details and questions the way 
things are and how they come to be (Kiersey, 2009).  
A governmentality approach seeks to understand the rationalities and discourses 
of power that enable the regulation of people’s conduct. This requires a critique that 
“does not consist in saying that things aren’t good the way they are… [instead] it consists 
in seeing what type of assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, unexamined ways 
of thinking the accepted practices are based” (Foucault, 1997). A critique is thus an 
investigation of the everyday nature of doing things. It is an analysis that endeavours to 
remain impartial while fully acknowledging a scholars’ positionality.  
2.4 Governmentality in practice: Methods of a Case 
Study and Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
	  
In this thesis, I situate myself within the critical social sciences by engaging with 
and reporting “the complexity of social activity in order to represent the meaning that 
individual social actors bring to those settings and manufacture in them” (Stark and 
Torrance 2005 p 33,). I have done so using a qualitative research methodology where I 
pay attention to the fluid ways in which meaning is made, what is included, why it is 
made, and how I make it. My use of a case study approach informed by semi-structured 
interviews fits within a governmentality approach and is, I suggest, a particularly well-
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suited method to investigate the governing of others’ or one’s own behaviour/conduct. 
My analysis centralizes a documentation of the discourses presented by landowners and 
policy makers within the Taupō catchment and how they adjusted and shaped the policy 
programme over time.  
2.4.1 Discourse and A Case Study Approach 
	  
Discourse is central to a governmentality approach since it influences what is said 
and done in a manner which solidifies what we think to be rational or proper conduct. 
The way that a problem is framed, how a narrative is presented, and our rational 
responses are all framed by discourse. At its core, discourse is “a set of statements that 
determine actions and thoughts” (Miller, 1993, p xiv).  Discourse is fluid, changing, co-
created, and contested. Foucault argues that nothing has meaning outside of discourse 
since it is a system of representation of all people, places, and things (Hall, 2001). 
Discourse is affected by material practices of power and relations but also effects 
understandings of knowledge and truth (Foucault, 1998). It indicates the “ways of 
thinking and speaking about aspects of reality,” helps to order our reality in certain ways, 
is extremely diverse, and is “a consequence of the effect of power relations” (Cheek, 
2008, p 356). In essence, discourse frames what we say, who can say it, why it makes 
sense, and how it is gains legitimacy.  
In relation to environmental governance, discourse shapes the scope and 
definition of a given ‘environmental problem’ as well as how it is managed (Feindt & 
Oels, 2005). In essence, “environmental discourse constitutes identities, expectations, and 
responsibilities that play their part in disciplining individuals and society at large (Feindt 
& Oels, 2005, p 169). A governmentality, and thus neoliberal environmentality, approach 
centralizes and analyses discourse to understand how a problem came to be ‘a problem’ 
and why or how it is solved.  
The methods used in this research were specifically designed to generate data 
amenable to a governmentality approach. Governmentality, when used as a methodology, 
helps determines a way to ask questions and analyse data to provide results. In my 
methods, I focus on documenting the central role and power of discourse. Analysing 
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discourse in a specific setting can be very insightful in highlighting the specific terrains 
of power in which the discourse occurs and what it can produce.  
A case study approach is helpful in providing a detailed explanation of space, 
place and time that discourses are emerging and in play. Case studies are empirical 
inquiries that investigate contemporary phenomenon in depth and rely on multiple 
sources of evidence to guide data collection and analysis in a specific context and within 
a set boundary (Yin, 2009). It is an all-encompassing method, which covers “the logic of 
design, data collection techniques, and specific approaches to data analysis” (Yin, 2009, p 
18).  
As outlined by Yin (2009) there are 3 different forms of case study: explanatory, 
exploratory, and descriptive. Xaio (2010) outlines two additional forms that include a 
critical and extreme case study analysis. Although these are separate forms of analysis, 
multiple approaches can be used in tandem within a singular case study (Yin, 2009). This 
is the benefit of using a case study method in comparison to others; it allows the 
researcher to accommodate for the specific context and intricacies of a situation given its 
ability to triangulate methods (Yin, 2009). 
 When conducting a case study, the goal is not to generalize findings, rather it is to 
understand and interpret a specific case and context (Aaltio & Hielman, 2010, p 70). The 
research is inductive in nature and the researcher’s goal is to reveal unexpected problems 
or issues. Instead of testing a theory or hypothesis, the purpose is to examine the data in a 
complex and precise manner. Research must be flexible and able to change plans as the 
conditions require to partly accommodate for complexity (Aaltio & Hielman, 2010, p 67). 
Although the research plan may adjust over time, the steps in conducting a case study 
include “a) selecting the case study objects b) ensuring entrance to the case site c) 
outlining the theoretical frame as a foundation of the study and d) data gathering, 
processing and analysing” (Aaltio & Hielman, 2010, p 69). 
 For my research, I have chosen a to conduct an explanatory and descriptive 
critical case study of the Lake Taupō community’s management of, and solution to, water 
pollution from agricultural sources. I focus on farmers’ engagement with, and 
subjectivities preferred within, the water quality trading programme. I gained entrance to 
the site through initial contact with one of the members of the farming community. As 
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discussed, I have used a governmentality approach to determine my research question 
and method of data collection and analysis. This case is insightful given its novelty as a 
policy programme as well as a first-of-its-kind pollution controlling regulatory scheme in 
the agricultural sector of New Zealand (Barns et al., 2013).  
2.4.2 Semi-structured Interviews and participant selection 
techniques  
	  
As Aaltio & Hielman (2010) point out, a case study is not separated from the 
research context. Instead, it forces the researcher to question the tool-like conception of 
methods and asks one to bring together multiple methods to enable a more complete 
methodological frame. In this case study, I have combined data gathered from semi-
structured interviews and an analysis of the grey literature to address two research 
questions that were informed by a governmentality approach.  
 In my research, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 25 participants who 
were living in or familiar with the Taupō catchment and farmers’ experiences of the cap 
and trade programme. The use of semi-structured interviews to gather participant data, 
especially when thematically based, is very common in case study methodology (Aaltio 
& Hielman, 2010, p 67). Interviews are useful due to their ability to gain insight into 
participants’ subjective perspectives, and give analysis and interpretation to something 
occurring in the present/past or within a specific physical boundary (Perakyla & 
Ruusuvuori, 2011).  
Within a post-structuralist framework, interviews can produce knowledge but are 
“representative of one of many possible social worlds” which suggests that they are 
unable to provide a definitive truth of a given context or situation (Barlow, 2010, p 497). 
I used a semi-structured interview technique in order to “compare the participants’ 
responses while simultaneously seeking to fully understand their unique experiences” 
(Barlow, 2010, p 496). A semi-structured approach as compared to a structured approach 
is useful in a governmentality study because it allows flexibility and fluidity in the 
interview, which enables participants to tell their stories. This elicits insights to their 
subject positions and how these roles shape the constitution of different subjectivities in 
particular contexts. In deciding what topics and questions to ask in the interviews, I 
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worked from a set of questions informed by themes identified through literature and grey 
material associated with the case13. I did not follow a linear line of questioning and 
instead allowed the participants to express their narrative (Barlow, 2010, p 498).  
During March of 2015, I conducted 24 interviews with 25 individuals in total. 18 
of these individuals identified as farmers and seven others were familiar with the policy 
programme in the catchment. Of the 25 individuals, four people were interviewed 
multiple times. Additionally, 6 individuals identified as Māori landowners. Ten 
participants were interviewed together as five couples.  
In order to be interviewed for this research, participants had to have been directly 
involved in trading nitrogen within the programme, been a landowner in the catchment 
under the Variation 5 rules, or be an individual who has extensive knowledge or 
experience with the design, implementation, and evaluation of the programme. Most 
participants were farmers living within the Taupō region. Other participants lived outside 
the catchment but were active at some point between 2000 and the present in the 
regulatory process due to business, professional, or personal reasons. Some potential 
participants were alerted previously to my arrival through the Taupō Lake Care group 
mailing list and were asked to contact me if they were interested in participating. I 
received five requests to be interviewed from this mailing system. Participants were 
selected based on their self-selection and through other participants’ recommendations.  
Given the snowballing technique employed in contacting potential interviewees, 
there may be selection bias given that I was unable to talk to many people who chose to 
move out of the catchment. In addition, I tended to use one central participant for 
recommendations on who to contact. However, at the end of each interview, I asked if 
participants would be willing to recommend other participants to me. Much of the time, 
they agreed and many of the potential contributors that were recommended had been 
nominated previously by other interviewees. This is testament to the small size of the 
community in this case study and the importance of anonymity of participants. Given the 
focus on farmers, more effort was paid to securing interviews with them.  
Before going to the Lake Taupō catchment to conduct the interviews, I sought 
approval for my research from the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See Appendix two for the list of potential interview questions 
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Ngāi Tahu Research Consultation Committee.14 The farming community within the Lake 
Taupō catchment is quite small and interconnected. During the research, I took as many 
precautions as possible to limit participant’s knowledge of who else I had, or was 
planning to, contact or interview.   
Participants were made aware of the main context and purpose of the research by 
reading the information sheet and were able to ask questions. All participants signed a 
consent form and were notified of the additional risk of identification given the small 
community.15 They were able to ask questions concerning the consent or information 
sheets and were asked if they still wanted to participate or be audio recorded. All but one 
participant interviewed agreed to be recorded and three potential participants declined to 
participate.  
Most participants were approached via email or via phone and many interviews 
occurred around the farm kitchen table with a cup of tea. If not occurring within this 
setting, interviews took place in mostly private and quiet locations. For many of the 
interviews, I was offered and sometimes participated in small meals. If present, the 
partners of the original participant were welcome to become involved in the interview. 
One couple had separate interviews but were partially engaged in the other participants’ 
dialogue.  
Many participants were males who identified as farmers and looked to be between 
the ages of 40 and 75. Other participants however were women and a few of the 
interview group seemed younger than age 40. Given the size of the catchment, an explicit 
statement on the breakdown of participants based on their presented gender may 
compromise the anonymity of certain individuals. To ensure anonymity of participants, 
each individual has been given a code name that I reference in my results section. This 
coded name relates to their subject position as ‘farmer’ or ‘other.’ My lacking 
clarification for different types of farmers or ‘others’ who included policy analysts, 
organizational representatives, and individuals who spoke on behalf of representative 
bodies is intended to ensure participant anonymity. This is especially important given the 
size of the catchment and limited number of people involved in the policy design and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See Appendix five for a copy approval receipts.  
15 See Appendices three and four for a copy of the participant consent form and information sheet.  
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implementation. Each individual is also assigned a number ranging from 101-118. For 
example, Farmer102 and Other104 are two separate individuals. 	  
  Before the interviews, I engaged in informal chat with the participant(s) and gave 
them some information on my background as a student. During the interview, I displayed 
empathy either with facial expressions or verbal utterances and in some cases also 
expressed my views on the matter to reaffirm the validity of their position (Barlow, 2010, 
p. 498). Notes were taken during the interviews unless it was clear that it made the 
interviewee(s) uncomfortable. Most interviews were around 45min but some lasted for 2 
or more hours. At the end of each day, I recorded additional notes and summarized my 
thoughts and impressions of the interviews.  
I was in the catchment for three and a half weeks and left once I felt that every effort 
was made to hear a variety of farming perspectives from people within the catchment. 
For one and a half of those weeks, I was invited and did stay with a farming family living 
in the area. During this time, I also attended and listened in on the Taupō Lake Care 
annual meeting on March 31st 2015.  
2.4.3 Foucauldian discourse and data analysis 
 
A Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA) is a preferred method when following a 
governmentality methodology. This approach to discourse analysis is concerned with the 
nexus between power and knowledge as expressed by language (Cheek, 2010). In this 
view, discourse is more than language or a way of speech, it is about the production of 
knowledge and its objects (Hall, 2001). The purpose of an FDA method is to “make 
explicit the ways in which discourses operate and their effects within particular contexts” 
(p 356) as well as to “enable us to explore how things have come to be the way they are, 
how it is that they remain that way, and how else they might have been or could be” 
(Cheek, 2010, p 355). Researchers using this approach are trying to understand how 
individuals develop a particular interpretation of an experience (Potter and Wetherell, 
2001). FDA differs from other forms of policy analysis. Namely, FDA “problematizes 
what conventional policy analysts take for granted: the linguistic, identity, and 
knowledge base of policy making” (Fiendt and Oels, 2005, p 163). This form of analysis 
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underpinned my methodological reasoning and coding practices when generating and 
interpreting the data collected.   
As part of my research, I fully transcribed 15 interviews that were deemed to be 
especially rich due to an individual’s perspective or position. Due to a focusing of my 
research on farmers in particular, I prioritised transcribing interviews with individuals 
who identified as farmers. I listened and took comprehensive notes on interviews with 
other participants. Key statements were transcribed verbatim from these audio recordings. 
Transcribed interviews and notes were coded using the NVivo software. I coded 
transcripts multiple times using a constant comparative method (Boeije, 2002). First, I 
open coded and tried to make sense of the data, then I tried to interconnect those 
categories, and finally selectively coded based on my two research questions. This 
method required that I review the data multiple times and interpret data sources in 
relation to each other as well as to my governmentality approach.	  	   
When conducting FDA, I used both inductive and deductive reasoning techniques 
to code my data. When reviewing the transcripts I found certain themes developed 
intuitively (inductively) even though the analysis was underpinned by a governmentality 
approach which tended to be more deductive. I identified themes within the interviews 
after initial coding and used these to guide my review of the interview transcripts 
thereafter. In all, I have aimed to give credence to the participants’ views and build upon 
their perspective within the context of a wider theoretical framework. 
2.4.4 Reporting 
	  
	   In November of 2015, I travelled back to the Taupō community to give them an 
opportunity to engage with my research findings and me. A notification was sent to all 
participants both personally and via the Taupō Lake Care group newsletter. I encouraged 
participants to meet with me during the four days that I was in the catchment as well as 
attend a presentation that was given during a farmer field day event held at the local pub. 
I met with five groups of participants outside of my formal presentation and talked 
extensively one on one with another participant while in the catchment. Farmers 
encouraged me to disseminate a summary of my results to farming newspapers after the 
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thesis is examined.  In addition, the complete thesis will be sent by email to all 
participants and made available online via the University of Otago research archive.  
2.5 My positionality 
	  
Within a poststructuralist and thus governmentality frame, truth and knowledge is 
subjective. It is impossible for me to be objective or neutral in my research. As a result, 
throughout this research process I have endeavoured to become aware of how my “own 
vision and that of the participants may have been normalized, because [I] otherwise run 
the risk of tacitly accepting the categories and visions imposed by the dominant world 
discourse” (Demirdirek, 2010, p 905). I will briefly discuss my ontological and 
epistemological roots as well as my personal assumptions and relevant biography.  
To begin, I am positioning this research as anti-realist and anti-naturalist 
straddling humanist and critical philosophies sometimes characteristic of a 
poststructuralist critical social science perspective (Panelli, 2004). I do not explicitly seek 
to challenge or reproduce hegemonic systems and instead desire to uncover the intricacies 
of such systems (Panelli, 2004). Although it is impossible to explicitly state all of the 
assumptions that I have included as part of conducting this research, I will endeavour to 
make relevant aspects of my identity and experience clear to the reader (Crang, 1998; 
Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). 
Based at the Centre for Sustainability at the University of Otago, I completed my 
first year of Masters study on a US Graduate Student Fulbright Award. This award allows 
American citizens to travel and conduct research outside of the United States thanks to 
funding from the respective governments. My award was funded by Fulbright New 
Zealand and does not require me to gain clearance for any of my research findings with 
either the U.S. or New Zealand governments. During my year (2014) as a US Graduate 
Student Fulbright Awardee, I enrolled in a number of courses including Environmental 
Sociology, Neoliberalism in the Pacific, as well as Environmental Law and 
Environmental Management that focused on New Zealand.  
In my original Fulbright grant proposal, I discussed my desire to interview 
farmers about their engagement with voluntary carbon programmes present in New 
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Zealand at the time. My previous experience as a farm hand working on sheep, beef, 
alpaca, and goat farms in New Zealand during 2010 informed this proposed research 
topic.  As outlined in my original grant, I elected to continue my studies over a two-year 
period and consequently adjusted my research topic to better reflect the research need and 
context presented to me in New Zealand in 2014. During my second year of studying, I 
received a scholarship from the University of Otago and have completed this Masters 
thesis during the year 2015.  
After gaining a Bachelor of Arts in Environmental Studies from the University of 
Maryland Baltimore County in 2012, I conducted field research in Ecuador on 
landowners’ participation in a payments for ecosystem services scheme, another kind of 
market based mechanism. Until the end of 2012, I interned for an Indigenous Peoples 
organization concerned with preserving Biocultural Heritage and proceeded to represent 
their interests at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP) that occurred in Doha that year. I then 
returned to my home of Washington, D.C. and interned for the Environmental Defence 
Fund, a well-known pro-market environmental organization. While there, I completed a 
project on Indigenous Groups participation in programmes aimed at reducing carbon 
emissions. Towards the end of my thesis journey, I applied for and accepted a position 
with the New Zealand Ministry for Primary Industries where I will begin work in 
February 2016 as a climate policy analyst. My interests over time have continued to focus 
on the application of market mechanisms in the land use sector with a specific focus on 
the participants involved in these programmes.  
While studying at the University of Otago, my positions regarding a number of 
relevant environmental policy approaches have adjusted and fluctuated over time. I have 
endeavoured to continuously challenge and document my thinking throughout this 
process and have tried to incorporate some of my intellectual adjustments towards market 
based mechanisms, farmer engagement, and neoliberalism in this thesis. My continuous 
internal dialogue on the role and responsibility of market based instruments in 
environmental governance, especially governance of common or open resource problems, 
has been informed by my previous policy experience as well as new understandings of 
the potential neoliberalisation of nature. For this thesis, I have aimed to understand how 
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participants, rather than policy makers, see the capability of a market based scheme to 
create meaningful and lasting environmental change in a just and civil manner. The 
conclusion of this work may provide the reader insight into where my current 
understanding of these topics lie and what I look forward to questioning more.  
2.6 Conclusions 
	  
	   This chapter has outlined the methodology and methods that informs this research. 
I have discussed how I use governmentality as a methodology that informed my data 
collection and analysis methods. Using Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA), this case 
study focuses on the questions of how do we govern and how are we governed 
centralizing Lake Taupō farmers utilization of discourses used to understand, and respond 
to, a limit on nitrogen leaching and a cap and trade policy implemented within the 
catchment. 
I chose to focus on the Lake Taupō case due to my professional background, 
positionality, and interest. The case is also a situation where ‘the way things are’ came to 
be questioned or ‘problematized’. I focused on discourses present and employed in the 
catchment to describe novel subject and object formations emerging as part of the Lake 
Taupō water quality trading programme.  
A governmentality approach as outlined by Dean (1999) is not an all-
encompassing perspective on a set of regimes, problems or solutions. It is at its heart a 
policy-centric approach to understanding socio-cultural change (Barnett et al., 2008, p 
628). Additionally, Foucault does not intend the approach as a way to classify a system of 
practices as global, or radical project (Dean, 1999). Lastly, it does not classify practices 
of governance as necessarily good or bad (Foucault, 1983). This is because all forms of 
power, originating from the self or other is potentially dangerous according to Foucault 
(1980). 
Based on its post-structural roots, there is no one way to use governmentality as a 
methodology and thus “no absolute standard of truth by which an analytics can be judged” 
(Barnett et al., 2008, p 633). However, “critical judgement might not require secure, 
transcendental foundations in the first place” (Barnett et al., 2008, p 633). In trying to 
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evaluate the approach, as well as research that utilizes it,  “we might simply compare the 
intelligibility and understanding it yields with alternative accounts” (Dean, 1999, p 23). 
In the next chapter, I discuss other applications of a governmentality approach to 
investigate a novel form of environmental governance: the application of market based 
instruments in agricultural landscapes situating farmers as environmental subjects.  
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Chapter 3  
Literature Review 
3.0 Introduction  
	  
In this chapter, I first provide an overview of what market based instruments 
(MBIs) are and then discuss how critical scholars have questioned their logics and 
application. Additionally, I outline how MBIs have been applied to address 
environmental problems occurring within or from agricultural landscapes and discuss 
farmers’ roles and past experience in these programmes. In order to give the reader an 
understanding of the political economy and national regulatory context in which the Lake 
Taupō catchment programme occurred, I then discuss Aotearoa New Zealand as the 
‘neoliberal experiment’ and the application of a neoliberal governance tools for the 
management of agriculture and the environment. I discuss how farmers’ experiences in 
these programmes may be partially determined by their subjectivities. Previous scholarly 
work on farmer subjectivities in Aotearoa New Zealand is then discussed and I conclude 
that an understanding of both political economy and subjectivities is essential to 
understand the logics and application of the water quality trading programme occurring 
within the Lake Taupō catchment.  
3.1: Market Based Instruments (MBIs) in 
Environmental Governance 
	  
As discussed in section 1.3 of the introduction, the use of MBIs in environmental 
governance is increasing internationally. One kind of MBI is an emissions trading 
scheme, or ‘cap and trade’ programme. The paramount example of an emissions trading, 
or cap and trade programme, is the Sulphur Dioxide market implemented within the 
United States used to address the problem of acid rain. Since its success in the 1990s, 
many other market systems in environmental management have emerged  (Cooper, 2011). 
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This is especially true for markets for ecosystem services which can include markets for 
positive ecological goods such as biodiversity preservation (Robertson, 2006) as well as 
polluting actions like greenhouse gas emissions (Lansing, 2009). To reiterate the 
difference, a market for ecosystem services is a kind of market-based instrument that 
usually is aimed at including a positive ecological externality in a payment programme. 
On the other hand, a ‘cap and trade’ market places a regulatory limit on negative 
pollution effects at least cost (at least to the emission sources). Payments for Ecosystem 
Services, markets for ecosystem services, and market based instruments all share a 
number of familial resemblances and most of these tools have been implemented within 
many different settings including pollution reduction on agricultural landscapes16 
(Cooper & Rosin, 2014).  
The benefits of using markets for ecosystem services have been identified as 
allowing more flexibility, efficiency, and innovation opportunities as compared to 
traditional environmental governance structures (Lane, 2012; McDonald, & Kerr, 2011; 
Shortle, 2012). The success of these markets can be gauged by a number of variables 
including the amount of trades occurring, the size of the trades, the level of participation 
among buyers and sellers, the cost savings associated with trading, and lastly the amount 
of pollution reduced (Shortle, 2012; Tietenberg, 2006). Experts agree that a market 
structure must be well designed, the context in which it is implemented well understood, 
and detrimental effects controlled, in order for the tool to be successful (Tietenberg, 
2006). Achieving most or all of these criteria for success, however, becomes a challenge 
when implementing these programmes in practice rather than theory.  
To date, there has been little success for these types of market structures, 
especially those for managing water quality (Mariola, 2011). Many of the water quality 
trading markets around the world have been thwarted by a lack of trading partners, 
uncertainty about the trading rules, legal and regulatory obstacles, or a lack of monetary 
or regulatory incentives (Breetz, Vanden, Jacobs, & Schary, 2005; Fisher-Vanden & 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Very few cap and trade programs, however, have existed internationally and usually manage more 
traditional polluting activities or institutional bodies. As a result, the only two examples found as part of 
this literature review of cap and trade programs being implemented in agricultural settings in the cap and 
trade program occurring in the Taupo catchment, and the GHG emissions trading program that was 
designed for application within Aotearoa New Zealand agricultural sectors but which has been postponed 
indefinitely.  
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Olmstead, 2013; Morgan & Wolverton, 2008; J. Shortle, 2012).  The limited overall 
success of these programs raises questions about how these tools are being implemented, 
how communities are enabling or disrupting their roll-out, and perhaps even whether 
these tools should be used at all.  
Questions of implementation of markets for ecosystem services and community 
engagement have been raised within the fields of environmental economics, ecological 
economics, and political ecology (Shortle, 2012; Gomez-Baggathun et al., 2010; Castree 
2008). Each of these disciplines takes a different epistemological stance on the 
importance of state involvement, power of markets, and value(s) of the natural world. 
What they do not have in common is the degree to which they question whether we 
should be using these tools at all.  I suggest that in order to understand why these tools 
have become so prominent, we may need to shift our attention from how to make these 
programmes function to how we understand these market tools to be embedded within a 
certain logic, political economy, or form of governance – that is, the governmentality 
underpinning their implementation and operation. 
3.2 MBIs and the Commodification of Nature 
	  
In contrast to environmental economics scholars, critical geographers and political 
ecologists suggest that MBIs bring new perspectives and expectations not only of our 
relationship with the natural world, but also the natural world itself (Heynen & Robbins., 
2007; Castree, 2008). The literature discusses the potential shifts taking place within 
environmental management and uses terms such as neoliberal natures, the 
neoliberalisation of nature, and the commodification of nature.  Each of these terms 
denotes a slightly differentiated way of understanding the relationship between 
neoliberalism, natural resources and natural resource/environmental management. 
Research on the neoliberalisation of nature, neoliberal natures, and the 
commodification of nature is vibrant within critical geography and political ecology 
literatures covering a wide breadth and scope.  Three epistemological roots 
predominantly guide the varied critiques. First, researchers who are committed to a 
Marxian analysis of commodification hold the theory that those who control capital and 
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labour control power, so that this approach is antagonistic to the capitalistic mode of 
production. Additionally, Karl Polanyi’s notions of the ‘double movement’, outlining 
social destruction and market (re)action that must be countered by the state, is also a 
dominant (Polanyi, 1944) critique. 17 Concerns for social justice, unequal distribution of 
wealth and environmental impacts are also prominent (Kallis, Gómez-Baggethun, & 
Zografos, 2013). Most critiques are focused on the rise of ‘market environmentalism.’  
This form of resource regulation: 
offers hope of a virtuous fusion of economic growth, efficiency and environmental 
conservation: through establishing private property rights, employing markets as allocation 
mechanisms, and incorporating environmental externalities through pricing... (Bakker, 
2009, p 431-432).   
Much of this research focuses on the use or exploitation of traditional primary 
resources such as water, timber, minerals or fish (Bakker, 2010; Bakker, 2009; Castree, 
2010a, 2010b; Dempsey & Robertson, 2012; Heynen & Robbins, 2005; McCarthy & 
Prudham, 2004; McCarthy, 2006). Scholars investigating the neoliberalisation of these 
resources point to the difference between traditional notions of a natural resource as a 
true commodity18 and new processes of commodification19 of the natural world (Castree, 
2008). The ‘commodification of nature’20 critiques the way in which practices of 
governance and capital accumulation increasingly characterise the natural world as a set 
of ecosystem services to be held privately, priced, and then exchanged (Castree, 2008).  
In all, research on the neoliberal commodification of nature becomes extremely 
diverse, complex, and complicated due to the complexities scholars associate with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Mariola (2011) suggests that the creation of WQTPs in the United States represents a ‘pre-emptive’ 
double movement: the state creates a market structure rather than manages the effects of burgeoning market 
systems.	  	  
18	  Polanyi (1944) makes a distinction between true and false commodities and defines ‘true’ commodities 
as goods that are produced solely for a purpose and use in price-markets (1944, p 33). Labour, land, and 
capital are thus considered ‘false’ commodities since these things were not created with the purpose of 
inclusion within a market. Mariola (2011) concludes that credits used within markets for ecosystem 
services, like WQTP, are not ‘true’ commodities.	  
19 ‘Commodification’ is a process where things, originally distinct from each other, are given equivalent 
value in order to become exchangeable. Polanyi (1944) defines commodities as goods that are produced 
solely for a purpose and use in price-market (p. 33). Thus, according to Polanyi, labour, land, and capital 
are considered false commodities since these things were not created with the purpose of inclusion within a 
market. Kosoy and Corbera (2010) dive deeply into this discussing how a payments for ecosystem services 
approach for the natural world is like commodity fetishism.  
20 Kosoy and Corberra (2010) discuss three distinct stages within the commodification of nature process: 1.  
Ecological functions are framed as ecological services 2. A single exchange value, usually monetary, is 
assigned to this service and 3. A market exchange is created to connect the providers and users of this 
service.	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characterizing ecosystems as services rather than functions of whole systems (Kosoy & 
Corberra, 2010; Dempsey & Robertson, 2012). As a result, ecosystem functioning is 
framed only in terms of what services the natural world can provide in the treadmill of 
production (Schnaiberg, Pellow, & Weinberg. 2002). Investigations of this new resource 
management regime include studies on fisheries management in New England (Peluso, 
2007), water privatization in Spain (Bakker, 2002), wetland banking in the southern 
United States (Robertson, 2004), and forest conservation strategies in Mexico (McAfee & 
Shapiro, 2010). Most of these investigations are case specific examples of the nebulous 
processes of the neoliberalisation of natural resources (Castree, 2008; Bakker, 2009).  
Although not required, many of the market based policy tools rely on a 
monetization of an ecological system or service (Bakker, 2009). It is extremely 
challenging to value ecosystems in a single metric, namely money (Gómez-Baggethun et 
al., 2010; Rico García-Amado, Ruiz Pérez, & Barrasa García, 2013; Vatn & Bromley, 
1994). Although this is challenging, methodologically speaking, other issues arise given 
that there are other notions of value than monetary ones (Martinez-Alier, Munda, & 
O’Neill, 1998; O’Neill, 2001). Monetary valuations are also value articulating institutions 
whose settings influence and regulate which values are included/excluded; determining 
what conclusions can be reached (Jacobs, 1997; Martinez-Alier et al., 1998; O’Neill, 
2001; Spash & Vatn, 2006). Based on these critiques, the resistance against monetary 
valuation of environmental systems is based on moral and epistemological grounds that 
urge for a plurality of value expressions (Kallis et al. 2013).  
Critique of the commodification of nature has grown steadily within the last 
decade but has not been able to halt the increasing use of markets to manage 
environmental problems. This may be due to the fact that market environmentalism is 
embedded within the logics of neoliberalism. With increasing percolation of a neoliberal 
governmentality into wide ranging forms of governance, solving a ‘market’ problem with 
a ‘market’ solution provides a compelling, simple way to address extremely complex 
environmental problems (Lockie & Higgins, 2007). Larner (2000) suggests that the 
situated nature of any ‘neoliberal’ programme’s application is important to note. To 
address the application of a neoliberal environmentality, a characterisation of the political 
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economy of a nation and the natural resource problem and context, as well as the form or 
type of subject positions elicited, is required.  
3.3 MBIs in Environmental and Agricultural 
Governance 
	  
This section of the literature review discusses the importance of understanding the 
contextual nature of environmental problems and solutions in agricultural settings. I focus 
on farmers’ behaviour and engagement in conservation and environmentally centred 
programmes. I specifically discuss farmers’ relationship to the problem of water pollution 
from their land and the MBIs suggested as solutions in these contexts. I orient this 
discussion around an examination of the neoliberal environmentalities present within 
these programmes.  
There are already varying types of environmental governance systems that occur 
on, and in, agricultural landscapes but over the last decade there has been a distinct rise in 
interest regarding the ecosystem services these landscapes can provide (Smith & Sullivan, 
2014; Van den Belt & Blake, 2014). Listed services include the provision of food and 
timber, regulation of climate variations, a source for culturally aesthetic or recreational 
values, and supporting services like soil formation (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 
2005). When compiling this catalogue of services, however, scholars tend to discount the 
negative impacts of agricultural production. For example, the contribution of agricultural 
landscapes to improved water quality through riparian plantings is considered a type of 
ecosystem service. Yet, when eutrophication, or increased input of nutrients into 
waterways is caused by agricultural production, this can have a negative impact on 
recreational or use values within local water bodies (Gordon, Finlayson, & Falkenmark, 
2010). Rather than agricultural landscapes just providing food and ecological services, 
they can also cause ecological harm. Markets and payments for ecosystem services 
reward landowners for creating an environmental good rather than punish them for 
causing ecological harm.  
As mentioned previously, the categorization of the natural world as ecosystem 
services is aligned with market oriented governance structures.  In Australia, Higgins, 
Dibden, & Cocklin (2012) identified three reasons as to why these market programmes 
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have become embraced and preferred by the government, without regard for farmer 
viewpoints. First, these programmes are a logical extension of the free-trade policy 
direction taken by the Australian government. Second, in alignment with the nation’s 
trade liberalization agenda, these programmes discourage a subsidization of production 
that would potentially distort world trade. Third, both governments and farming 
organizations are interested in finding more effective and efficient forms of agri-
environmental governing. Market instruments provide this sense of efficiency because 
they encourage activities to take place within the existing farming management plan, 
offering the prospect of more sustainable farming production practices (Higgins et al., 
2012).  
The subject of environmental governance occurring in agricultural landscapes 
tends to be a farmer. Under a market based trading mechanism managing an ecosystem 
service, farmers are expected to act both in an economically rational and morally 
responsible manner. On the one hand, farmers are seen to be rational economic actors 
who are active agents in the market setting. At the same time, however, they are expected 
to be good environmental stewards doing work for the community and its common good 
problem of water pollution. As a result, land managers can be defined “as socially and 
ecologically responsible only to the extent that they have the managerial capacities to 
pursue economically ‘rational’ practices” (Higgins, 2002, p. 419). The requirement to act 
in this rational way comes from the mechanism’s design that tries to establish “within 
subjects a predisposition and capacity of governing themselves and the conviction that 
the aims of the governmental programme are right and proper” (Cooper & Rosin, 2014, p 
392 citing Miller & Rose, 1990, p 18). Yet, the social, political, and institutional 
conditions that these ‘light touch’ programmes rely on are unlikely to exist in many 
settings (Hanemann, 2010). Neoliberal governmentality assumes that the world that is 
being designed is already created (Lemke, 2002). It is thus paramount to examine the 
specific knowledges, institutional contexts, and technologies within specific emissions 
trading programmes that encourage a preferred environmental or farming subject.  
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3.3.1: Farmers as Environmental Subjects: More than ‘Homo 
Economicus’ 
Much of the literature focusing on farmers’ participation in conservation or 
environmentally oriented programmes suggests that Western farmers residing in 
developed countries are perfectly rational economic actors who will be motivated to 
participate in a programme given the correct incentive (Hunt, et al., 2013; Ribaudo et al., 
2010). Neoliberal environmentality assumes that if we create programmes aimed to 
motivate the ideal neoliberal subject of ‘homo economicus’ to act in environmentally 
friendly ways, our policy programmes will be successful in achieving positive 
environmental change. Environmental subjects, such as farmers, however, may not 
always act in ways that are expected.  
Individuals as idealised within a neoliberal governmentality are entrepreneurial, 
innovative, and able to understand and interpret the logics of the market structure to best 
fit their personal financial interest. Foucault picks up John Stuart Mill’s term and 
describes this individual as homo economicus (Mill, 1994). The structures surrounding an 
individual’s behaviour as well as the individual’s willingness or ability to fulfil it, is 
highly contextual and situated. Thus, there is no one definition of who homo economicus 
is.  The rationality underlying homo economicus shifts depending on when and how it is 
mobilized.  
Characterizing a farmer as a disembodied economic thinker who is inherently 
disengaged with conservation programmes is fraught with mischaracterisation. For 
example, Greiner & Gregg (2011) found that farmers who were more willing to take risks, 
especially financial ones, were also more likely to participate in conservation practices. 
Assuming that farmers who are not completely motivated by profit-driven thinking are 
thus more likely to participate in conservation programmes can also be flawed. For 
example, farmers holding a high ethic of preservation may distrust outside intervention 
into their lives and thus government conservation programmes (Shoreman & Haenn, 
2009). Given these seemingly conflicting motivations for participating in a given 
environmental governance programme, it becomes clear that a moral responsibilisation 
call for action may not be the same as farmer responsibilisation.   
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When discussing why farmers may not feel able or willing to participate in 
specific conservation programmes in a north eastern area of Australia, Greiner & Gregg 
(2011) discussed four themes emerging from their survey data. First, farmers were 
concerned that conservation practices would not be practical or necessary and thus impact 
productivity and profitability on the farm. Secondly, farmers felt constrained to adopt 
conservation practices due to the time, money, or labour that would be required. Third, 
due to uncertainty over the tenure or management of the land, farmers were hesitant to 
make permanent conservation decisions. Lastly, farmers felt that without industry support, 
best practice guidelines, or assurance that others within the industry would not take 
advantage of other’s achievements (free-riding) the intended conservation outcomes 
would be jeopardized. This evidence suggests that even if one understands a given 
farmer’s identity, beliefs or motivations for farming, it may not be enough to just describe 
their resistance to a given environmental governance programme or institution.  
There is evidence that programmes which appeal solely to individual farmers’ 
economic interests may fail due to their ignorance of altruistic or common-good 
motivations for farming, farmers’ care-based ethic for their familial or personal well-
being as well as conservation or land stewardship reasons for farmers’ action (Bowles, 
2008; Brodt, Klonsky, & Tourte, 2006; Fairweather & Keating, 1994; Farmer-Bowers & 
Lane, 2009; Greiner & Gregg, 2011; Maybery, Crase, & Gullifer, 2005). Further, 
characterizing farmers as only being willing to participate in a programme if they are 
given a monetary incentive, may increase their desire for intensive agricultural 
production which tends to increase environmental degradation (Chouinard, Paterson, 
Wandschneider, & Ohler, 2008; McGuire et al., 2013). 
3.3.2: Acknowledging the ‘Environmental’ Problem  
	  
To engage with a given programme, especially an ecosystem service market, a 
farmer must accept that one’s on-farm actions do affect ecological systems (Mariola, 
2011; McGuire, Morton, & Cast, 2013). Farmers can play a large role as individuals and 
constituent groups in pollution abatement strategies designed to govern their business 
practices and thus behaviour (Shortle & Dunn, 1986). However, even if farmers 
recognize the need to reduce the negative impacts of their farming practices (Arbuckle, 
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Valdivia, Raedeke, Green & Rikoon, 2009; Boonstra, Ahnström, Hellgren, 2011; Pfeffer 
and Wagenet, 2011), some farmers may still feel uncertain about the specific 
environmental problem itself (Popp, Rodriguez, Gbur, & Pennington, 2007). Farmers 
may question the science or blame others rather than accept that their own actions could 
have an impact (McGuire, Morton, & Cast, 2013; Hughey, Kerr, & Cullen, 2010). This 
may be due to farmer’s relative notion of pollution that is “informed less by an 
understanding of its consequences and more by an understanding of the context in which 
it arises” (Lowe & Ward, 1997, p 267).  The ‘accidental’ nature of their pollution, as well 
as the uncertainty when measuring non-point source pollution, allows for individuals to 
question the problem even before a solution is created.  
Farmer uncertainty with regards to a programme’s expectations or potential 
consequences may also discourage behaviour change or participation (Rosin, 2008). This 
uncertainty can relate to the economic impacts and regulatory uncertainty of a given 
programme as well as whether their participation in one programme may lead to future 
programmes that are even more restrictive (McGuire et al., 2013; Cooper & Rosin, 2014). 
Yet, to this point, a distinction has not been made between the problem of 
pollution occurring within agricultural settings and the potential problem of farmers 
being identified as polluters. If farmers are assumed to be the cause of a certain form of 
environmental degradation, being identified as a "polluter" may instigate a chain reaction 
in which farmers question good farming practices (McGuire et al., 2013) and thus what it 
means to be a good farmer (Burton, 2004a). Given New Zealand farmers’ existing 
subjectivities, this new label poses a threat not only to their business but also their 
identity. This may result in farmer pushback or resistance (Rosin, 2013; Cooper & Rosin, 
2014).  This literature is discussed further in Section 5 of this chapter and results 
discussing these issues within the Lake Taupō catchment presented in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis.  
Within New Zealand, one hope is to implement enforceable quantitative limits of 
nitrogen through modelling tools. These are used to reduce ambiguity and uncertainty 
within water quality management. However, there are still major challenges in 
connecting individual farm action, to a catchment wide problem (Duncan, 2014). Actions 
mitigating on-farm contributions to catchment-wide problems are embedded within 
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national and regional forms of governance. The policy programme implemented within 
the Lake Taupō catchment was the first in the nation to formally limit non-point source 
pollution from agricultural sources using the country’s environmental governance regime. 
The policy tool chosen is embedded within a neoliberal environmentality and given that 
Aotearoa New Zealand is a country known for the broad range and extent to which 
neoliberal governance has been applied (Larner, 2000) it is important to understand the 
nuance of both the country and the new governance forms that emerged in the 1980s.  
3.4 The NZ Experiment and Management of 
Inconvenient Truths 
	  
The nature of Aotearoa New Zealand’s internal economic and social institutions 
changed rapidly during the late 1980s and 1990s (Boston, Dalziel, & John, 1999). The 
reforms were more extreme and faster in comparison to other western parliamentary 
democracies such as Australia and Britain (Nagel, 1998). Reforms were oriented towards 
the deregulation of financial markets and the expansion of external commodities markets 
(Humpage, 2011, Ramia & Wailes, 2006; Vis, 2007). As a result of both the speed and 
scale of reforms, the country has been called the ‘Neoliberal Experiment’ (Kelsey, 1995).	  
Due to its colonial history, Aotearoa New Zealand has always been an “outward 
looking nation” that encourages political and economic ties with multiple nations and 
peoples (Nobbs, 2014, p 198). New Zealand is part of the British Commonwealth, and 
gains much of its economic security from export markets mostly for agricultural goods. 
When forms of neoliberal governance were suggested as potential solutions to the 
financial crises the country was facing in the early 1980s, the fourth Labour government 
(in power between 1984 and 1990) was instrumental in initiating early neoliberal reforms 
including deregulation, liberalization, and privatization of institutions associated with 
free market neoliberalism.  The National government (in power between 1990 and 1999), 
however, applied social and economic reforms more consistently associated with the term 
neoliberalism (Humpage, 2011).  
Reforms focused on more than just delivering better economic outcomes for the 
country. For some reformers, the goal was to begin a cultural revolution and transform 
the hearts and minds of citizens away from the egalitarian and communitarian values 
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associated with New Zealand welfare state history (Boston and Eichbaum, 2014, p 374). 
In this respect, the reformers seemed to have been successful; arguably heterodox voices 
were effectively silenced and neoliberal ideals have become largely uncontested within 
the country (Boston & Eichbaum, 2014, p 374). Although official reforms were aimed at 
opening the borders to trade, deregulating the financial sector, and reducing the role of 
the state, the actions taken transformed not just New Zealand institutions but also subject 
positions and ideals of citizenship (Larner, 2000).  
The neoliberal reforms of the 1980s also affected sectors not traditionally 
associated with the ‘economy’.  The country’s planning, natural resource and 
environmental management structures were also transformed. Created in 1991, the 
Resource Management Act (RMA) was initially highlighted the world over for its focus 
on the importance of sustainable development principles. The main objective of the RMA 
is to balance the socio-economic needs of society with the buffering capacity of the 
environment (Resource Management Act, 1991). It is guided by the aims of ‘sustainable 
management’ (Fisher & Russel, 2011). Achieving these lofty aims through resource 
consenting processes has been a challenge as demonstrated by the range and frequency 
the legislation has been amended since 1991. The RMA created a single framework for 
planning and resource management which was previously fragmented. Nevertheless, 
Aotearoa New Zealand is still left with a number of serious water related challenges 
(Fisher & Russell, 2011). To understand why for some it is a great example of 
environmental planning and management, and for others a short-sighted mandate, we 
must understand the RMA’s constituent ideologies.  
3.4.1 The Resource Management Act (1991): Contradictions 
	  
The RMA includes two underlying, and potentially competing, ideologies: 
environmental equity and market liberalism (Memon, 2002). On the one hand, the RMA 
is novel for its specific focus on the sustainable management of resources. It allows for 
environmental, economic, and social concerns to be weighted “equally” in decision-
making processes. Under the RMA, a high value is placed on the incorporation of an 
environmental ethic, and thus sense of moral responsibility, when informing how 
interactions with environmental systems are regulated (Memon, 2002).  
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The RMA is an effects-based regime where any activity is permissible so long as 
its effects are not more than minor. The assessment of any effects is limited to mitigating, 
remedying, or avoiding detrimental effects on the environment. It may be challenging, 
however, to accommodate the cumulative effect of an many separate actions. This 
approach is characteristic of a minimalist approach to environmental planning in line with 
market liberalisation and neoliberal paradigms (Memon, 2002, Memon, Kirk, & Selsky, 
2011). The New Zealand Treasurer at the time of the RMA’s finalisation, Simon Upton, 
outlined how market liberalisation suggests “that public decisions involving common 
property resources and the common good do not involve value judgments, and that 
society should accept efficiency outcomes as necessarily ‘fair’” (Nobbs, 2014, p 193). In 
this view, efficiency, as decided by the free market, is the key determinant of moral 
judgment regarding common resources as opposed to individual or community values. 
Even if the market liberalisation agenda articulated in the RMA suggests that non-
efficiency values do not matter, some components of the RMA processes ensure public 
consultation. There is a recognized unevenness in this process where the most powerful 
voices in social or governance systems are usually given the greatest weight in the 
decision making process (Thomas, 2014). Similarly, Memon et al., (2011) suggest there 
is a:  
convenient foundation for production based groups to further their interests while 
implementing only incremental changes which are insufficient to address the scale of 
complex, second generation, environmental problems such as agricultural non-point 
source water pollution (p 534).  
 
This suggests that the problem of diffuse water pollution from agricultural sources may 
not be able to be sufficiently addressed under the existing structure of the RMA (Duncan, 
2014). New Zealand is not alone in this challenge. Many other countries, including the 
United States, struggle to manage diffuse agricultural pollution through production-based 
incremental changes (Carpenter et al, 1998).21  
Before the implementation of the Lake Taupō cap and trade programme, the 
management of freshwater in New Zealand was left to individuals or industry groups. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 More recently, the United States has used the ‘Total Maximum Daily Load’ classification under the 
Clean Water Act to manage the cumulative impacts of diffuse pollutants going into the Chesapeake Bay 
watershed from agricultural production. See www.epa.gov/tmdl and www.epa.gov/chesapeake-bay-tmdl/ 
for more information.  
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This may be due to the contradictory nature of the RMA that includes an environmental 
ethic and market liberalisation under the same regulatory framework. It may also partially 
be due to the large economic and cultural presence of the agricultural sector in New 
Zealand.  
3.4.2: The State and Agriculture’s Inconvenient truths: 
Freshwater and Agricultural Extension 
	  
New Zealand as a ‘settler state’ has relied on agricultural production for most of 
its history. Starting in the 2000s, however, the country has worked to partially transform 
its economy to focus on the ‘clean and green’. The tourism industry dominates this image 
at present but certain scholars have suggested that agriculture can also take advantage 
(Saunders, Geunther, & Driver, 2010). Yet to do so would mean a shift in the role of the 
state from production-oriented management to ‘environmentally friendly’ support. For 
environmentally friendly action, a major impediment to this adjustment is the 
inconvenient truth of agricultural pollution.  
It can be a challenge to ‘save the world’ while ‘feeding the world’ at the same 
time. The management of water pollution from agricultural sources may also be thwarted 
by the very nature of farming and/or farmer subjectivities. To understand why this may 
be the case, one must understand the previous management of freshwater pollution within 
agricultural landscapes as well as existing farmer subjectivities.  
 
Freshwater Management in New Zealand 
	  
Within New Zealand, under the guidance of the Local Government Act 2002 and 
the Resource Management Act 1991, regional councils are given the responsibility for 
freshwater allocation and management (Cullen, Hughey, & Kerr, 2006). Councils manage 
freshwater quality and quantity within catchments. Using regional policy statements and 
regional plans, water quality and quantity guidelines are provided (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2014). This can include rules for water use, take, or discharge allowances. 
It is through resource consents or discharge permits governed by rules within regional 
plans that diffuse discharges into waterways are managed (Cullen, Hughey, & Kerr, 
2006). This means that a regional plan can require landowners to apply for a consent, or 
Chapter 3: Literature Review    
 53 
discharge permit, depending on the Council’s calculations regarding production level, 
location, or other influential criteria.  
The management of freshwater within the country has evolved over time and is 
characterized by both government and industry-led initiatives. During the 2000s, there 
was increasing pressure from social organizations and the public regarding agricultural 
impacts on freshwater systems, and specifically the dairy industry. In 2002 when the Fish 
and Game Council (now Fish and Game New Zealand) 22 launched their “dirty dairying” 
campaign to combat the impact of dairy effluent on recreational water users, there was 
also concern about the potential impact on the country’s ‘clean and green’ image that was 
claimed to underwrite a value creation in both tourism and international commodities 
markets. In response, Fonterra23 created a “clean streams accord” in partnership with the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (now the Ministry for Primary Industries) and the 
Ministry for the Environment which encouraged producers to voluntarily reduce their 
ecological footprint through riparian planting and fencing stock from waterways (Rosin, 
2013). Central or regional government encouraged these forms of governance but 
industry representatives or farmers themselves did much of the on-the-ground work. It is 
unclear how effective this programme has been at actually reducing dairying’s ecological 
impact (Wilcock et al. 2006; Wilcock et al, 2007).   
The National Policy Statement on Freshwater was initially released in 2011 but 
given real weight in 2014 (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 2015). The 
Land and Water Forum, which is a partnership between central government, iwi, NGOs, 
and business interests, recommended action and a structure for the national policy 
statement. As the first national effort to manage non-point source water pollution, some 
have concerns about the ‘bottom line’ water quality standards put in place (Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment, 2015). In all, the National Policy Statement requires 
regional councils to plan for freshwater pollution reduction starting in 2020.  
The Lake Taupō programme (Regional Plan Variation 5) was designed 
simultaneously with some of these formal regimes. As noted in Chapter 1, in 2008, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 “Fish & Game New Zealand manages, maintains and enhances sports fish and game birds and their 
habitats in the best long-term interests of present and future generations of anglers and hunters” and is 
supported through purchases of fishing licences (Fish & Game New Zealand, 2016).  
23	  A farmer owned cooperative for dairy producers. See Stock et al, (2014) for an analysis of their position 
within a liberalized market structure and environmental protection.	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became the first regulatory programme implemented to manage non-point source 
pollution from agricultural production within the country. Under the programme, farmers 
were required to apply for resource consents if they had a certain number of livestock or 
level of production. The consent on a land title gives permission for a certain amount of 
nitrogen to be discharged from the property. Variation 5 managed the effects of non-point 
source pollution, not only of emerging land-uses but also of already existing farming 
systems as well. Partially because it was the first programme to do this, it was challenged 
under the legal framework of the Resource Management Act (1991) in the Environment 
Court.24 This process took three years and set a precedent (regarding the use of permitting 
or a consenting regime among other things) for other regional councils. The final rule 
under the Regional Plan, Variation 5, was released in 2011.  
To understand why it was so novel for the Waikato Regional Council to 
implement a water quality management strategy for Lake Taupō, we not only need to 
know the environmental management approach within the country, but also the trajectory 
of state involvement in agricultural production.  Within New Zealand, agricultural 
extension has moved from state-led to market driven. Agricultural extension is defined as 
the education and empowerment of farmers to adopt ‘best-practice’ associated with the 
most recent technological innovations (Vanclay & Lawrence, 1994; Chapman & Tripp, 
2003). In the 1950s, government funded scientific agencies created disease control 
systems and provided technology to increase production on farms  (Haggerty et al., 2009). 
During this time, if there were limits to farmers’ actions, it was in the interests of the 
productivity of the industry or farmer’s business. State action that limited production was 
done with the understanding that limitation, in the present, would lead to increased profits 
or security in the future.  
The support of the state in the agricultural sector changed dramatically, however, 
in the 1980s in line with the wider neoliberal reforms discussed previously. This began in 
1984 with the removal of agricultural subsidies, market liberalization of agricultural 
commodities, and privatization of state extension services among other things (Campbell 
& Lawrence, 2003). The reforms resulted in a worsening of the agricultural crisis in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  The Environment Court is a judicial body which hears claims regarding the RMA and usually hears 
“appeals about the contents of regional and district plans and appeals arising out of applications for 
resource consents” (New Zealand Ministry of Justice, n.d.). 
Chapter 3: Literature Review    
 55 
country between 1985 and 1989 (Rosin & Campbell 2012; Campbell & Lawrence, 2003). 
Occurring at the same time as other neoliberal reforms, the removal of agricultural 
subsidies was one of the most poignant and controversial actions. As Morris (2009) puts 
it: “if the historical extent of government support for agriculture signalled farmer’s iconic 
status, the removal of that support signalled its loss” (p 106). This change in political 
economy had the potential to expose contradictions in farmer subjectivities (Haggerty et 
al., 2009).  
As a result of this change, many farmers went out of business and those that 
remained were considered to be heartier and better able to deal with the flux of the 
market (Rosin, 2008). Once formal subsidies were removed, the New Zealand 
government lessened other forms of support for farmers. Agricultural information was no 
longer provided by the state and no longer open and available to all. Instead, it was 
undertaken as a result of industry demands rather than spurred by a technological push 
and then commodified, packaged, and marketed to individual farmers (Rivera, 2000; 
Valentine , Hurley, Reid, & Allen, 2007). Farmer support now came mainly from 
commodity sector groups such as New Zealand Beef and Lamb and Dairy NZ. Support 
for increasing productivity may not come from state-led initiatives anymore, but a heavy 
focus on a growth model of production is still present (Rosin, 2013).  
Social concern increased in the late 1990s when evidence of declining ecosystem 
health as a result of agricultural production came to light. As a result, the mode of 
agricultural extension, and potentially production, has been adjusted. Still maintaining a 
focus on the adoption of technological innovation to increase productivity, extension 
programmes began to provide advice on the impact of agriculture on the natural world. 
The style of state intervention shifted from a focus on productivity behind the farm gate 
to managing the impacts outside of the gates (Valentine et al., 2007). This adjustment 
was first put into regulatory action in the Lake Taupō catchment where the regional 
council limited production for the common good rather than for a business’s good.  
Voluntary measures of managing diffuse pollution such as industry standards and 
audit schemes grew during this time (Rosin, 2008; Campbell, Rosin, Hunt, & Fairweather, 
2012; Hunt et al., 2013). This was due in part to a distrust of regulatory instruments to 
achieve a desired outcome and/or a perception of them as being unfair or outright 
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inappropriate (Valentine et al., 2007). Even if action to reduce pollution could be taken, 
many of the approaches were ‘hands-off’ and delegated “environmental management to 
regional councils who, in turn, passed much of the responsibility to land managers” 
(Valentine et al., 2007, p 313). This responsibilisation of the individual is embedded 
within a neoliberal environmentality (Fletcher, 2010).  
3.4.3: New Zealand Farmer Contestation of Markets for 
Ecosystem Services  
 
The MBI in Taupō is not the only one implemented within the country. An 
emissions trading scheme tried to include agricultural GHG emissions, and thus farmer 
actions, in a cap and trade programme managing carbon. Evidence of farmers’ 
involvement in this programme suggests that the market ideologies employed may not be 
enough to garner farmers’ participation. Due to farmer’s familiarity with other 
commodity markets like those for cattle, sheep, or crops one may assume that they prefer 
a commodity market for pollutants.  However, evidence from farmer’s views towards 
another market for an ecosystem service occurring within New Zealand suggests 
otherwise. When Cooper and Rosin (2014) interviewed farmers regarding their attitudes 
towards the country’s Emissions Trading Scheme, “the alignment of farmer subjectivities 
and markets did not extend to a market for emission” (p. 396) even though farmers’ 
prioritized market rule as an organizing principle.  
	   The misalignment between farmers existing subjectivities and the potential 
subjectivities required to take ‘environmental’ action on farms highlights a need to dive 
deeper into interpretations of farmer subjectivities in place-based situations. The potential 
need to adjust farmer behaviour in the Lake Taupō catchment required that farmers 
participate in this market based agri-environmental governance scheme and that their 
subjectivities would be pivotal in its success.  
3.5 The Importance of Subjectivities: the ‘Good 
Farmer’ in New Zealand 
	  
Following understandings of the subject in post-structuralism, farmer 
subjectivities are considered embedded, varied, place-based, situated, contextual, 
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multiple, and connected with agro-ecologies (Galt 2013; Haggerty, 2007; Haggerty et al., 
2009; Hunt et al., 2013; Morris, 2009; Gibson-Graham, 2006; Larner, 2011). As a result, 
legal structures and politics are some of the building blocks, rather than external factors 
to, farmer subjectivities (Morris, 2009). Simply put, Galt (2013) concludes that 
subjectivities, especially farmer subjectivities, can be defined as the complex ways that 
subjects are interpolated by power and capable of it.  
Investigations of farmer subjectivities have blossomed in the last decades and 
provide a lens to understand how farmers’ beliefs may shape their behaviour (Burton 
2004a; Burton 2004b; Burton & Wilson, 2006). Haggerty et al., (2009) suggest that 
“changes in farming practices come about not only through market and ecological signals, 
but through what we might think of as subjectivity signals, via the construction of notions 
of good farming in particular fields” (Haggerty et al., 2009, p 776). This construction is 
informed not only by farmer’s practices but also the structural systems and stories which 
inform them.  
Political economies and farmers’ beliefs work together to create farmer 
subjectivities and by understanding both we may be able to understand what policy 
programmes potentially result in behaviour change (Haggerty et al., 2009). For example, 
an altered relationship between the state and the farmer can instigate a reordering of 
farmer subjectivities (Morris, 2009). Additionally, a modification of farmers’ relation 
with the land can result in alterations of identity (Morris, 2009). An understanding of 
both the situated political and economic context of a policy programme and existing 
farmer subjectivities may lead to better policy prescriptions and outcomes.  
Within New Zealand, there have been a number of studies documenting farmer 
subjectivities and their potential relationship to environmental policy (Rosin, 2013; Hunt 
et al 2013, Campbell et al 2012, Morris, 2009, Haggerty et al 2009). Specifically, 
research has sought to understand farmers’ uptake of environmentally friendly or 
sustainable practices and the construction of the ‘good farmer’. This research seeks to 
directly build on this body of work.  
3.5.1 The Productivist ‘Good Farmer’ 
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Burton’s (2004a) analysis of farmers in the UK is associated with a rising interest 
internationally in farmer subjectivities. His work encouraged researchers in rural 
sociology and agricultural extension to move from looking at farmer attitudes to 
understanding the discourses, instigators, and potentially reinforcing practices which 
inform understandings of ‘good farming’. At the core of the ‘good farmer’ notion used by 
Burton (2004a, 2004b) is Bourdieu’s (1998) theory of identity. Bourdieu‘s concept of 
identity is centralized and defined as a “two way relationship between objective 
structures (those of social fields) and incorporate structures (those of the habitus)” 
(Bourdieu’s, 1998, p vii). Burton (2004b) used Bourdieu’s work to interpret how 
‘language, meaning representation, identity, and difference’ create farmer identities (p 
360).  
This body of research suggests that if we understand the discourses surrounding 
what it means to be a ‘good farmer’ and how farmers themselves come to see themselves 
in this light, we may we may be able to identity farmer’s future behaviour. In a way, we 
might possibly better predict farmer behaviour by understanding “why farmers do what 
they do.” (Hunt et al., 2013, p35). Although this work uses a slightly different 
conceptualization of identity and subjectivity as compared to Foucault’s work on the 
matter, the insights provided by this literature are useful for an environmentality 
approach in an agricultural setting (Cooper & Rosin, 2014). 
Burton (2004a) found that the farmers’ identities were correlated with the 
‘productivist’ model of farming that they followed. A ’productivist’ model aims to 
increase food production through the application of intensive farming practices with help 
from biochemical inputs and state support primarily based on improved output and 
productivity (Wilson, 2001; Lowe, Murdoch, Marsden, Munton & Flynn, 1993). In this 
system, the greater the production, the greater the financial reward for farmers. The 
model is tied not only to farming practice but farmer identities as well (Burton, 2004a). 
Farmer actions and identities reinforce each other so that “the actions of farmers are 
actively reproducing the productivist ideology in a manner that facilitates their 
engagement with the broader structures of the food system” (Rosin, 2013, p 52). Farmer 
identities and practices are in a positive feedback loop.  
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Any change in the model of production may encounter farmer resistance since 
“anticipated loss of identity or social/cultural rewards traditionally conferred through 
existing commercial agricultural behaviour” can also be challenging (Burton, 2004a, p 
196). A model of production may change due to an adjustment in the commodity grown 
for market, the type of farming practice chosen (e.g. organic vs. conventional), or even a 
limit on what form of production is allowed due to legal limits. The ideals of ‘good 
farming’ may not necessarily be associated with the kind of agricultural production that 
they practice however. For example, a person’s farm can be labelled as ‘organic,’ but the 
individual may not fulfil the subjectivities associated with the term (Campbell et al., 
2012). An adjustment in the kind of production may not necessarily mean that an 
individual’s subject position is less ‘productivist’. 
Burton & Wilson (2006) reapplied the concept of the ‘good farmer’ in a social 
psychology framing and found that both an agricultural producer and agribusiness 
individual can be considered ‘productivist’. On the one hand, an agricultural producer is 
defined as a ‘conservative productivist farmer who maintains cultural notions of 
‘stewardship.’ ‘Stewardship’ refers to an idea that ‘farming nurtures the land’ (Burton, 
2004a, p 210). In other words, an agricultural producer is a farmer who is ‘productive’ 
but strives to do so based on the sustainability of the land. On the other hand, an 
agribusiness person is a ‘farmer who concentrates agricultural production to the extent 
that the profit motive dominates and stewardship concerns are lessened (Hunt et al., 2013, 
p35 citing Burton & Wilson, 2006, p101). Within New Zealand, dairy farmers tend to be 
characterized as agribusiness people while sheep and beef farmers tend to be 
characterized as agricultural producers (Rosin, 2013).  
A farmer’s focus on productive roles can come to “symbolize, both to farmer and 
the country, the notion of good farming practices that enables farmers to claim a high 
social position as caretakers of the nation’s food supply” (Burton, 2004a, p 195).  This 
can result in farmers maintaining a powerful position within a country’s culture or 
identity (Morris, 2009). As a result, ‘productivist’ good farmer identities can be 
influential in psychological, policy, and pastoral fields. 
The idea of the ‘good farmer’ as being solely productivist is contested in wider 
public settings. This is partially because productivism can place the environment at 
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greater risk (Burton 2004a, Burton & Wilson 2006). A plea from other groups for farmers 
to reduce agricultural impacts on the environment may also be understood as a challenge 
for them to change their productivist identity. Many agri-environmental schemes, 
especially within New Zealand, thus pose a challenge not only to farming systems but 
also to farmer autonomy and identity (Stock & Peoples, 2012, Stock, Forney, Emery, & 
Wittman, 2014; Rosin, 2013).  
3.5.2 Farmer Subjectivities in New Zealand 
	  
Rosin (2013) suggests that along with changing political economies of the country, 
the utopian productivist ideals of farmers have also shifted throughout the 20th century in 
New Zealand. This was due to changing ties with New Zealand’s colonial motherland 
and the removal of agricultural subsidies (Le Heron, 2003). At present, the ideals are 
settled on a union between technological efficiency and market distribution as a utopian 
vision to ‘feed the world’ (Rosin, 2013). This value on the high quantity of production is 
deeply underpinned within social, cultural, and financial capitals of the country and the 
identities of its farmers (Rosin, 2013).  
These transitions in farmer subjectivities can be described as farmers identifying 
as ‘the backbone’, ‘productivist’, ‘neoliberal’, ‘market-audit centred’, ‘stewards’, and 
‘resistant’.	  	  Each of these subjectivities is constituent, contextual, and co-mingled. 
Farmers within the nation have been confronted with environmental challenges as a result 
of demands for high production. These challenges have the potential to adjust 
subjectivities (Rosin, 2013). 
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Figure 2: Farmer Subjectivities in New Zealand 
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For many New Zealanders, their national identity is oriented towards the rural 
landscape (Bell, 1996; Sturm, 1998; Dominy 2001; Jutel, 2004). As a result, a love for 
farmers and farming is present within the country dating back to the pioneering days 
(McAloon, 2002). This is because of a dominant discourse which suggests that “helping’ 
agriculture was to be ‘helping’ the nation.” (Haggerty et al., 2009, p 35). Farmers have 
been called the ‘backbone of the country’ due to their large role in colonizing the country, 
prominence in its economic growth, as well as presence on the high-country jagged 
mountainous landscapes of the South Island. This subjectivity has influenced not only 
what it means to be a good farmer in the country, but also what it means to be a ‘good 
man’ (Campbell et al., 2006).  
Although the ‘backbone’ discourse still rings true under a ‘productivist’ 
subjectivity, the removal of subsidies in the 1980s hurt the agricultural industry and 
farmers. When interviewing farmers in the 2000s, Hunt et al., (2013) concluded that 
“while it was apparent that status based on the importance of farming was still very 
prevalent among farmers themselves, some were mourning its passing and experiencing a 
loss of identity” (p 39). This mourning for identity requires an empathetic attitude when 




 Scholars building off the work of Burton (2004) to inform research in New 
Zealand have concluded that New Zealand farmer subjectivities are also centred around a 
productivist identity (Rosin, 2008; Haggerty et al., 2009; Campbell et al., 2012)25. Much 
of the work concluded that a difference between farmers in distinctive sectors depends on 
subjectivities, audit schemes, industry culture, and time commitments (Campbell et al., 
2012). In reviewing the previous research on farmer subjectivities, however, Hunt et al., 
(2013) suggest that as a new dimension of neoliberalism, farmers consider farming as a 
business rather than a lifestyle, which potentially makes them ‘neoliberal’. This novel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Much of this work occurred at the Centre for Sustainability (CSAFE) at the University of Otago as part 
of a larger research program on Agricultural Research Group on Sustainability (ARGOS). Funding for this 
project lasted between 2003 and 2012. 
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‘neoliberal’ farmer subjectivity results in farmers identifying as business people rather 
than agricultural stewards.  
 However, characterizing farmer subjectivities in New Zealand as ‘neoliberal’ has 
its challenges as the relationship between them is complex. Neoliberal farmer 
subjectivities may result in greater environmental risk (Burton, 2004a), yet scholars in 
New Zealand have also found the opposite. Within New Zealand, a rise in the neoliberal 
identity has been found to increase the prevalence of innovation, environmental 
responsibility, and financial success of farm practices (Hunt et al., 2013). The 
environmental responsibility tends to be as a result an increase in efficiency however 
(Hunt et al., 2013). In essence, environmental responsibility is a consequence of 
efficiency gains rather than a concerted effort towards environmental protection or 
benefit. Additionally, the model of neoliberal agricultural business management may not 
ring true for New Zealand farmers. This is because the New Zealand farmer model of 
production (especially in the sheep and beef sectors) is usually unable to make a profit 
year on year (Hunt et al., 2013). In all, farmer subjectivities may be ‘neoliberal’ in New 
Zealand but the associated environmental risk or viable profit oriented business models 
may not automatically be present.  
 The move towards neoliberal farmer subjectivities is constituted by the political 
economy of the country, which includes state involvement. In essence, “New Zealand 
governments have acted as a mediator to make the unthinkable thinkable and therefore 
possible” (Hunt et al., 2013 p 40). In other words, governments and governance have the 
ability to profoundly change much of the wider framework around what it means to be a 
‘good farmer.’ The mentality of farming is clearly able to be influenced by actions of the 
state.  
Within New Zealand, notions of a good farmer have changed: it is now acceptable 
to be business oriented and motivated (Hunt et al., 2013). As a result of government 
policies, individuals have come to see ‘themselves more as business people than as 
farmers” (Hunt et al., p 40). This adjustment has serious implications for the ability to 
adjust farmer subjectivities towards more socially-oriented positions; farm business does 
not necessarily care about production’s negative environmental outcomes which 
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increasingly becomes a arena of change and concern in an era of increasingly public and 
policy concern over environmental impacts of farming. 
 
Social Subjectivities: Stewards, Markets, and Land Tenure 
	  
The environmental harms associated with food production within the country 
have been increasingly exposed (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 
2004; 2013). Before the 1990s, farmer practices were only questioned on the basis of 
animal or human welfare, with there also being some investigation of soil erosion in 
certain regions (Rosin, 2013). During the 2000s, some farmers were confronted with a 
potential need to be more adaptive to international ‘green consumers,’ or urban 
‘greenies.’ Associated with this need for change is a potential change in farmer 
subjectivities (Rosin, 2013; Rosin 2008; Morris, 2009). These new socially conscious 
subjectivities partially relate to existing stewardship subjectivities. Stewardship 
subjectivities, as well as others, may help determine farmers’ willingness to practice 
‘sustainable’ actions and participate in programmes like market oriented auditing 
schemes (Haggerty et al., 2009; Rosin, 2008).  
 
Market Audit Oriented 
 Market driven environmental auditing schemes encourage a change in the means 
of production oriented towards the ‘green consumer’ (Barnett, 2008). Most of these 
schemes, however, have focused on attributes that occur outside the farm gate through 
‘light touch’ approaches (Haggerty et al., 2009). This mode of neoliberal governance 
encourages or incentivizes farmers’ participation rather than adopting disciplinary force. 
Although more traditional forms of disciplinary governance like ‘command and control’ 
environmental management may be part of a ‘light touch’ market approach (Fletcher, 
2010), market audit schemes allow consumer demands or industry standards to govern 
farmers’ behaviour rather than coercion by the state.  
Rosin (2008) suggests that these schemes have eventually achieved a high social 
acceptance and level of compliance among farmers involved. This potentially means that 
farmers are moving from a ‘productivist’ subjectivity to a ‘market-audit-oriented’ 
subjectivity (Rosin, 2008). Yet, this does not mean that farmers are potentially oriented 
Chapter 3: Literature Review    
 65 
towards other market-based systems to encourage environmental behaviour such as 
reduction in agricultural greenhouse gas emissions (Rosin, 2013; Cooper & Rosin, 2014). 
This suggests that farmer subjectivities are not only situated in a country context, but are 
also rooted in the political economy and even within a given ‘environmental problem.’ 
 
Resistant  
A highly contentious issue at the time, Morris (2009) investigated farmers’ 
subjectivities in the New Zealand tenure review of the high country of the South Island. 
As part of tenure review, the Department of Conservation (DOC) re-evaluated its system 
of leasing crown land to farmers that grazed on the high country. DOC assessed land they 
would release for either freehold or conservation estate management (Morris, 2009). 
Morris (2009) suggested that as part of this process, high country farmer subjectivities, 
linked to a relationship between the land and its people, were greatly challenged. The 
reimaging of the farmer’s relationship to the state and nation as part of this tenure review 
process required active engagement on behalf of farmers through an interpretation of 
experience and self-formation (Morris, 2009; McNay, 2000). 
When engaging in the tenure review process, farmers employed two discourses: 
stewardship and resistance. First, a stewardship subjectivity, which aligned with the 
state’s goal of conservation, positioned farmers ‘as guardians of the nation’ (Morris, 2009, 
p 106). However, the power of this discourse has lost its influence over time because 
farmers are increasingly:  
 
regarded as an ecological threat to the nation (their gas-emitting cows are contributing to 
global warming, fertilizer run-off is polluting rivers and lakes and so on) or as simply 
businessmen, motivated purely by profits, with discourses about farming as a morally 
superior way of life increasingly ringing untrue (Morris, 2009 p 106).  
 
When faced with a reduction in the power of the stewardship or even ‘backbone’ 
discourse, farmers may adopt an alternative subjectivity revolving around resistance to 
‘green’ ideals. Under the tenure review process, farmers were in opposition with the state 
in regard to the state’s goal of putting farmland into conservation areas. Farmers felt they 
were the best caretakers of the land and thus wished to keep it in production for sheep 
rather than convert it to traditional tussock ecosystems. In addition, they found 
themselves opposed to urban ‘greenies.’ According to Morris (2009) ‘greenies are the 
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traditional enemies of farmers, representing interference from outside and the imposition 
of alien values’ (p 106).26 This misalignment between ‘green’ interests and farmer’s 
interests “represents a radical change from times when farmers were considered to be the 
economic and symbolic backbone of the nation” (Morris 2009, p 106). Today, tensions 
between the neoliberal productivist ‘good farmer’ and the environmental steward who is 
required to curb pollution, remains (Cooper & Rosin, 2014).   
Rosin (2013) investigated how the potential change in production required in an 
Emissions Trading Scheme was contested - partly due to the neoliberalisation of 
agricultural systems - impacted farmer’s resistance to more sustainable production of 
meat, milk, and wool. This sustainable production would occur through the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions since such emissions are associated with global climate change. 
Although this change in production would pull upon ideals of ‘saving the world’, he 
found that farmers were resistant to the programme because it contested a utopian ideal of 
‘feeding the world’ (Rosin, 2013). He suggested that “beyond cultural practices and/or 
subjectivities the actions of farmers are actively reproducing the productivist ideology in 
a manner that facilitates their engagement with the broader structures of the food system” 
(Rosin, 2013, p 52). Thus, a utopian ideal of feeding the world provides a moral 
justification for productivist ideology. If farmers allowed production to be limited due to 
environmental impacts, it would not only mean going against the dominant structures of 
the existing food system but also committing an immoral act (Shamir, 2008). 
Grounding the distinction between existing NZ farmer subjectivities and the 
potentially novel environmental subjectivities within a governmentality framework, 
Cooper & Rosin (2014) focused on New Zealand farmer subjectivities as part of the New 
Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS). Specifically, they investigated the 
programme’s ability to “unsettle the attempt to reconfigure environmental practices 
through market based instruments” (Cooper & Rosin, 2014, p 391). The research showed 
the contradictions between New Zealand pastoral farmers’ existing productivist oriented 
subjectivities and the environmental subjectivities necessary to establish concern and 
action regarding agricultural greenhouse gas emissions (Cooper & Rosin, 2014, p 398). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 One of the “greenie” people the farmers were especially angry with was a 2006 Fulbright Scholar who 
documented farmers taking advantage of their positive position with Crown in order to make personal 
financial gain (Brower, 2006). 
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Although the NZ ETS was justified politically using economic efficiency arguments, it 
was unable to open up new environmental subject positions and, as such, faced resistance 
from farmers.  
In addition to the productivist mindset of farmers, the researchers also identified 
farmers’ priority for the market as an organizing principle, a perspective that pollution 
was inevitable, and farmers’ hesitancy towards fickle changes in regulatory policy 
(Cooper & Rosin, 2014, p 397). However, farmers’ preferences for sustainable actions on 
farm did not align with their desire to take part in the NZ ETS. As such, the application of 
a market based trading mechanism for carbon reveals the contradictions between a 
farmer’s preference for markets, dislike of limits to productivity, and desire for 
environmental stewardship.  
3.6 Conclusions 
	  
The use of market based instruments has increased internationally along with the 
prevalence of neoliberal forms of governance and governmentality. The solution posed to 
address the problem of non-point source water pollution within the Lake Taupō 
catchment is the only like it in the world but the logics underpinning it are already present 
within the country. New Zealand, as the ‘neoliberal experiment’, presents an interesting 
location in which to examine the implementation of, and subjectivities associated with, a 
unique market based instrument (Cooper & Rosin, 2014; Haggerty et al., 2009; Kelsey, 
1995). This policy programme represents a large shift in the way that farmers engaged 
with the land, the ‘state’ and each other which raises questions as to how this process 
took place and what effect, if any, this policy programme has had on farmer subjectivities 
within the catchment. Additionally, it is not clear if farmers are required to change their 
‘environmental’ beliefs, identity, or subjectivities as part of their participation in the 
water quality trading programme. Lastly, given farmers’ prominent role in the policy 
design and their central position as the subjects of the programme, it is important to 
understand their positioning in order to understand the dynamics around, or mobilise 
critique of, water quality trading programmes or other forms of market based instruments 
and wider neoliberal environmentalities. 
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Chapter 4 
A Regime of Practices 
4.0 Introduction 
	  
This chapter will explore the regime of practices within the Lake Taupō solution 
by discussing what was governed (section 4.1), how it was governed (section 4.2), why it 
was governed (section 4.3), and who was/is governed (section 4.4). This chapter focuses 
on the question of ‘how do we govern’ while Chapter 5 focuses on ‘how are we governed’ 
(Dean, 1999). As discussed in Chapter 3.2, the application of this MBI fits within a larger 
shift in environmental governance known as the ‘neoliberalisation’ of nature. In this 
chapter, I draw upon this literature to examine the regime of practices that constitute the 
basis for how this policy tool was designed and implemented within the Lake Taupō 
catchment. I also outline and critique the discourses that informed the solution posed 
within the catchment. I argue that the object of governance, the rationale of governance, 
the actors governing and governed, and the processes of governance are contextual, 
situated, and complicated with neoliberal discourses of governance. 
The research question I answer in this chapter is: how is a new regime of practices 
made to ‘work’ within a water quality trading programme in the Lake Taupō catchment 
of Aotearoa New Zealand? By investigating a specific ‘regime of practices’ we may 
document and question the logic of 1) the fields of visibility, 2) the teleology of 
governance, 3) the technical aspects of governance, and 4) the identities that governance 
creates or acts within (Dean, 1999, p 30-32). Put simply, this means outlining the what, 
how, why, and who of governance.  
Within the Lake Taupō catchment, the community was confronted with the 
problem of lake water quality decline and a question of how to govern the influx of 
nitrogen that was causing this problem. As a result, a problematisation occurred revolving 
around the question of how to best manage non-point source pollution from agricultural 
production within the catchment. Excess nutrients leaching from farmland into Lake 
Taupō needed to be controlled but, given the ecological complexity of diffuse pollution, 
Chapter 4: A Regime of Practices   
 69 
and agriculture’s privileged cultural and economic position within the nation, managing 
agricultural land-use would be a challenge for the Waikato Regional Council (WRC).  
4.1 Objects of governance: What are we governing? 
	  
The first aspect of a ‘regime of practice’ is the domain of governance and 
specifically the object that power that is being exercised over (Dean, 1999, p 30). I argue 
that the object being governed within the Lake Taupō catchment was ‘manageable’ 
nitrogen (N). This N was then translated into ‘credits’ which would then be governed by 
the market. This reflects a shift in WRC’s management of farming activities and a 
preference for the ‘market’ as a governing tool.   
Although there are many sources of naturally occurring N within the catchment, 
only certain sources of nitrogen were deemed ‘manageable’ by the regional council. 
Manageable sources as defined by WRC were ones that were caused by human activities. 
These polluting activities, defined by the council, were septic tank leaks and agricultural 
production (Vant et al., 2008). Human induced sources of N represented only about 40% 
of the total nitrogen entering the lake (Vant et al., 2008). Of this 40%, agricultural 
production from pasture was the source of about 93% of the ‘manageable’ nitrogen 
entering the lake (Environment Court, 2008; Duhon et al., 2015). As stated by one of the 
designers of the programme, “while the water quality objective relates to the effect of 
nitrogen in the lake, it is the amount of N from land use activities that is controlled by 
polices and rules in Variation 5” (Young, 2007, p 7). Of land use activities in pastoral 
farming, non-dairy production accounted for 79% of nutrient inputs and dairy pasture 
accounted for the remaining 12%. Thus, it wasn’t ‘dirty dairying’ that was the largest 
form of agricultural production, nor contributor of nutrient pollution within the catchment. 
Instead, sheep and beef operations had the largest manageable impact on lake water 
quality.  
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Table 2: Breakdown of 2005 land uses in the Taupō catchment 
and summary of pastoral properties  














These calculations of how much N was leaching into the lake and where it was 
coming from were created by modelling and coordinated with field measurements in the 
catchment. As more field measurements were taken, the Council decided that greater 
reductions were needed. This was due to the margin of error between modelling systems 
and measured Nitrogen amounts on farms. In essence, the total amount of N going into 
the lake was higher than originally estimated within the catchment. As a result, the total 
amount of ‘manageable’ N that needed to be reduced in the catchment jumped from 152 
to 170 tonnes in 2011. 
In working to estimate exactly what quantity of manageable N needed to be 
reduced, the regional council scientists were in disagreement. Although the reduction of 
N recommended by scientists went from 20-70%, 20% reduction was their final 
conclusion based on the harm that any higher percentage would pose to the community 
and thus the scheme’s feasibility (Barns & Young, 2012). The nitrogen from agricultural 
production was ‘manageable’ only if there was not a large negative impact on the 
community. 
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The object of this new regime was ‘manageable’ N not just all N. Once 
manageable N was identified as the object of management for the Waikato Regional 
Council to monitor and limit, this was converted to a Nitrogen Discharge Allowance 
(NDA) unit that was given to each landowner. The NDAs would be allocated to a given 
piece of land and could range from 3kg of N per ha to over 40kg of N per ha. The NDAs 
are a form of property right given through the resource consenting regime under the 
RMA and administered by the Waikato Regional Council (Barns & Young, 2013, p 7). 
The total amount of NDAs are limited and then they can be traded as ‘credits’ in a 
‘market’. To prevent further water quality decline the supply of credits provided to 
landowners within the catchment was limited by the council, and then reduced by the 
LTPT. Thus, NDAs became a commodity to be traded in the market: “For the Taupō cap-
and-trade scheme, the commodity is diffuse emissions from agricultural and horticultural 
land in the catchment” (Barns & Young, 2013, p 7). Thus, N was identified as a pollutant 
to be made into a tradable commodity traded as a ‘credit’ (Duhon et al.,, 2015; Mariola, 
2011).   
The NDA regulated by the Waikato Regional Council is “not observable and 
measurable” (Barns & Young, 2013, p. ii). This is accounted for in the programme by 
using livestock units as a proxy for nitrogen emissions (Barns & Young, 2013, p 7). The 
use of this proxy confuses some within the catchment and continues to be a point of 
scientific contention within the community (Interview with Farmer104, March 2015; 
Interview with Other102, March 2015; Interview with Farmer 109, March 2015; 
Interview with Farmer106, March 2015). Some farmers find it strange that their lives are 
being determined around something they can’t see (Interview with Farmer102, March 
2015; Interview with Farmer 107, March 2015; Interview with Farmer 101, March 2015). 
Farmers and regulators agreed that the process of converting an ecological measure of 
water quality into a tradable credit is not straightforward (Yerex, 2009; Barns & Young 
2013; Mariola, 2011). This may be because “environmental services do not behave like 
traditional commodities” (Mariola, 2011, p 237) and water-based services are especially 
uncooperative (Bakker, 2005). The complicated nature of this, did not deter the 
programme from moving forward however.   
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Although the N units were calculated in part by measuring the number of stock  
units on a farm, it was N on farms that was to be limited, not farm production. Even if a 
limitation on N posed a limit to production, the regional council’s actions were not 
directly managing production. However, there is a general correlation between increasing 
the amount of stock on a piece of land and the amount of N being leached from that area. 
The council legislated “a limited degree of protection sufficient to deflect criticism but 
not enough to derail the engine of growth” (Hannigan, 2014, p 34). As part of this, a 
‘common’ resource rhetoric could be deployed as a means of easing tensions and 
soothing the harsh effects of capitalism while fundamentally maintaining existing 
relations of production” (Buck, 2014, p 64). The regional council placed a cap on 
nitrogen, but the market mechanism facilitated commodification of N and allowed the 
WRC to remain isolated from the implication for production limitations and reductions.  
It was the ‘market’ that would encourage farmers’ N reduction, not the council 
per se (Interview with Other104, March 2015; Interview with Other103, March 2015; 
Interview with Other101, March 2015). By focusing on nitrogen and turning it into a 
commodity, the council is governing people by creating and then limiting a new property 
right. This potentially has the effect of masking the processes, people, and politics of 
governance (Kallis et al., 2010) through the application of a ‘market’ system (Polanyi, 
1944). As Hannigan (2014) notes: “by enacting environmental policies and procedures 
that are complex, ambiguous, and open to exploitation by the force of capital production 
and accumulation the state reaffirms commitment to strategies for promoting economic 
development” (p 34). N as a commodity in a market system allows individuals to manage 
their new property right, incentivises them to take advantage of it (See Chapter 5.3) and 
grow their production but only if they can understand the policy and the process.   
The particular problemisation of N as a manageable commodity is central to the 
new regime of practices within the Taupō cap and trade programme. This way of framing 
the governable object has an impact on-farm production and potentially practice (See 
Chapter 5). The dominant paradigm of high production livestock systems however, is not 
directly questioned as a result of this policy programme. Instead, it is nitrogen that is 
managed, rather than the production system within which it sits. 
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4.2 Rationale of governance: Why are we governing? 
	  
The second component of a regime of practices are the forms of rationality 
present in a governance approach. This regime determines how governance is made “to 
be a rational and thoughtful activity” and asks “what moral principles are drawn on (to 
justify certain ends of government)?” (Dean, 1999, p 31). In this section, I discuss why 
water quality was considered a problem in the catchment, why action was taken at the 
time it was, and why a market based policy tool was chosen as the policy solution.  
The connection between agricultural production and nutrient leaching into the lake was 
known since the 1960s. It wasn’t until 1999 however that the regional council felt the 
need to put a solution forward. There were a number of factors that influenced the 
regional council’s decision to take action in 1999 (Barns et al., 2013; Barns & Young, 
2012).  
 To begin, there was statistically significant evidence that the lake’s water clarity 
was in decline and had been over the previous three decades (Vant, Huser, & Peterson, 
2000). This was considered a problem for a number of reasons and Lake Taupo became 
an example for others in the country to follow. According to the policy analysts designing 
the programme: 
Taupō was a special case: a nationally significant lake; a culturally 
valuable lake; a tourist destination; a high level of recent government 
involvement in agricultural development in the catchment; a small 
farming community; a large area of forestry; and a large area of 
undeveloped iwi-owned land. These characteristics contributed to 
widespread community support for change, and to a commitment from 
all levels of government (Barns & Young, 2012, p iii).  
 
Given the Labour government’s launch of ‘100% Pure’ branding campaign in 1999 
(Morgan, Prichard, & Piggott, 2002), it may have been a bit hypocritical if a nationally 
significant lake was not 100% pure. Second, the Taupō Basin is considered to be taonga27 
to Ngāti Tūwharetoa. As a result, Lake Taupō holds high spiritual and physical value for 
its kaitiaki, or guardians. In addition, the Regional and Central governments felt that they 
had to protect the lake, especially since its quality was a point of contention in the recent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  ‘Treasured’ is a rough translation from Te Reo.  
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Treaty of Waitangi settlement(Yerex, 2009). Third, with the high amount of forestry, a 
small farming community, and a large iwi presence in the catchment, the Waikato 
Regional Council felt that they could garner significant community support. As one 
policy analyst suggested in a report written by a farmer in the catchment, if it can’t be 
done in Taupō, then it can’t be done anywhere (Yerex, 2009).  
In addition to the stated rationale by policy analysts, there are a few other pieces 
of history to consider. In the late 1990s, DairyNZ had expressed interest in encouraging 
dairying conversions within the catchment, which the regional council feared would 
increase the potential for nutrient pollution (Yerex, 2009). Also, a report by the Ministry 
for the Environment two years earlier stated a need to address the problem of water 
quality decline throughout the nation (Ministry of the Environment, 1997). Due to these 
initiators, confronting water quality decline in the Lake Taupō catchment would show 
positive leadership for the nation and the world (Hobbs, 2003; Barns and Young, 2013). 
These components suggest why water quality was a problem in the catchment and why 
the WRC wanted to fix it.  
 The regional council felt that they had the imperative to address the problem of 
water quality decline but were confronted with many uncertainties about how best to 
address it. Due to a lacking precedent, the Waikato Regional Council had few resources, 
expertise or case law within the country to build upon (Young, 2009). I argue that a 
market based policy tool fitted legally as well as socially within the country which made 
it the go-to option for the Lake Taupō catchment.    
Market based instruments were considered the ‘buzzword’ at the time (Interview 
with Other101, March 2015; Costanza et al., 1997; Shi, 2007). For the Minister for the 
Environment, Marion Hobbs, marrying “local, regional, and central government, [with] 
Kyoto principles28, [and] setting an N limit [with] an envelope to trade within it, appealed 
as a way forward” in the Taupō catchment (Hobbs, n.d. qted in Yerex, 2009, p 29). The 
market could be used to garner international praise, experiment with a promising policy 
regime, ensure cost efficiency for the regulator, and offer flexibility to polluters.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  In early drafts of a central government cabinet paper (before the Kyoto protocol was signed) an outline 
of the central government’s role within the catchment had “references to climate change with an idea for a 
win-win land use change option- to get political kudos for a combination of carbon sequestration and 
contribution to N removal target for the lake” (Yerex, 2009, p 30).	  
Chapter 4: A Regime of Practices   
 75 
Implementing it fitted within a window of opportunity to manage water quality decline at 
a time when this problem was being recognised across the country.  
A market based trading instrument ‘made sense’ for a number of reasons that are 
tied with the assumptions and rationales behind such instruments. First, proponents of 
these approaches argue that market based instruments are more cost-effective, efficient, 
and flexible than more traditional ‘command and control’ approaches to environmental 
governance (Gómez-Baggethun & Muradian, 2015, p 217). The hope is that by placing a 
price on a pollutant, or other externality, a value for its emission or removal will be 
created. If the pollutant is allowed to be traded, then enterprises with the least cost of 
reduction can sell their units to a bidder who has a higher cost of abatement resulting in 
an overall reduction in cost.  This value can then be incorporated into other forms of 
capital investment effectively changing the cost structures of business transactions. The 
change is due to the pricing of a previously invaluable externality. The pricing a water 
quality places a value on the ‘right to pollute’ and creates a novel property right in place 
(Shortle, 2012). The assumption here is that the creation of a private property right will 
potentially alleviate a common resource problem like non-point source water pollution 
(Hardin, 1968). By giving individuals ownership over a given right or resource the 
assumption is that they now have the incentive to care for and manage their new property 
right. Property rights and their repute under a neoliberal governmentality are thus 
extended into this regulatory market environmental approach (Larner, 2000; Mariola, 
2011; Robertson, 2006).  
Putting this theory into practice was new legal territory for the WRC. The council 
has the authority under the RMA and the Local Government Act (2002) to manage water 
quality. In 1999, however, it was unclear whether the council actually had the authority to 
manage diffuse or non-point sources of pollution (Connor 2009, p 356; MacDonald et al., 
2004, p 5) since the RMA had never been interpreted that way before. If they could 
manage non-point source pollution, the WRC could not charge a ‘polluter-pays’ fee 
without an Act of Parliament (Sharpe, 2002). This meant they could not directly charge 
polluters based on quantity of emissions. Given this legal uncertainty, the council had to 
find a way to use their existing, but untested, authority.  
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Within the Resource Management Act (1991) there is a preference for ‘voluntary’ 
measures as well as ‘economic instruments’ (Drummond, 2006; Sharpe, 2002; Resource 
Management Act, 1991, S. 32). The Minister for the Environment must consider the use 
of ‘economic instruments’ when creating new policy (Sharpe, 2002). These instruments 
sit within the larger framework of sustainable development written into the logic of the 
RMA (see Chapter 3.1). Sustainable development as a form of governance dispels the 
traditional view that market principles are in complete opposition to environmental 
protection; economic growth can occur as long as it is ‘sustainable’ (Hartwick & Peet, 
2003). The use of market or ‘economic’ instruments is a form of light-touch regulation 
but not a lessening of its power (Dyson, 2014). Instead, it is the economy or ‘market’ that 
provides the logic for action, rather than the formal ‘state’ (Mariola, 2011).  
The RMA requires that regional councils conduct an evaluation of the costs and 
benefits when proposing a policy scenario. The application of an economic instrument 
may be a least-cost option since it may decrease compliance and implementation costs 
(Barns & Young, 2013). Although the RMA prefers these tools, it was unclear in the 
early 2000s if regional councils had the authority to implement one (Bullen, Jacobsen, 
Palmer, & Scrimgeour, 2000) given the lack of clarity in the RMA.  If possible, the use of 
an economic instrument would allow the regional council to control the influx of 
Nitrogen in a cost effective manner so that there was an incentive for behaviour change to 
allow some “flexibility in choice over the means to achieve prescribed goals” (Connor et 
al., 2009, p 349). Essentially, the market based policy tool placated some of the 
uncertainties of the situation and promised a lower cost for the council.  
The Waikato Regional Council had the legal ability under the RMA to create a 
novel property right through the design of their regional plan which could grant the use of, 
or build access on, land through resource consents (Guerin, 2003). Given the legal ability 
to do this as well as a preference for the use of ‘economic instruments’ in the RMA, the 
use of a market based instrument to manage the problem of lake water quality decline 
was the preferred option (Barns & Young, 2012). Landowners’ perceived scarcity of 
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nitrogen would drive this market and the price that buyers would be willing to pay would 
determine the demand.29   
Using a market based instrument would allow for production to continue but 
“significantly contribute to shaping the behaviour, technological capacity and location of 
an industry in an environmentally, economically, and socially acceptable way” (Connor 
et al., 2009, p 350). Rather than stopping industry pollution, the MBI could shape where 
and how pollution can occur and how a business can potentially operate.  As part of this 
approach, the regional council “does not have to judge the relative use values of different 
economic production” (Felli, 2015, p 643). The value of farming as a productive land-use 
was not questioned. Instead, the regional council created a novel property right, helped 
place a value on it, and required landowners to manage it within their farming business. It 
was not just the council that supported the use of a trading programme, farmers also 
argued for it (Interview with Other101, March 2015). 
A market based mechanism would allow the WRC to place a regulatory cap on 
nutrient pollution through the RMA consenting process but still offered flexibility for 
landowners to stay under their allocated limit. The “[market] promotes the idea that you 
are not stuck with this forever” since there was flexibility for landowners to buy 
additional credits if they wanted to increase production (Interview with Other103, March 
2015). A well functioning market would be spurred by the Lake Taupō Protection Trust’s 
buying power and the landowners’ desire to grow year on year. Economic growth in the 
catchment would not be limited, but certain farming activities would make more sense 
than others (Interview with Other101, March 2015; Interview with Other102, March 
2015; Interview with Other104, March 2015).  
The benefits of this approach were listed by the Waikato Regional Council policy 
analysts as twofold: “for the council, the attraction of this solution is that it provides 
certainty, regarding limiting the quantity of nitrogen emissions, and achieves the desired 
water quality objective at the least cost” (Barns & Young, 2013, p. ii). Farmers wished to 
maintain: “water quality in the lake, long term viability, and flexibility for their farming 
businesses” (Memorandum of Understanding between Taupō Lake Care and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The Waikato Regional Council placed a trading notice board on their website but it was not used. 
Instead, transactions between buyers occurred ‘over the fence’ (Duhon, 2015). The TLC is presently 
providing a notice in its newsletter of individuals who want to buy, sell, or lease N within the catchment.  
Chapter 4: A Regime of Practices   
 78 
Environment Waikato, 2001, p 1).  A market based instrument allowed farmers “to 
continue to make their own business decisions, provided they stay within the bounds of 
their resource consents” (Barns and Young, 2013, p. ii).  As a result, landowners had a 
“range of land use options, including pastoral farming, horticulture and forestry” to 
choose from (Barns, et al. 2013, p 17). It was their choice to continue farming or change 
land uses. It would be the price of N in the market rather than the Council which would 
greatly influence that choice however.  
While this thesis does not evaluate the ‘success’ of the programme, it is 
interesting to note the infiltration of the market rationality, providing a sense of freedom 
and flexibility, has been quite successful within the catchment. The market mechanism 
was sold to farmers as way to offer them flexibility under a cap but to date few private 
landowners have traded N and continued to live and farm within the catchment 
(Interview with Other103, March 2015). Some people in the catchment contest whose 
idea it was to have a cap and trade programme but contend that it was making the best of 
a bad situation (Interview with Farmer106, March 2015; Interview with Farmer 107, 
March 2015; Interview with Other102, March 2015). The WRC was limiting, not 
reducing N or requiring a reduction in on-farm production. Instead, farmers would be 
encouraged by market incentives to make decisions that fit their business (Interview with 
Other103, March 2015; Interview with Other105, March 2015; Interview with Other101, 
March 2015). The market shifted the discourse away from a top-down command and 
control regulatory technique that victimised farmers to a market based mechanism that 
would offer them agency and opportunity.  
The application of a market tool fits within a neoliberal governmentality and 
privileges ideals of individual choice, flexibility, and market efficiency (Cooper & Rosin, 
2014; Larner, 2000). If it is assumed that all aspects of the natural and social world can 
be incorporated effectively into market structures, then the task at hand is to figure out 
how best to do that. This framing of pollutants or other aspects of ecological systems 
positions markets provides an “overarching institutional framework defining what is 
inside and outside of the system of societal choice and conveys the notion that the 
solution to environmental problems is to be found in the technical domain” (Gómez -
Baggethun & Muradian, 2015, p 222).  
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In 2015, a New Zealand economic and public policy think-tank declared that “it is 
technically feasible to include non-point sources within a cap and trade water quality 
market, that such a market can function and that once property rights are clearly 
established, the additional cost of allowing trading is low” (Kerr et al., 2015, p 1). In 
other words, the market was designed effectively and has achieved its stated goals.  
(Duhon et al., 2015). There are buyers and sellers although this has become less certain 
now that the LTPT has achieved its reduction goals. The programme has been declared a 
‘success’ and a model for others to follow (Kerr et al., 2015) but some within the 
catchment question the faith in markets as policy tools. In particular:   
 
I would think that some regulators thought originally ‘well this is 
the answer to all our prayers and we will make this work and in 
our area.’ So there was a simplistic hope that markets would solve 
a lot of things. That was generally where the developers of markets 
were at the time, and they generally believed that market 
instruments would be a very useful tool… I guess I would say that 
they are a useful tool but they are not the whole solution. They are 
part of a suite of things that will involve regulation, social change, 
farmer practice change, consumer buying pattern change. So don’t 
hold out hope that the market instrument is the whizbang that will 
solve everything. It’s just one tool in a kit” (Interview with 
Farmer1XX30, March 2015). 
 
In summary, the WRC has to address why water quality in the catchment was a 
problem, why they had the authority to do something about it, and why they would use a 
cap and trade programme. The problem was defined as an excess of nitrogen – that 
became the object of governance as noted above. The RMA preferred the use of 
economic instruments and market based instruments were the buzzword at the time. A 
cap and trade programme for diffuse nutrients although untested, came highly 
recommended in numerous economic evaluations and think tanks looking into the Taupō 
case (Memorandum of Understanding between Taupō Lake Care and Environment 
Waikato, 2001, p 1; Connor et al, 2009; Shortle, 2012; Duhon et al., 2015). The N 
entering the lake would be managed through a proper pricing and incentive structure that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Farmer number removed to ensure anonymity.  
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would incorporate N into farmers’ business (Interview with Other103, March 2015). This 
was a solution that would “maintain water quality in the lake through sustainable 
catchment management for future generations and achieve acceptable and workable 
policy for all stakeholders” (Memorandum of Understanding between Taupō Lake Care 
and Environment Waikato, 2001, p 1). This solution was informed by the broader 
discourses of the time that preferred market based instruments as the best tools, and a 
technology that was able to support sustainable development. Given the already ‘hands 
off’ approach in the RMA, preference for the use of an economic instrument, as well as 
the ‘light touch’ agricultural extension within NZ (discussed in Chapter 3.4), a market 
cap and trade system allowed ‘fair’ and ‘efficient’ outcomes.  
4.3 Techniques and technologies: How are we 
governing?  
	  
A third component of an analytics of governance is a focus on the question of 
how we accomplish governance. This regime of practice focuses on the techniques and 
technologies used to make governance possible in practice. It is well accepted that 
making markets for ecosystem services ‘work’ is extremely complex and challenging 
(Shortle, 2012; Connor et al., 2009). For example, “the use of a MBI often calls for the 
development of more sophisticated inputs, monitoring regimes and program outputs” 
(Connor, 2009, p 349). Paying attention to how these programmes are put into practice 
allows us to question their connection with neoliberal practices and discourses (Lewis, 
2009; Larner 2000; Larner, 2003).  
The regime of practice in Lake Taupō deployed several different technologies in 
its implementation. Three are significant here – OVERSEERTM modelling software to 
evaluate how much nitrogen is in the catchment and where it is concentrated, the cap on 
nitrogen, and the Lake Taupō Protection Trust (LTPT). These specific technologies are 
discussed in the following sections. 
4.3.1 Modelling of diffuse N using OVERSEERTM 
	  
Given the diffuse nature of the excess nutrients going into Lake Taupō, it was a 
challenge for the council to first measure the total amount of N going into the lake and 
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then estimate what quantity of N had to be reduced. Since agricultural production 
represented 93% of the ‘manageable’ nitrogen, the task at hand was to change land-use 
by changing on-farm behaviour. Adjusting farmers’ behaviour meant that the council had 
to give landowners enough information so they could monitor their actions accordingly. 
If farmers had the right tools, they could potentially understand the consequences that on-
farm action had on lake water quality. If farmers knew this, they could improve their 
nutrient efficiency and meet their nutrient management goals.  Based on these 
requirements, “farm-scale models or decision support systems/tools [had to be 
developed] to model nutrient flows around the farm systems” (Shepard et al, 2013, p 1). 
OVERSEERTM is a nutrient modelling programme.31 Based on inputs such as 
stock type, number, gender of stock, age of stock, soil type, average rain fall, and climate 
variants by month, users of the programme can estimate the nutrients coming out of a 
given paddock or entire farming system. Although the tool was originally marketed as a 
nutrient input efficiency tool, it was used for the first time in the Taupō catchment as a 
model to assess nutrient outputs (Duncan, 2014; Interview with Farmer112, March 2015). 
At present, the tool is being used by other regional councils to estimate the amount of 
diffuse nutrients in other arable and horticultural landscapes (Williams et al., 2013; 
Interview with Other103, March 2015).  
It is impossible to have an ‘accurate’ measurement of diffuse nutrient flows due to 
the diffuse nature of ecosystem process. To partially accommodate for this, the designers 
of the tool have endeavoured to increase the precision of the tool. Although the tool has 
gone through a number of model variations over time, the margin of error in the 
programme continues to be + or – 30% for OVERSEERTM 5 (Roberts, 2013).  The 
industry and government research institutes who are the designers of the tool maintain 
that “OVERSEERTM has been developed with a set of underlying assumptions that 
simplify the relationships between the complex biological systems and farm practices so 
that they can be modelled” (OVERSEERTM, 2015). This is a problem with any modelling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The programme was developed by AgResearch Limited (a Crown-owned research institute) as contracted 
by the Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry to report nutrient loadings to international bodies. It was then 
marketed in coordination with the fertilizer industry as “fertiliser recommendation software” in 2000.  In 
2003, OVERSEER 5 was released and could predict nutrient loadings between different farm management 
areas (OVERSEER, n.d.). 
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system, but can raise additional hurdles when used in a regulatory context like in Lake 
Taupō (Duncan, 2014).  
 The use of a modelling tool allowed the regional council to provide a clear way to 
measure and monitor a diffuse pollutant. This allowed for a credit to be created in the 
market trading programme but was seen by many as the best tool available, not the best 
tool for the job (Interview with Farmer108, March 2015; Interview with Farmer110, 
March 2015; Interview with Farmer106, March 2015; Interview with Other101, March 
2015; Interview with Other102, March 2015; Interview with Other103, March 2015). 
There are many aspects of the modelling programme that participants find fault with but 
contend that there is no alternative that could fully account for farming practice (Ledgard 
et al., 2008; Duhon, et al., 2015).   
4.3.2 Cap and Consenting 
	  
Once the modelling inputs from the different farms were coordinated, the total 
‘cap’ on the manageable N within the catchment was determined. This cap meant that 
each landowner would have their farms modelled and their nitrogen leaching limited.32 
Nitrogen discharge allowances (NDAs) enabled the cap to be enforced through 
landowners adapting their practices in order to operate within nitrogen limits. The 
allowance was based on a landowners’ highest ‘productive’ year between 2001 and 2005 
as modelled by OVERSEERTM. This ‘grandparenting33’ scheme gave greater NDAs to 
higher producers and lower NDAs to lower producers. 
A grandparenting scheme allowed landowners to continue to maintain their 
present land use type or intensity and allowed landowners  “to reach their productive 
potential in favourable farming years” (Barns, et al., 2013, p 16). As stated during the 
Environment Court proceedings:  
While there are many ways to allocate the initial NDAs, ranging from 
grandparenting to auctioning, the norm around the world for trading schemes…has 
been grandparenting. Economic theory shows that irrespective of the way initial 
[Nitrogen Discharge Allowances] are allocated, an effective trading scheme will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 As discussed previously, the modeling predictions for the whole catchment are different from what 
individual farms predicted which increased the total amount of N needing to be reduced by the LTPT from 
153 tons to 172 tons.  
33 Grandparenting’ is the term given to a gratis allocation of credits to participants within a cap and trade 
market based on a baseline year or benchmarking period (Daigneault, Greenhalgh, & Samarasinghe. 2015).  
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result in an efficient outcome, i.e. pollution control at the least cost (Miester, 2008 
quoted in Barns & Young, 2013, p 8).  
 
Based on this advice, as well as other technical economic experts, the regional 
council decided to use a grandparenting scheme in allocations (Barns and Young, 2013). 
Some landowners thought that it was unfair “that people who were ‘pushing the land’ or 
even being wasteful, were rewarded, while those who were ‘doing their bit for the 
environment’ or had not intensified for other reasons, were subsidising higher users by 
receiving a lower allocation” (Barns, et al., 2013, p 16).34 As stated above, this potentially 
unequal distribution of allocations didn’t matter since an effectively designed and 
implemented trading scheme would result in an ‘efficient’ outcome anyway.  
A grandparenting scheme was the alternative to an ‘averaging’ form of credit 
allocation where landowners would each be given the same NDA calculated through a 
division of the total amount of N within the catchment divided by the number of 
landowners. This option was preferred by forestry landowners but disliked by farming 
operations (Yerex, 2009). In the end, grandparented allocations of NDAs were formalized 
as part of a resource consent process and determined a piece of land’s legal ability to 
leach N.  
The ‘grandparented’ allocation of N using the consenting regime outlined under 
the RMA allowed the regional council to manage the diffuse nitrogen as well as create a 
crediting structure for the cap and trade programme (Barns et al., 2013). To gain a 
consent, farmers had to apply for approval to run their businesses through the regional 
council and provide information which could be inputted into the OVERSEERTM model. 
These inputs would inform the amount of nitrogen that they were allowed to use or leach.  
Because of this, farmers had to apply for the right to emit nitrogen from their farm. This 
was a large shift from previous governance structures between the council and farmers. 
One farmers felt that they were now required to apply for the ‘right to farm’ rather than 
the right to emit pollution from their farm (Interview with Farmer110, March 2015). The 
council’s environmental governance actions diminished farmers’ privileged role (Morris, 
2009). The ‘grandparented’ allocation structure is a technique within the regime of 
practices present in the Taupō catchment that privileged certain landowners in the market. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 This is discussed further in Chapter 5.	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Those who had the greatest contribution to the problem were allowed to continue doing 
so.  
4.3.3 Third party trust reduces N 
	  
 Once the council allocated Nitrogen Discharge Allowances, the next task was to 
figure out how to reduce the total amount of these allowances that could be used in the 
catchment. However, that responsibility was not given to the council. Instead, it was 
given to a third party agency, the Lake Taupō Protection Trust (LTPT). LTPT existed 
between 2007 and 201535 as “a public fund to encourage and assist land use change, 
purchase land or nitrogen in the Lake Taupō catchment and fund research and other 
initiatives that assist land owners to reduce the nitrogen impact of their activities on Lake 
Taupō” (Lake Taupō Protection Trust, n.d.). It was the LTPT’s responsibility to reduce 
nitrogen and the regional council’s responsibility to measure and monitor it. 
The LTPT is a non-governmental body whose funding comes from three sources. 
The central government (45% of funds), the Waikato Regional Council (35% of funds) 
and the Taupō District Council (20% of funds) each contributed to the total $81 million 
budget of the Trust and “reflected the distribution of benefits” (Barns et al.,  2013, p15).  
This statement suggests that each level of government provided money into the fund in 
proportion to level of responsibility for the problem of/solution to water quality decline. 
The LTPT was “set up under their own constitution and able to act in a commercial 
manner free from any further political involvement” (Barns et al., 2013, p 15). They were 
also free to “act like a private body” without the constraints that a  “normal government” 
would have when conducting “business deals” (Interview with Other104). The LTPT is 
thus a non-regulatory and semi-private governing body that was heavily involved in the 
process. Having the LTPT as a separate body allowed for the instigator and the 
policeman of the market to be separate (Interview with Other102, March 2015).  
An alternative approach was put forward originally to have the central 
government’s state-owned enterprise (Landcorp) convert its pastoral land into forestry. 
This was considered “inequitable” since a ‘whole community approach’ was required 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The LTPT achieved its goal of 20% reduction in June of 2015 and has worked to reassess its role 
following this success.  
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where Landcorp could “be treated like any other landowner” (Barns et al.,, 2013, p15; 
Yerex, 2009). This meant that the central government wanted to treat Landcorp just as 
any other private landowner, and not concede that the state-owned enterprise had the 
same responsibilities as the central government (Hobbs, 2003). Many landowners in the 
catchment were disappointed, and angered by Landcorp’s lack of leadership (Interview 
with Farmer103, March 2015; Interview with Farmer104, March 2015; Interview with 
Farmer106, March 2015; Interview with Farmer107, March 2015; Interview with 
Farmer109, March 2015; Interview with Farmer110, March 2015; Interview with 
Farmer112, March 2015; Interview with Farmer114, March 2015; Interview with 
Farmer116, March 2015). Farmers hoped that Landcorp land could be a trial area for best 
farming practice in the catchment as well as reduce most of the 20% reduction needed 
(since the size of their landholdings was so large in the catchment). Instead, the Landcorp 
land was sold to private landowners, one of whom is a large dairy farmer who moved into 
the catchment.  
 The LTPT made reductions through payments to landowners for either land or 
nitrogen. The price given for nitrogen was between $300-$500/ton depending on the 
“business transaction” (Interview with Other104, March 2015). In a way, the LTPT 
wasn’t forcing land use change, but strongly encouraged it. The LTPT offered 
landowners who wanted to leave the catchment a price for their land based on the land-
value at the time.  This was calculated using third party evaluators comparing the value of 
the land to other areas outside of the catchment (since the land value in the catchment 
dropped significantly once it was clear that the rules were going to be put in place) 
(Interview with Other104, March 2015; Interview with Other102, March 2015).  
The majority of reductions purchased through the LTPT came from Māori 
Incorporations. Representing more than 60% of the total reductions made by the Trust, 
only NDAs (not land with it) could be bought from these lands since Māori land is unable 
to be sold. When selling NDAs, many Māori Incorporations converted their previously 
farmed areas to forestry blocks.  When converting from farming blocks to forestry blocks, 
not all NDAs could be sold from a given piece of land since forested lands still needed to 
have a minimum of 3kg of N per ha allowance. When combined with the New Zealand 
Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS), which was also occurring at the time, these 
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incorporations were not only able to get N credits for their reductions, but also carbon (C) 
credits for the resulting forestry plantings. Reducing the total amount of N in the 
catchment by 20% is only one of the LTPT tasks. The LTPT also paid for benchmarking 
or baseline measurement services for landowners within the catchment, applied research 
into best practices, and educated landowners within the catchment about their NDA 
trading opportunities. As of June 2015, the LTPT achieved their target three years early 
and are investigating novel roles. 
 The LTPT tried to become the go-to buyer of N within the catchment. They 
didn’t want to ‘persuade’ anyone to sell to them, but instead wanted to encourage 
individuals who were thinking of selling their farms to sell to the LTPT (Interview with 
Other104, March 2015; Interview with Other 103, March 2015). In all, 6 farming families 
sold their land and other private landowners sold some of their Nitrogen to the LTPT, but 
the majority of nitrogen reductions came from Māori Trusts and incorporations (Duhon, 
2015). Since Māori land is unable to be bought or sold, the additional property value that 
N gave these landowners meant that were able to have a ‘win-win’ opportunity. As part 
of reducing nitrogen, landowners could plant trees that could then garner carbon credits 
under the ETS. At $25/ton of carbon, and $300/ton of nitrogen, these landowners could 
participate in two market-based instruments at once (Interview with Farmer 111, March 
2015; Interview with Farmer113, March 2015; Interview with Other103, March 2015).   
  The payment given to landowners for nitrogen, however, was not compensation. 
Compensation is allowed under the RMA if a limitation would render land incapable of 
reasonable use. “Ignoring the argument that in some cases, they were imposing external 
costs on the public, compensation-seekers argued that they were required to make 
financial sacrifices for the benefit of the wider community” (Barns et al., 2013, p 17).  
Given the flexibility for land users to determine alternative land uses under the cap and 
trade programme, no compensation was given. As a result, farmers were aware and 
conscious of not calling the payments, that were potentially given to landowners for N 
reductions on farm, compensation (Interview with Farmer106, March 2015; Interview 
with Farmer114, March 2015; Interview with Farmer 118, March 2015; Interview with 
Farmer104, March 2015; Interview with Other102, March 2015; Interview with Other104, 
March 2015).  
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The tools and techniques deployed in the Taupō catchment to make a market 
based policy solution for diffuse, but ‘manageable’ N, fits within other neoliberal forms 
of governance embedded within water quality trading programmes (Bartle, 2011; Mariola, 
2011). The market privileged a decision making calculus based on economic efficiency 
rather than ecological protection. The logic of the market within the cap and trade 
programme reduced an ecological system into a commodity for trading (Bartle, 2011; 
Robertson, 2006). The modelling process required is always political and through 
ecological commodification the market is allowed to ‘see’ the environmental problem 
rather than ignore it as an externality (see Cooper, 2015). As in some other market 
frameworks, the grandparenting allocation privileged larger landowners  (Polanyi, 1944) 
and producers, and allowed for production to continue. The cap and trade program also 
allowed the LTPT to pay landowners for their ‘environmental’ actions while acting as an 
instigator in the market. They were encouraging land use change rather than the council. 
Without their purchases, it is unclear if there would have been any reduction of nutrients 
(Barns et al., 2013) and some in the catchment still have doubts about their actions, 
autonomy, and worth (Interview with Farmer101, March 2015; Interview with Other105, 
March 2015; Interview with Farmer110, March 2015; Interview with Farmer114, March 
2015). 
Although many participants question the application of this programme, they do 
not deny its worth (Interview with Farmer106, March 2015; Interview with Farmer107, 
March 2015; Interview with Farmer108, March 2015; Interview with Farmer109, March 
2015; Interview with Other102, March 2015; Interview with Other103, March 2015; 
Interview with Other104, March 2015). However, since they question the tools (and the 
validity of them), some participants question whether or not the programme will actually 
benefit the lake (Botha, Roth & Brown, 2013; Interview with Farmer 102, March 2015; 
Interview with Farmer105, March 2015; Interview with Farmer111, March 2015; 
Interview with Farmer 113, March 2015; Interview with Other105, March 2015). This 
may discourage participants from making a concerted effort to stay within the rules and 
potentially increase compliance and enforcement costs for the council (Barns and Young, 
2013). Under a neoliberal mentality, it is the individual who is responsible for the success 
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of any given regulatory market, including the compliance within it (Barnett et al., 2008; 
Shamir, 2008).  
4.4 Actors and Agents: Who is governing? 
 
The last component of an analytics of governance is a focus on the regime of 
practice examining who it is that governs. Within the Taupō water quality trading 
programme, there are a number of institutional groups involved in governing. The 
Waikato Regional Council limits nutrients and have the legal responsibility over the 
lake’s quality. In addition, they conduct monitoring and are working to ensure 
landowner’s compliance with the rules36. On the other hand, the Lake Taupō Protection 
Trust (LTPT) reduces the nutrients within the catchment by providing financial 
incentives for landowners to sell their NDA credits. I argue that central to both of these 
institutions success is landowners’, and specifically farmers’, participation.  
At the end of the day its not [the council’s] choice whether people choose to 
plant trees or not, its [farmers’] choice that they have made because they have 
sold N or they decided that they wanted to intensify their land and retire some 
of it as well (Interview with Other103, March 2015). 
 
Any reductions in nitrogen made within the catchment come down to farmers’ 
choices. Within the catchment, individual landowners are highly encouraged rather than 
required to participate in the ‘market’ created by the Regional Council (Interview with 
Other101, March 2015; Interview with Other102, March 2015; Interview with Other 104, 
March 2015). It is the responsibility of the LTPT to encourage farmer participation but it 
is the responsibility of landowners to actually police their decisions or actions (Interview 
with Other103, March 2015; Interview with Other105, March 2015; Interview with 
Farmer106, March 2015). Individual landowners are held accountable for their own 
governance. It is the individual landowner who is ‘governed’ by the regional council but 
landowners are governing their own behaviour. As a result, individuals are both a subject 
and source of power (Foucault, 1982). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 To date, there has only been one landowner who has been notified for going above their allocated 
nitrogen discharge allowance. Discussions with farmers and the regional council are beginning to occur 
with regard to long-term compliance.  
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The placement of responsibility on the individual, and the centralization of their 
choices, is primary in a neoliberal governmentality (Fletcher, 2013; Rose, 1996; Dean, 
1999; Barnett, 2005; Larner, 2000). With the responsibility to govern one’s own 
behaviour, however, comes the freedom of the individual to pursue entrepreneurial 
activity, without the imposition of strict regulation upon them. And yet, certain levels of 
regulation from outside the self are acceptable in order to assure that self-development 
does not impede on overall societal wellbeing. Usually, under a liberal form of 
governance, the ‘social good’ is defined as economic growth or wellbeing (Harvey, 2005). 
However, a need to create space for subject positions that also contribute to other forms 
of social good may be required.  
Within the catchment, farmers’ freedom to pursue farming without a strict 
limitation upon them was challenged by the market based instrument. The cap on 
production limited their ability to expand their operations. However, the trading 
component allowed farmers to buy their way to freedom of on-farm activity (theoretically 
at least). The social good in the catchment was defined both as allowing farmers to 
maintain their business and maintaining the health of the lake. Although most agreed that 
the environmental ‘good’ being addressed was worthwhile, the level of regulation was 
initially not welcomed (Barns et al., 2013; Botha et al. 2013; Yerex, 2009). Over time, 
however, most farmers in the catchment have come to accept the rules (Botha et al. 2013; 
Interview with Other102, March 2015; Interview with Other103; March 2015; Interview 
with Farmer106; March 2015; Interview with Farmer109; March 2015).37   
Within an MBI, the hope is to incorporate ‘externalities’ into individual’s decision 
making calculus. Specifically, “market based instruments in agri-environmental 
governance seek to reassemble the subjectivities of participants by aligning their 
economic interests with behaviours the state wishes them to adopt” (Cooper & Rosin, 
2014, p 393). The hope is that individuals acting in their own best interest, given the right 
regulatory structure guiding their calculations, can create a positive environmental impact. 
The purpose of the regulator is to design the rules of the game so that individuals within 
it will seek to fulfil their highest interest. Instead of personal interest leading to negative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 See Chapter 5 for further discussion of farmers’ acceptance of the rules over time.  
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outcomes for others, or for common/open resources, a market based trading scheme 
provides personal incentives for a common environmental good.  
Farmers’ participation in the market scheme potentially required that they not 
only believed in the aims of the programme but also adjust in their ‘environmental’ 
beliefs or morals (McGuire et al., 2013).  A transition is not guaranteed, however, even if 
individuals are highly involved in a change in governance (Agrawal, 2005; Jepson, 
Brannstrom, & Persons, 2012, p 852).38 An MBI for water quality represents not only a 
new instigator of farming practice but also a new system of governance oriented around 
environmental protection. It is unclear, however, how participants in MBIs come to act in 
relation to the ‘environment’ or rather water quality in this case (Cooper & Rosin, 2014).  
An MBI for nutrient management aims to mediate the traditional tension between 
the good of ‘the economy’ and the good of ‘the environment’ by creating an 
environmental benefit from a profit motivated logic. In this way, individuals are able to 
act in their own financial best interests as well as create positive results for environmental 
action or protection. When social and environmental responsibility is the logical outcome 
of “conducting oneself in an ‘entrepreneurial’ manner, seemingly competing policy 
objectives are addressed as single political problems” (Stenson and Watt, 1999 quoted in 
Lockie & Higgins, 2007, p 3).  An MBI allows farmers to remain profitable and use those 
same entrepreneurial logics to restrain their environmental harms.  
The creation of structures or tools that facilitate farmer participation, such as a 
nutrient trading platform, may not be enough in order to motivate the individual to 
participate in a programme however. Governing bodies must also establish “within 
subjects a predisposition that the aims of the governmental programme are right and 
proper” (Miller & Rose, 1990, p 18 cited in Cooper & Rosin, 2014). Within the Taupō 
catchment, many felt that something needed to be done since “everyone loves the lake” 
(Interview with Farmer103, March 2015; Interview with Farmer104, March 2015; 
Interview with Farmer106, March 2015; Interview with Farmer107, March 2015; 
Interview with Farmer109, March 2015; Interview with Other102, March 2015; Interview 
with Other105, March 2015).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See this chapter’s conclusion as well as Chapter 5.3 for a discussion of farmers changing environmental 
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All we are doing is trying to protect the lake, which is great. I mean no one wants 
to see it polluted (Interview with Farmer105, March 2015).  
 
In this way, action within a given programme not only denotes a positive thinking 
towards its purpose, but potentially a moral act (Shamir, 2008). As a result, participation 
in the MBI suggests that participants’ not only change their actions on farm but also their 
orientation to their practice (Mariola, 2011). Under a neoliberal governmentality subjects 
are not required to take action per say but instead have the freedom to choose when and 
how they participate. This makes ‘success’ of a programme dependent on its ability to 
create subjects and subjectivities that coalesce with a governing purpose (Lemke, 2002; 
Larner, 2000; Dean, 1999).  
A market-based policy tool is dependent less on how it is designed and more on 
how effective it is at coordinating and motivating participants within in it. It can only be 
‘successful’ to the extent that individuals are incentivised to act rationally within its 
boundaries. Put another way, the regulatory hammer is only as good as the nail it is 
working into place. This is counter to the saying that to the regulatory hammer, 
everything is a nail. Within a market used as a regulatory tool on the other hand, it is the 
nail, or rather the individuals participating within the market, that have the power: the 
power of choice.  
Well [the regional council is] not forcing it, yes the regulation is allowing 
for [nitrogen reductions] to happen, promoting that, it is giving them an 
incentive to do that but that is actually the farmer’s choice and you have 
to remember that. They have to specifically think that this is a good 
financial decision for them. Its like anything … it’s their choice, their 
business (Interview with Other10X39, March 2015). 
 
To understand more about ‘the nail’ we must understand farmers and their 
subjectivities. Subtler questions of identity in relationship with market-based instruments 
tend hold a small space in the literature investigating these tools (Bakker, 2010). This 
presents a scholarly space to fill since the preferred subjects in governance may 
problematise the issue or the solution posed. Within the Taupō cap and trade programme, 
a change in farmer behaviour was encouraged using a market structure that limited 
production and incentivized reduction. Farming individuals in the catchment fulfilled and 
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contested their elicited responsibility to absorb nitrogen into their farming practice, 
business, and identity (see Chapter 5). An understanding of their experience is central to 
understand the efficacy of market-based instruments to elicit changes in subjects’ actions 
and subjectivities.  
4.5 Conclusions 
The programme implemented within the Taupō catchment is the only one like it 
in the world; incorporating non-point source pollutants into a market trading mechanism 
had never been done before (Shortle, 2012). Although implemented, many questions 
remain about participants’ values and understandings of this programme. The designers 
of the policy note the importance of documenting theirs, and farmers’, experience in this 
programme given its experimental nature (Barns & Young, 2013).  
Within the Lake Taupō catchment I have argued that the use of a market based 
instrument privileged certain assumptions about what, why, how and who would be 
governed. This combination of governance in Taupō is potentially neoliberal (Bartle, 
2011). The formal state institution, the Regional Council, limits, but does not reduce, the 
amount of N within the catchment. Actual reductions and land use change are made via 
payments to landowners from a pooled fund managed by a third party organization. It is 
the responsibility of landowners to manage their businesses with regards to nutrient 
efficiency and financial viability. In this chapter, I have endeavoured to understand how 
this process and logic is made to ‘work,’ and focused on the intricacies and potential 
inadequacies of neoliberal governmentality in action.  
 Under the kinds of neoliberal governmentality present within market based 
instruments, a central feature of governance is to invite, elicit, and promote individuals to 
‘govern their own behaviour in a manner consistent with governmental aims” (Cooper & 
Rosin, 2014, p 392). The aims of governance within the catchment are oriented around a 
‘cleaner lake’ which included a limit on nitrogen leaching into the Lake as well as a total 
reduction facilitated by the market and the Lake Taupō Protection Trust. Since 
agricultural production was identified as the main source of excess nutrients, there 
needed to be a reduction of in the use or intensity of agricultural production in the 
catchment.  It would be the market, as supported by the LTPT as an instigator that would 
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change farmer behaviour or rather farming production. Farmers’ activities were limited 
by the council but they had to make any changes on-farm themselves; they governed their 
own behaviour.  
As part of the cap and trade programme implemented, an environmental problem 
was reduced to a tradable unit, and then individuals were incentivized to make a 
voluntary and ‘rational’ decision under the limitations of cap and the market (Duhon et 
al., 2015).  Manageable nitrogen was the object of governance and measured and 
monitored using the modelling tool OVERSEERTM and then traded as credits using a 
‘market.’ The cap and trade programme allowed the LTPT to reduce pollution without 
directly questioning production. Nitrogen discharges allowances were bought and sold 
and this tool was implemented due to ‘flexibility and viability’ it offered farmers as well 
as it being the least-cost option for the WRC. This programme created as well as 
exacerbated inequalities (Bartle, 2011), caused grief for its participants (Botha et al., 
2013), and furthers the logic of neoliberal market rule into a new domain: environmental 
protection (Mariola, 2011). It also has achieved its nutrient reduction targets ahead of 
time (Kerr et al., 2015), brought together varying levels of government (Yerex, 2009), 
and has spurred a conversation about who pays for the price of pollution (Waikato 
Regional Council C, n.d.).  
As a result of participating in an ‘environmental’ water quality policy programme 
there is some evidence that farmers may become more environmentally oriented as a 
result of their changing ‘environmental practices’ (McGuire, 2013). Some participants 
not identifying as ‘farmers’ in the Taupō catchment tended to see the policy programme 
in Taupō as a means to change farmers’ attitudes as well as practices (Interview with 
Other103, March 2015; Interview with Other102, March 2015; Interview with Other104, 
March 2015).  
 
[The policy programme has] changed how people look at the environment. I mean, 
everyone thinks about it now, they talk about the N cap and the farmers 
understand that they want to look after the lake. Most people are on board. That’s 
a possible change. It forces people to think what their actions might be having 
(Interview with Other103, March 2015). 
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Other participants, who identified as farmers themselves, did not note any change 
in their ‘environmental’ beliefs (even when asked explicitly) (Interview with Farmer105, 
March 2015; Interview with Farmer104, March 2015; Interview with Farmer106, March 
2015; Interview with Farmer 109, March 2015). This questions the assumption within 
much of the scholarly work focusing on environmentality that a change in behaviour 
oriented around an ‘environmental’ purpose will result in a change in belief (Agrawal, 
2005; Cooper & Rosin, 2014; Haggerty, 2007). Within an MBI, individuals are 
‘environmental subjects’ but also neoliberal ‘market’ participants. How these two 
positions intertwine with existing farmer subjectivities is both theoretically, and actually, 
complex. A focus on farming subjects and subjectivities within this market based trading 
scheme is thus needed.  
The central responsibility for environmental change within the catchment comes 
down to farmers. Under a neoliberal governmentality, individuals are responsible for the 
management of their own conduct. Their perspectives and subjectivities are thus central 
to a questioning and critique of conduct. The next chapter will outline how farmers’ 
subjectivities informed, and were affected by, the water quality trading programme 
implemented
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Chapter 5  
Farmer Subjectivities 
5.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I address my second research question of: how are farmer 
subjectivities constituted, altered, contested, and created as part of water quality 
governance within the Lake Taupō catchment? I argue that Taupō farmers’ subject 
positions have shifted over time from being ‘producers’ to ‘polluters’ to ‘Nitrogen 
managers.’ These positions interact and intermingle within farmers’ stories of who they 
are and what they do in their capacity as farmers. Although farmers are not required to 
fulfil environmental subject positions, I suggest that as a result of their participation in 
the design and implementation of the cap and trade programme, they have shifted their 
other subjectivities.  
5.1 Productivist Farmers: 
 Farmers’ subjectivities tend to be articulated in two ways within New Zealand 
(Rosin, 2013; Hunt et al., 2013). As discussed in Chapter 3.4, productivist stewards and 
productivist agri-business individuals are the dominant framing of farmer subjectivities 
within Aotearoa New Zealand (Rosin, 2013; Hunt et al., 2013; Stock & Forney, 2014). 
Since the 1980s, the second agri-business subjectivity - oriented around profit 
maximization - has increased in prevalence and prominence (Rosin, 2013). This is 
connected to an increase in the permeation of neoliberal governance (Hunt et al, 2013). 
Yet, other forms of subjectivities, such as farmers being stewardship oriented, are still 
present and intermingled with ‘neoliberal’ subjectivities. The tensions and overlaps 
between these two productivist subjectivities were highlighted by farmers within the 
catchment and have continued to permeate discussions throughout the water quality 
trading design, implementation, and critique.  
When the cap and trade programme was introduced and farmers read in the local 
newspaper that agricultural, and thus farmers’, activities were compromising water 
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quality, many were surprised and angered (Yerex, 2009). Some farmers thought they had 
already done everything they could for the health of the lake. They weren’t polluters, they 
were the good stewards. They had even gained support for ‘environmental’ actions from 
the government when some of the farms were first settled. Through ballot farming40 
schemes, farmers were given access to farmland for reduced prices or interest rates. In 
taking a ballot farm in the 1970s or 1980s, some had to sign a contract that they would 
have their waterways fenced or trees put around the gullies. The central government 
ensured the ownership and conversion of the land; the local government (Taupō District 
Council) helped them to be good stewards in this process. As a result, before the cap and 
trade programme was proposed, many farmers thought that they had already taken 
positive action for the health of the lake. For example, one farmer recalled:  
 
When we first came here many41 years ago, we chose the farm we had because it 
had waterways going through it. When we arrived, we had to sign an agreement 
that we would allow our waterways to be fenced. That was the beginning, fencing 
off the waterways to have clear water in Taupō. We were happy to sign the 
agreement because it was good for us any ways. In hindsight though, it wasn’t a 
bad thing…. the government had initiated [an irrigation] water scheme that came 
out of the bush.  We got a better amount of water than the creek anyway and it 
kept stock out of the waterways. We were quite happy with that, and then you 
think you have done your thing and the whole groundwater theory is coming in. I 
guess we were lucky to have the opportunity to be there in the first place 
(Interview with Farmer114, March 2015). 
 
Another farmer suggested: 
 
People went in here in all good faith, and initially it all came via the government. 
People had done nothing wrong; they weren’t a guilty party (Interview with 
Farmer109, March 2015).  
The farmers who had their waterways fenced considered themselves to be good 
environmental stewards. This, however, was a visible representation of something much 
larger. Farmers who spoke of on-farm stewardship said that there was a ‘balance’ in 
running and making decisions on farm. This balance could involve a need to make 
money, a preference for a certain kind of farming, or the ethic of farming and attachment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 As mentioned in the introduction the Bureau of Land Management encouraged potential farmers to settle 
within the catchment through the allocation of Ballot farms. In this process, land was developed by the 
Bureau and then on-sold to individuals interested in farming the land.  
41 Number of years taken out to ensure participant anonymity 
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to place which guided them to farm in a ‘sustainable’ way. The following two quotes 
demonstrate these diverse values: 
 Put it this way, people could offer me lots of money for [my farm] and I don’t 
want their money. I want my farm. I don’t care if [I am offered] $100 million I 
don’t even really want to know, I don’t care about money. Because this is hard to 
replace. Only a landowner who lives on a farm can actually feel and say that. 
That’s what I’m trying to say to a certain degree. It’s not about money… I just 
want to look after this [pointing at map] to its capacity of what it can naturally 
do, I don’t want to force it into a world by putting lots of crops on it, lots of dairy 
cows, intensifying it up and having a big market gardening thing (Interview with 
Farmer112, March 2015).  
I know [another farming property] changed their farming system because [they] 
liked to do a certain kind of farming rather than because it was going to produce 
more money. You don’t make decisions just on making money or just on looking 
after the N, you have got to make decisions on a balance and one person may look 
at the balance at that point and another person would look at the balance at 
another point and say that’s the balance for me (Interview with Farmer104, 
March 2015). 
 
As the above farmers’ words highlight, each individual farmer has their own way 
of managing their system and providing structure. While profit on-farm is important for 
farmers because it determines their livelihood, there are clearly various other factors that 
shape decision-making. Homo economicus is present as a subject position for farmers to 
fulfil, but it is complicated by the varying values that farmer hold (see Chapter 3.3.1). 
These complications can potentially lead to conflicting expressions of a given discourse.   
There were tensions between the ‘farmers as good stewards’ discourse and what 
forms of farming could express it. Some farmers suggested that sheep and beef farmers 
(the majority in the catchment) were better stewards than dairy farmers. There was some 
animosity between farmers who considered themselves stewards and other farmers in the 
catchment who they saw as “raping and pillaging the land” (Interview with Farmer112, 
March 2015; Interview with Farmer106, March 2015). 
 
There is a huge amount of lifestyle as well. So I think, I don’t think that’s the case 
for many dairy farmers but, for a lot of drystock farmers, there’s an emotive 
context to what they do. They have very much a strong allegiance with the land, 
strong allegiance as a steward…. Is that it’s not just about cows and making 
money… there is a very strong affiliation with the land. Big difference between 
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how dairy farmers view things and how drystock farmers view things. Very 
different! They think completely differently. You will find a dairy farmer is, I mean 
this is a gross generalization, a dairy farmer will go right up to the fence, right up 
to the river. You will find a drystock farmer, they will be thinking about the 
planting there. The cost is a big thing. But they are not pushing the system to the 
same extent. They, have a different way of farming (Interview with Farmer106, 
March 2015).  
 
Based on these discourses and existing productivist subjectivities, acknowledging 
the problem of lower water quality as a result of agricultural production was a challenge. 
If some farmers felt they had already ‘done all the right things’, why were they being 
blamed for the problem that they had already contributed to solving? Additionally, some 
farmers asked why the Regional Council was blaming them for the Lake’s problem when 
they were doing such a good job of ‘feeding the world’?  
 
Society hammers farmers but demand cheap food. In fact, even worse, they openly 
criticize the cost of food. I feel annoyed and peeved that there is a handful of 
people that have been chosen to take the fall for community demanding cheaper 
food (Interview with Farmer101, March 2015).  
 
As the proposal was announced, farmers felt that the regional council did not 
understand their perspectives nor the consequences of their initial statements originally 
published in the local newspaper. Some farmers talked of the ‘arrogance’ of the Regional 
Council in thinking they could solve the problem in just a few months (Yerex, 2009). In 
order to represent themselves formally before the Regional Council, farmers in the 
catchment gathered together to create the Taupō Lake Care (TLC) group.42 TLC put a 
collective face for farmers forward when engaging with the regional council. At the 
beginning, there was a lot of animosity between farmers and the council and a few 
farmers mentioned how the council’s perceived attitude at first really determined the 
conversations that followed:  
 
Regulators had decided in their mind what they were going to do and farmers 
were lambs to the slaughter (Interview with Farmer101, March 2015).  
 
Oh [the regional council were] the enemy, we were in for a fight. Both parties got 
educated over time. First meeting they had to tell everyone [they were] discussing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 A memorandum of understanding between the WRC and TLC was signed in May 2001.	  	  
Chapter 5: Farmer Subjectivities      
 99 
it as it had just come out of the blue. Someone running it said they had to ‘go to 
another meeting’ and we said ‘sit down girly, this is our livelihood you’re dealing 
with here, it takes as long as it takes’. But they didn’t actually realize that. They 
were just announcing something then were just going to leave (Interview with 
Farmer109, March 2015).  
 
There was a recognition early on that we were going to be picked off and we need 
to unite, get our representative voice heard, establish credibility, and do it quickly 
to manage that (Interview with Farmer106, March 2015).  
In order to represent themselves formally before the council, farmers in the 
catchment gathered together to create the Taupō Lake Care (TLC) group. Aside from 
farmers’ dislike of the ‘tone’ that the council took, many farmers discussed how they 
questioned the validity of the council’s scientific conclusions. Statistically significant 
results released in 1999 concluded that the lake water quality was in decline and a major 
cause was the increase in agricultural production within the catchment over the previous 
50 years (Vant, 2008). Many farmers said that they were not convinced that agricultural 
production was the most significant source of nitrogen, nor the most manageable in terms 
of enhancing water quality:  
I struggle to understand how we are one of the main contributors to the loss of 
clarity in the lake. I just don’t think there has been enough science information 
about it... There are lots of things that affect the lake clarity (Interview with 
Farmer105, March 2015).   
If they wanted to protect Taupō and about tourism… If you really meant business, 
get the tourists out, get the fish out. But no no no they just picked on about 12 
farmers, well I mean there are 120 land owners but only about 12 of a substantial 
size (Interview with Farmer112, March 2015).  
Some farmers suggested that they were only able to trust that farming had an 
impact on the lake after they did the measurements themselves. To do this, they raised 
funds among the members of TLC and cast their net wide in order to gain as many 
landowners on board. These funds helped the farmers to conduct ‘independent’ science 
with AgResearch, a Crown research institute. The commissioned science came to the 
same conclusions: groundwater nitrogen leaching was coming from agricultural 
landscapes (Yerex, 2009).  
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After concluding that the Regional Council’s initial finding regarding 
agriculture’s impact on the lake was correct, farmers began questioning the way the 
council was going about the ‘regulatory’ process. Some farmers questioned the Regional 
Council’s understanding of the consequences of their regulatory actions. Farmers 
suggested that if the council continued to have a bad relationship with them, any solution 
would not be successful. Farmers could just ‘lock the gates.’  
When they first started talking about it, it was the law and you will do this and 
you will do that. [We said], well we can’t afford to do that, [they said] well I will 
take you to court, [we said] well I can’t pay in court, [they said] oh well we will 
take your farm! TLC worked with Environment Waikato to work things out…it 
became far less dictatorial and everything was debated more, talked through. We 
got to a position where we probably got as good as we were gonna get. … 
Because it was so dictatorial, I initially said you go shove it up your arse, you’re 
not coming on my land. There are some, still some people, like that in the 
catchment now. (Interview with Farmer110, March 2015).  
 
 [the TLC reps] used to come back and report to the general members every now 
and then….It was about the regulations. It was about the impact on farming. The 
impact on the value of the farms and the impact on the activity on the farming 
system (Interview with Farmer104, March 2015).  
 
You realized you didn’t actually have a voice, you were only there to listen. So 
then we started a consultative team. Worked really hard to try and tell all our 
members what was happening. But every time at a meeting, people would go back 
to beginning and some just couldn’t understand. Some people just didn’t have the 
knowledge and sometimes a little knowledge is more dangerous than none. People 
chopped and changed (views). Got to get involved and speak up. I would re-
emphasise that to other groups, otherwise you will get railroaded by legislation 
(Interview with Farmer109, March 2015). 
To mend the relationship between the two parties, TLC created a memorandum of 
understanding with the council, signed in 2001. This ensured that farmers would be able 
to maintain ‘flexibility and viability’ in their farming systems while also protecting the 
lake. Many farmers said that this agreement was a legal signal of new relationship with 
the Regional Council. 
[After forming TLC} then it was a matter of how can I maximize my position, I 
can’t change from what I have done in the past cause it’s too late (Interview with 
Farmer110, March 2015).  
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Farmers also questioned the impact on their economic wellbeing that any solution 
posed would have. Farmers within TLC pooled additional money to commission another 
independent report, this time on the impact that a cap would have on farm viability, or 
rather profitability. Under Section 28 of the RMA, regional councils must undertake an 
economic analysis of a given regulation’s effects. This analysis was completed in 2001 
but farmers felt it was not fully respected by the council. As a result, farmers paid for 
their own report to be completed. A couple of farmers in the catchment still feel that this 
report, and the initial one done by consultants hired by the council, was never fully 
accounted for in the council’s regulatory activities (Interview with Farmer107, March 
2015; Interview with Farmer101, March 2015; Interview with Farmer109, March 2015). 
Many farmers thus feel that the costs to their business are not fully reflected in the 
policy’s structure and thus suggest that they should not in paying as much for the 
pollution they produce.  
Even though farmers were questioning the council, TLC made a decision early on 
to work with the Regional Council, not against them. As part of this, a semi-closed door 
policy was established so that different groups felt able to communicate openly with one 
another. Many of the participants interviewed found value in the way that TLC, and its 
leaders, worked with the council. Many feel that the TLC tried to get the best of a bad 
situation and work ‘well’ with the council. But, TLC couldn’t change the fact that some 
farmers didn’t want to be an active part of the group. Working ‘well’ with the council 
was treated as a give and take. For example, as part of these formal negotiations between 
TLC and the regional council, the terms ‘polluter’ and ‘compensation’ were formally 
removed from the conversation. For some farmers this took away some of the emotional 
baggage associated with the conversation since regardless of their position on how best to 
solve the problem, everyone ‘loves the lake.’  
There’s no point fighting it. We didn’t see any point fighting it. We did put money 
into TLC, in hindsight we probably should have put it somewhere else, but we felt 
we were doing our part for the catchment. I think TLC did a sterling job. Because 
I think EW first thought they were going to…’we’re going to tell you what to do, 
you’ve got to do this and that’s the end of it’, but I mean they’ve got no chance of 
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monitoring us. I’ve got [X]43 stock here. There’s no way EW is going to count 
those. Especially if I run them really fast past the gate. They’re reliant on us 
being truthful. And I think most of the farmers in the catchment, everyone that 
lives here likes the lake (Interview with Farmer102, March 2015).  
I’m a firm believer that either you ‘front up or shut-up’. I don’t want someone 
else controlling my destiny either (Interview with Farmer109, March 2015).  
 
This farmer also expressed concern over the impact the scheme would have on ballet 
farmers in the catchment who, he noted: 
 
Many [are] older than me, have been through a lot of struggles over the years 
( E.g bankruptcy) and they are finally reaching a state in life when farm has gone 
up in value, thinking 5 or 10 more years till retirement and then suddenly their 
whole world exploded in front of them (Interview with Farmer109, March 2015).  
 Through negotiations with the Regional Council, the TLC worked to inform the 
solution created by the Regional Council: a cap and trade programme. Any form of cap 
not only threatened farmers’ ability to continue making a profit on farm but it also 
threatened a productivist subjectivity.  A cap potentially required a change in the way 
farmer subjectivities were articulated externally by the designers of the cap and trade 
programme and ultimately wider society (see Chapter 4.5) and internally by farmers. In 
addition, there was a 20% reduction of N required in the catchment by a third party 
organization, the Lake Taupō Protection Trust (LTPT).  The trading component of the 
policy allowed ‘flexibility and viability’ in farmers businesses. However, accepting this 
solution meant that farmers had to accept that they were the cause for the problem and 
thus the ‘polluters.’ 
5.2 The ‘Polluters’ 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the cap on manageable nitrogen within the catchment 
was established through the modelling programme OVERSEER. Nitrogen Discharge 
Allowances were allocated using a grandparenting allocation method that allowed 
landowners to continue leaching at the same nitrogen levels as their baseline year – the 
highest productive year between 2001 and 2005. For many farmers, the cap essentially 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Numbers of stock removed so to ensure anonymity	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limited on-farm production. Without the ability to increase production year on year, many 
farmers were afraid that they could not continue their operations. If a farmer’s business 
wasn’t viable under their present leadership, they feared that no one would want to buy 
their farm or even move into the catchment. 
 
Like people were scared, terrified that they were going to have to halve their 
stocking rates and they wouldn’t be able to use any fertiliser at all, and because 
of that their farms were worthless and they couldn’t get out (Interview with 
Farmer103, March 2015).  
 
Farmers heard cap and trade and 20% reduction. There are two steps in that. 
There is a cap, there will be a trade. 20% reduction was going to be bought out 
by the crown entity. They didn’t hear that. So they couldn’t figure out how on 
earth they were going to farm under a 20% reduction… (Interview with 
Farmer101, March 2015).  
	  
Most farmers in the catchment agree that something needed to be done to protect 
the water quality. But not all agree that a cap was required or whether the regional 
council knew the ramifications of the potential rules. I argue that farmers partially 
resisted the cap because it imposed a ‘polluter’ subject position that threated, as well as 
moralized, productivist subjectivities. The term “polluter’ denoted a moral and individual 
responsibility for environmental contamination (Cooper & Rosin, 2014; Shamir, 2008) 
For many farmers, capping nitrogen leaching meant capping production, in turn 
resulting in a cap on farm growth, which would thus threaten farm viability. Within New 
Zealand, farms tend to follow commodity pricing structures and market fluctuations. 
Farmers are able to make a profit by increasing their production year on year or 
understanding when it is best to buy and sell stock (Rosin, 2013). A limit on farmers’ 
ability to increase their production or match market demand put a strain on the financial 
models used by many farmers in the catchment.  
 Aside from the financial threats that the cap posed, the cap also solidified the 
discourse that farmers are the ‘polluters’. A cap on nitrogen leaching on-farm meant that 
farmers’ actions were polluting the lake. When asked how farmers felt when they were 
labelled as polluters a farmer responded with: 
 
In terms of how farmers felt, they definitely felt like they were pariahs, like the 
community was blaming them. That was not a nice feeling and human behaviour, 
Chapter 5: Farmer Subjectivities      
 104 
doesn’t matter what the issue is, but human behaviour, in my psyche, they like 
simple reasons for things, they like simple explanations, simple opportunities to 
blame people and kiwis love to say, its your fault, you’re a polluter, its your fault, 
you pay, you sort it out. (Interview with Farmer106, March2015).  
 
Many farmers are still quite defensive of the term ‘polluter’, however. In some 
minds, a polluter is a dirty businessman who is purposefully putting green sludge out of a 
pipe into a waterway. To be affiliated with this image seemed like an insult to many 
farmers (McGuire, 2013; Hughey et al., 2010).44 This is because farmers were not aware 
that they were causing harm nor could easily connect on-farm actions to off-farm 
eutrophication effects. The concept of ‘polluter pays’ was not explicitly stated much of 
the time during participant interviews. However, many farmers felt that they were paying 
too high a price for everyone’s benefit. Many farmers felt that everyone in the catchment 
wanted a clean lake, but ‘the townies’ weren’t willing to pay for it.  
 
Cockies45 are the first people who want the lake to be good but, they are also the 
first to see that everybody else wants to bloody penalize them, or make them pay 
the cost for other people’s benefit (Interview with Farmer110, March2015).  
 
Because its like any form of any significant change, all the players in the process 
in the early stages of any change management process, all want the problem to be 
someone else’s. They don’t want to own part of it and they certainly don’t want to 
front up with any of the costs. So [even now] we are still at the early stages of a 
change management process whereby society and consumers are happy to blame 
farmers and have never thought about the impact of their purchasing decisions 
and the price they pay has on water (Interview with Farmer107, March 2015). 
 
 The labelling and blame attributed to farmers did not distinguish between the 
scale of different activities contributing to the problem. Some farmers suggested that 
were lumped into a singular group of ‘baddies’ by ‘the townies.’  In essence, all farmers 
were lumped into being ‘polluters’ regardless of their actual contribution to the problem46. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  The title of this research given to farmers in March of 2015 was “From producers to polluters: Farmers 
participation in the Lake Taupō Water Quality Trading program.” It was only by getting some strange looks 
from farmers, offhand comments, or when someone mentioned that it was formally taken out of 
negotiations that I realized that this was not an acceptable term within the catchment.	  	  
45	  Colloquial	  term	  for	  pastoral	  farmers.	  
46	  Many farmers also discussed how they were not the only cause for the lake water quality decline. Some 
farmers talked about the role that pollen from pine trees can play in increasing nitrogen levels and others 
talked about how the septic tanks across the lake weren’t being regulated as heavily as they were. One 
farmer even talked about tourists’ urination around or in the lake had a negative impact.  
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Everyone likes the lake and likes living here. The public perception is that there 
are lots of dairy farms here that are just pouring into the lake and that’s what we 
were up against originally (Interview with Farmer109, March 2015).  
 
When asked more directly whether farmers had been labeled polluters, another farmer 
responded: 
 
Oh in the town people’s eyes, those people without any doubt. And I mean you go 
into their house and see what they pour down the sink (Interview with Farmer103, 
March 2015).  
 
 Given that all farmers were the ‘polluters’, a ‘grandparenting’ form of allocation 
exacerbated and created tensions. The allocation of credits allows the high producers to 
remain so, but restrained everyone from increasing their leaching (unless they bought 
credits). Since this allocation can be bought and sold in a trading scheme, larger 
producers, and thus polluters, may have an easier time working within the rules or even 
gaining a profit from selling nitrogen. Their scale and ability to de-intensify gives them 
the ability to sell N and thus make a profit. With a grandparenting allocation, the largest 
polluters are ‘rewarded’ for their higher levels of production with a greater amount of 
nitrogen allocation. Many farmers struggled with the potential conflict between the right 
of landowners to maintain their present operations (given how much investment was put 
into them) and the harm potentially imposed on the lower producers. The farmers with 
lower levels of production were the original ‘good stewards’ since they had the least 
impact on the problem of water quality in the lake.  
 
If you are allocating the right to discharge, you are allocating a property right. 
No matter how you allocate it there will be some inequalities…	  Some opponents 
argued that you are providing greater property right to the greatest polluter. But 
we argued that the dairy farmer didn’t set out to pollute and he was encouraged 
by society to invest twice as much in his farm than the sheep and beef farmers, so 
maybe he should be recognized for that (Interview with Farmer107, March 2015).  
Well for a farmer that had a low stocking rate and was doing all the right things 
on his farm, he ended up with a low N and he can never increase his carrying 
capacity. Whereas if he wanted to trade his farm, sell his farm, [that’s] not as 
attractive. Whereas his next door neighbour for instance, was farming at a higher 
stocking rate cause he was more intensive and that’s the way he enjoyed doing 
things, he ended up with a high N. And he can throttle off and farm just as a good 
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as his neighbour and trade or sell his N and do very well out of it. In some ways it 
didn’t quite seem fair the way the regional council had implemented the rules 
(Interview with Farmer105, March 2015).  
[I thought grandparenting was unfair] because all the people that hadn’t done 
anything to the lake, hadn’t polluted the lake at all, they got screwed. They 
basically got screwed right over. Whereas the ones that polluted, like the dairy 
farmer up here, they got patted on the back for being a big polluter (Interview 
with Farmer102, March 2015).  
As a result of the policy programme put in place, 6 farming families left the 
catchment in the mid and late 2000s.47 Some farmers who remain suggest that these 
people didn’t want to accept the science underpinning the rules, the rules themselves, or 
the idea that they were polluters of the lake they loved. However, these families were 
able to leave ‘with dignity’ thanks to payments given to them by LTPT. The price for 
farms received by families that left the catchment was debated quite heavily early on.48  
My gripe with the whole concept is that a small community is paying a high price 
for the community’s desire. The original farm owners, most of them are no longer 
there. They are left with less capital value than they were supposed to (Interview 
with Farmer101, March 2015). 
 
Most people I know, well the ones that were unhappy about it, are gone. They 
have exited the catchment. They have gone which is in some ways a bit sad. I 
mean in some cases they had been on the land for 30 years but they struggled to 
get their head around it, the rules. And the fact that some of them weren’t a 
profitable farmer. So they had just kept their head above the water and then to 
just have this happen is just a final blow (Interview with Farmer105, March 2015). 
 
It’s sad that we have seen the owner-operators disappear out of the district. They 
are here for the long haul, front up for the school boards etc….[as a result of the 
programme] Nobody’s gone broke, and nobody’s been forced off their farms. 
Some of them feel as though they have been forced and they have actually come 
out of it with some money and some dignity. So that has worked (Interview with 
Farmer109, March 2015). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 As of 2011, 5,800ha of land was converted to forestry within the catchment. Since 60% of the reductions 
came from Māori land trusts this means about 2,320ha of private land was converted (Duhon et al., 2015). 
48 Some farmers talked about a meeting in a woolshed where the chairman of the LTPT at the time said that 
the Trust would pay a price for N based on the value of the land after the regulations were put in.  Many 
farmers were quite angered by this proposal since land values in the catchment had declined sharply when 
the regulations were notified. The TLC worked with the LTPT for farmers to be paid on the basis of 
previous land values or values that were being seen for similar areas outside of the catchment.	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For those who remain in the catchment, the regional council regulating them as 
the ‘polluters’ can be quite confronting. The term or subject position of ‘polluter’ can 
impose a novel moral connotation to one’s on-farm actions. When that label is embedded 
in a policy approach, or how one is governed, it can feel especially challenging for some 
people. 
 
 [having the regional council regulate us is] like a big parasite that sits on us. It’s 
a tax on my system, on my moral fibre crawling all over me, treating me like I’ve 
done something wrong. And I’m paying them! (Interview with Farmer112, March 
2015).  
 
 Different farmers in the catchment have differing views about how much of a 
‘polluter’ they are. Some suggested that just by accepting the cap, they accepted that they 
were the polluters and ‘sold out’ in the process.  
 
There were a lot of farmers who felt that we sold out. When the whole cap, we 
didn’t agree to a cap, but look we were 100 farmers against a whole country and 
against an urban population who [97% agreed when asked by the Regional 
Council that a clean lake is very important to them], well of course clean water is 
a big thing! But in that survey they never said but the cost to farmers is x, the cost 
to you is x, in terms of rating. That was never posed. The question was, would you 
like clean water? Absolutely! (Interview with Farmer106, March 2015).  
	  
Not all farmers agree that their actions have the largest impact on lake water health. Some 
have come to the conclusion that it doesn’t really matter anyway since they will be 
regulated and treated as ‘polluters’ regardless.  
 
While I work with [the rules]. I don’t need to accept that something needed to 
happen. But from my understanding the lake has been improving since 1998 
anyway… I still don’t think they know enough about the science (Interview with 
Farmer110, March 105).  
 
Many farmers have come to accept that they do have a role to play in maintaining 
and improving the lake water quality. Although some farmers are still annoyed at the 
rules, and especially the trees49 that were planted on previously farmed land, many are 
also trying to learn how to shift their on-farm practices or have already done so.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Within the catchment, the LTPT had to change high nitrogen leaching land use (farmland) to a low 
nitrogen leaching land use. The most prominent low nitrogen land use adopted within the catchment was 
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Eventually most farmers, in varying ways, accepted both the cap and that they 
were being regulated as polluters: 
 
Farmer: ya. It took quite a long time for people to even get around the idea that 
they were polluting the lake when they only had stock. They weren’t using N 
fertilizer and to understand really… ..it’s all abstract, other than seeing your cow 
pee, you cant see any more after that!” 
Researcher: What changed people’s minds from ‘oh I’m not polluting to oh I 
guess I am’? 
Farmer: I don’t know… I think that people just had to accept in the end that the 
regulations are there and get on with life. Just the same as driving on the left side 
as the road as compared to the right (Interview with Farmer104, March 2015).  
 
By accepting a cap on production, however, farmers in the catchment had to 
partially accept that they were the polluters. This was confronting personally for many 
farmers and other social scientists have described this acceptance process as stages of 
grief (Botha et al., 2013). I suggest that farmers partially resisted the cap because it 
imposed a ‘polluter’ subject position that threatened, as well as moralized, existing 
productivist subjectivities. As polluters, farmers in the catchment were no longer 
considered to be ‘good stewards.’ Additionally, farmers were forced to question the 
intensive growth model embedded within the productivist agri-business ‘good farmer.’ 
As a result of the cap, the stories of who the good farmer was could no longer stay the 
same. Farmers had to learn how to think about their systems a bit differently.  
5.3 Farmers as “Nitrogen Managers”  
The change in the rules for farming in the catchment has created a change in the 
stories that farmers tell others and themselves about their farming actions and operations. 
Many farmers talked of a transition over time in their acceptance of the rules and what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
forestry. Trees tended to strike a different chord with different farmers. Some farmers did not like trees 
because they saw them as unproductive or taking up productive land. Other farmers saw them as an eyesore 
on the landscape. Some farmers blamed the LTPT for encouraging the planting of these trees and ruining 
the landscape around the Taupō catchment. Additionally, farmers tended to dislike trees since they 
associated the lack of farmland with a lack of labour. The suggestion was that the more trees there were, the 
more likely it was for ‘rough’ people to hide in the woods, grow marijuana in the woods, and just generally 
cause trouble. In some farmers’ minds, more trees mean less people - which are a visible reminder of their 
loss of community.  
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that means for their business. I argue that farmers have reoriented their productivist 
subjectivities so that a new farmer subjectivity has emerged within the catchment: a 
‘nitrogen manager’. This novel subjectivity has emerged simultaneously with farmers’ 
new relationship with the council, the management of their land, and their challenged 
farming identities.   
The cap and trade programme occurring in the Taupō catchment aimed to change 
land-use partially through a change in farmer behaviour and practice. For many farmers 
in the catchment, however, their on-farm practices haven’t changed very much as a result 
of the rules coming in. They still shear their sheep, shift stock between paddocks, and bail 
hay among hundreds of other activities. For some, however, the idea of farming has 
shifted greatly. Under the cap and trade programme, farmers have a new limiting factor 
as well as tradable asset, nitrogen. Some farmers consider this new property right an 
annoyance to manage while others see it as an opportunity, or both. Not only does 
climate variability, along with commodity market prices, determine farming in the 
catchment but also farmers’ utilization of nitrogen. For some, this adjustment in the 
bottom line of farming from kg of meat/ha to kg of N/ha has helped to foster what I argue 
to be a novel ‘nitrogen manager’ farmer subjectivity. These farmers are still productive in 
the sense that they are producing food to ‘feed the world’ but they are doing so in a way 
that aims to ‘save the world’ as well.   
The rules have not resulted in uniform changes in farming practices throughout 
the catchment. This may be due to drought (on and off during the late 2000s until 
present) after the nitrogen discharges were allocated during a particularly intensive or 
productive year for their farm.  For those who have changed their farming systems, either 
in thought or practice, some see it as a result of coming to terms with the problem of lake 
water quality decline. This may mean farmers are accepting that their actions have a 
negative impact on the lake or that they are ‘polluters.’ Some suggest a forced acceptance 
of the ‘polluter’ subject position embedded within the cap and trade programme has lead 
to adjusted farming practice.  
 
Researcher: So do you think that, do farmers, are they forced now to consider themselves 
polluters as a result of all of this regulation? 
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Farmer: probably. But that’s not necessarily a bad thing as long as it makes you aware 
and thinking of that… where you winter your cows, you know, whether you winter them 
at the top of a hill or at the bottom of a hill, things like that. Where your deposits are 
going to be less likely to leach. I’m sure everybody is doing that now, you know 
(Interview with Farmer103, March 2015).  
 
 
Although farmers’ changes in practice might indicate their acceptance of the new 
regime, many remain resistant or opposed to it. Many farmers see the rules as unfair since 
other farmers in the country are not in the same situation. The rules limit their ability to 
take advantage of a good season, require them to maintain more contact with the regional 
council, and spend more ‘time in the office.’ 
 
You have to farm to bloody books and not the seasons. You can’t do anything when years 
are bad…your basic farming is dictated to by that plan that you are supposed to operate 
on…you can’t be spontaneous... Farming has changed a lot that way, you have lost a lot 
of flexibility (Interview with Farmer110, March 2015).  
 
It [has] cut down our flexibility. With farming, you have to be able to reap the benefits of 
the good years, to cover the bad years. The cap stops you from taking the good years. It’s 
one year not the average between them… it’s a major restriction…Suddenly we have 
created a whole other level of bureaucracy and paperwork and time to go into it at both 
levels. I am spending so much more time in an office than I actually farm (Interview with 
Farmer109, March 2015).  
 
But [when] restrictions kick in for us [they] won’t be dictated by weather, they will be 
dictated by the fact that we sold some N. So farming policy will have to change a bit 
(Interview with Farmer105, March 2015).  
 
 Some farmers discussed how larger farming operations can maintain a bit more 
flexibility under the rules. This may be due to their financial situation as well as their 
scale. So far, the only farming operations to sell N, and continue farming in the 
catchment, were quite large (Duhon et al., 2015; Bartle, 2011).  
 
 The trading is not viable. Shifting around. Unless you’re going dairy. Your return 
doesn’t stack up unless you’re dairy (Interview with Farmer102, March 2015).  
 
In addition, a large dairy farmer has moved into the catchment. Some farmers are 
unsure whether or not it was right for a large dairy farmer to be able to move into the 
catchment.  
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 [the dairy farmer] went and bought N off of other farmers and now he is running a dairy 
farm so he is actually, he took something that was almost doing no damage, to an 
intensive dairy farm. He has broken no rules, and ya know, by me he is has done the right 
thing. He has employed a lot of people and took a piece of land that should have been a 
dairy farm, and made it a dairy farm. But he is a person that I know went against the tide. 
Against the flow of the concept. And he has done it well, I’m not taking anything away 
from it. I mean a lot of people would look at it and go hmmmm (Interview with 
Farmer112).  
 
 Regardless if their N is sold, farmers in the catchment have had to learn to 
manage a new component in their farming system. Nitrogen has become a limited 
resource, asset, and tradable unit. Farmers are required to keep detailed records of its 
utilization and potential leaching from their farm. They must submit a plan yearly that 
details how they plan to use their allocated Nitrogen for the year.  
 
 Well [farmers] are Nitrogen managers and a lot of that is about timing and technically, 
you are supposed to contact the regional council if you deviate from your N management 
plan. I mean farmers change their farming system all the time! It might be that you buy a 
few more animals than what you thought or you run a few less of this kind of animal and 
a few more of that class of animal” (Interview with Farmer106, March 2015).  
 
Including N in a farming system is not only a different way of running a business 
but also a potentially different way about thinking about the farm. Farmers are now 
keeping in mind what impact their activities have outside their farm gates by 
incorporating a previously external effect into their farming operations. In addition, this 
new external effect can limit what they think is good farming. For a productivist agri-
business farmer, high on-farm intensity and stocking rates is ‘good farming’ (Haggerty et 
al., 2009). In the catchment, this ideal has come to be questioned not only because of a 
limitation on their production but also because the cap and trade market provided a new 
incentive structure for an ‘environmental action.’ Within the catchment, the most 
intensive low N use is forestry. As a result of the cap and trade programme and the LTPT 
actions, many agricultural lands were planted into forestry blocks (Interview with 
Other103, March 2015; Interview with Other104, March 2015). Previously, ripping trees 
up off lands was considered to be good farming, in the Taupō catchment, planting trees is 
now good business thanks to the cap and trade market for nitrogen as well as carbon 
(Interview with Farmer112, March 2015).  
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Perception wise, oh look at us, were not hurting the lake. I got ___50 cows last year, this 
year I’ve got ___.51 But we lost the opportunity to actually farm the land properly cause 
you don’t put the animals on, you don’t eat the grass, the grass just grows weeds and 
you’ve got nothing. You can’t farm lightly, you can farm in the middle and you can farm 
intensely, but intensely is wrong (Interview with Farmer112, March 2015).  
The best farmers were the ones that could develop the bush the best. Now we are 
replanting some of it (Interview with Farmer109, March 2015).  
Good farming business is a bit of a pejorative term in that [planting trees on farms as a 
result of the cap and trade programme] was good business, but it wasn’t necessarily 
good farming in that the production dropped (Interview with Farmer107, March 2015).  
 
Certain landowners or managers ‘took advantage’ of the market situation by 
ramping up their allocations. In a way, they were given more credits than they were 
already using and ended up being able to sell credits that did not have any associated 
environmental benefit. Some landowners were able to take this a step further and 
participate in the carbon market as well as the nitrogen market. Those who did so usually 
saw this as a ‘win-win’, not in terms of environmental and economic benefit, but as a 
‘win-win’ for taking advantage of two sources of additional income. 
 A lot of people spent a lot of time throwing their hands up and saying ‘you can’t do this, 
what to do’. It was obvious it was coming. So you’ve either go to get on board and work 
with the system, or try and manipulate the system (Interview with Farmer102, March 
2015).  
 
Farmers within the catchment still consider themselves to be ‘productive’ farmers. 
However, the measure of productivity may have changed. The ‘smart’ landowners are the 
ones who are monitoring their business based on kilograms of N/ha rather than kilograms 
of meat/ha. These individuals call themselves ‘nitrogen managers’ at times. They are still 
farmers who manage stock, but they also now manage nitrogen.  
	  
Well I run my farm on a totally different metric now which is $ profit per Kg of N leached. 
It used to be $ profit per Ha or $ profit per stock unit. Under a N cap, the only metric that 
matters is $ profit per kg N leached (Interview with Farmer107, March 2015).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Greater number of cattle removed to ensure anonymity 
51 Lesser number of cattle removed to ensure anonymity	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The N cap is really a urine cap, forget the fertilizer. I am capped on the number of 
animals I can run… The project is about making a choice of where and how to winter 
cows. Without thinking about our cropping programme, saves us two tonne just by 
thinking about winter that we can realize or utilize. We could potentially buy another 
farm with that [money]… (Interview with Farmer108, March 2015).  
 
‘Nitrogen Managers’ in the catchment tell of a new relationship with their land, 
their regional council, and sometimes themselves. Farmers have shifted their production 
to be centralized around nitrogen, have worked actively to have a positive relationship 
with the council when being ‘regulated,’ and speak of a transition in their acceptance of 
the problem and rules. Many of the nitrogen managers no longer question whether or not 
their actions on farm have an impact52 and have come to accept that the rules are in place 
and here to stay.  
Some farmers have capitalized on the rules and have created a novel business as a 
result. They have adjusted their farm practices to market a new farming business under 
nutrient limits. They argue that under the limits, the commodities markets they were 
using before are no longer viable for their business. Competing with other farmers not 
under production limitation means that the prices farmers in the catchment receive for 
their products may not be enough for them to generate a profit. However, cattle and sheep 
reared within the Taupō catchment can be sold for a premium to high-end markets locally 
as well as in larger cities. The idea is for the consumer to help pay the price for clean 
water so that farmers don’t have to do it on their own.  
 
 Its hard to make an analogy of putting a cap on a farming business without explaining 
that costs have gone up just in the time that the cap has been on and our produce hasn’t 
gone up with that. If you are competing with others without a cap, we can’t compete. 
Which why [Mike and Sharon Barton] were so adamant to prove that people would pay a 
premium by setting up Taupō Beef (Interview with Farmer106, March 2015). 53 
 
 Farmers in the Lake Taupō catchment are only environmentally responsible as 
long as their actions are economically rational. This may be determined by the ‘neoliberal’ 
form of agri-business management present within New Zealand farming operations as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Farmers, however, do question the extent of their impact. 
53	  See Taupō Beef on the Waikato Regional Council’s website: http://www.makearipple.co.nz/Local-
Heroes/Taupō-beef/. The company also won the country’s top award from the New Zealand Sustainable 
Business Network in November of 2015.	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well as the neoliberal governmentality present within the cap and trade programme (see 
Chapter 4). As a result, these ‘environmental subjects’ are not taking action solely 
because it is ‘environmentally friendly,’ instead there is a potential profit (Agrawal, 2005; 
Galt, 2013).  
 
Researcher: How do you define responsibility in this catchment?  
Farmer109: “…Responsibility to keep the lake clean and there’s also the responsibility 
to maintain a viable and flexible farming and so that there is future for farming in the 
catchment too…You cant be green if you’re in the red. The best way for any change is for 
people to be doing well.  
 
5.4 Conclusions:  
As discussed in Chapter 2, subjectivities are varied, embedded, contextual, and 
multiple (Galt, 2013; Hunt et al., 2009; Morris, 2009; Gibson-Graham, 2006). That is to 
say that this new potential subjectivity is based on the specific experience of, and rules 
applied to, Taupō farmers. Farmers involved in the cap and trade programme do not 
automatically take on the subject position of ‘nitrogen manager.’ Being a ‘farmer’ and a 
‘nitrogen manager’ doesn’t necessarily conflict or combine well. Individuals may fulfil or 
reject multiple roles and subject positions (Read, 2013).  
The limits on N have created a novel farming context in which the rules of the 
game have been significantly changed. Alongside the impressive policy claim that the N 
reduction is already years ahead of schedule, farmers have also been lauded for acting as 
good subjects – as demonstrated by the way a new enterprise has been created: Taupō 
Beef. Creating a market premium for the meat provides a potential avenue for farmers in 
the catchment to maintain business feasibility even when traditional methods of profit 
generation are limited. By ensuring that the cap and trade programme incentivizes 
entrepreneurial opportunities, rather than placing strict limits on criteria for best on-farm 
practice, the programme is highlighted by the regional council and the farmers alike as 
making the best of a problematic situation. In November of 2015, Taupō Beef won the 
country’s highest sustainable business honour: the supreme award from the National 
Sustainable Business Network (Stuff.co.nz, 2015). They hope to not only change the way 
that farming is done, but the way consumers choose what to eat as well. They are trying 
to play within the rules while working to change the game. Taupō Beef is one small 
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example of an enterprise emerging as a result of a radically different form of governance 
managing pollution; even with the N limits. 
Within the Taupō catchment, I argue that farmers have shifted their subjectivities 
from producers, to polluters, to nitrogen managers (see Figure 3). Farmers suggest that 
much of their on-farm practice hasn’t really changed on farm but the idea of farming has 
shifted. A new limiting factor has been added to farmers’ equation: nitrogen. This new 
limitation is an annoyance to many, but also an opportunity for some. This new bottom 
line of farming has also fostered a novel farmer subjectivity. Farmers are still 
productivitist but rather than measuring their productivity in terms of kg/meat/ha there 
have shifted over time to Kg/N/ha metrics.	  This is not a directly linear process nor one 
that every farmer has done. Based on the rules, however, many have had to adjust their 
business to be centred around nitrogen leaching. This reorientation is challenging for 
many in practice but also complicates the dominant ‘productivist’ subjectivities within 
the country.  
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Figure 3: A novel farmer subjectivity in Lake Taupō 
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Productivist subjectivities are challenged in numerous ways with the cap and 
trade programme. First, farmers in the catchment can no longer be the ‘good stewards’ 
since their actions are creating harm for the lake. Rather than farming in a way that helps 
the land, every stock unit they have hurts it. Farmers are the polluters and regulated as 
such by the regional council. In addition, the ‘good farmer’ is no longer those who make 
land more ‘productive’ by converting shrub to pasture. In the catchment, the ‘good 
farmer’ is potentially the one who plants the most trees. In addition, farmers who traded 
Nitrogen and Carbon credits54 were also considered to be taking a win-win opportunity. 
Certain landowners or managers ‘took advantage’ of the market situation by ramping up 
their allocations. In a way, they were given more credits than they were already using and 
ended up being able to sell credits that did not have any associated environmental benefit.  
 A lot of people spent a lot of time throwing their hands up and saying ‘you can’t do this, 
what to do’. It was obvious it was coming. So you’ve either go to get on board and work 
with the system, or try and manipulate the system (Interview with Farmer102, March 
2015).  
A cap on production also challenges the story of the ‘good farmer’ who grows and 
intensifies production year on year. A limit on N essentially limits a farmer’s ability to 
grow. This challenges the ‘agri-business’ productivist subjectivity that encourages 
farmers to make a profit each year based on increased growth and intensification on farm 
(Rosin, 2013). A cap and trade programme also allows farmers to still build on some 
‘productivist’ subjectivities. Farmers can continue to be productivist agri-business 
individuals but rather than having kg of meat be the measure of productivity, kg of N is 
the new bottom line that farmers orient their business around. Their productivist 
subjectivities are now oriented around profit per kg of N leached. In addition, ‘good 
farming’ stewardship is able to continue since all farmers in the catchment have to work 
with the limits of their land in order to avoid fines from the WRC. Farmers are working at 
lower intensities and all are farming within limits for the betterment of the lake. 
Rather than just a cap on production, an additional trading component offers 
farmers a theoretical ‘flexibility and viability’ in their system. However, this flexibility is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  During the mid 2000s, there was an additional opportunity for some landowners to gain carbon credits 
through the planting of trees. This market-based instrument combined with the nitrogen market based 
instrument allows the LTPT to meet their targets.	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only available to the larger landowners who have been able to trade or lease nitrogen. It is 
up to farmers to decide how best to utilize the N they are given, and whether or not it is in 
their business’s best interest to sell or lease N. Their businesses and livelihoods now 
depend on how well they use and manage their nitrogen.  
Some farmers in the catchment have met these challenges head on and in the 
process have adjusted the stories that they tell themselves and others. A new story has 
developed around farmers’ management of nitrogen as a central component of their 
farming identity. This reorientation of subjectivity is related to the reordering of farmer’s 
relationship with the council, their land, and their business (cf. Morris, 2009). The new 
position of ‘nitrogen manager’ is one which combines both a ‘producer’ and a ‘polluter’ 
subjectivity while a purely productivist subjectivity would not necessarily account for 
environmental externalities.  
A cap and trade programme asks farmers to both ‘feed the world’ as well as ‘save 
the world’. It is a regime of practices managing farmers and their actions which 
challenges the dominant ways of going about things.  One farmer even talked about the 
relationship between the impact of ‘Rogernomics’ and how the agricultural reforms at the 
time also brought in changes to the way farming is done.  
 
 Outside forces’, which is basically legislation in both cases, stuffing up what someone is 
trying to do for their country and the world. We have to find a way to feed an increasing 
world population (more efficiently) using less nutrients going forward (Interview with 
Farmer109, March 2015).  
 
Although the cap and trade programme is an ‘environmental’ policy, these 
individuals may not have changed their environmental beliefs to match their more 
‘environmentally friendly’ practices (Agrawal, 2005). Additionally, farmers who reduce 
their production (by selling to the Trust) aren’t considered more environmentally friendly 
compared to those who are limited under the rules. The cap and trade programme defines 
responsibility for farmers to be ‘environmentally’ friendly only as long as it is 
‘economically’ rational.  
Farmers in the Taupō catchment had to accept that: 1) there was a problem with 
lake water quality, 2) they were the cause, 3) a solution would most likely require 
changes on farms and, 4) said solution would most likely harm their businesses in some 
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way. Navigating these different stages of acceptance would be challenging for any group 
or individual. Creating a solution that worked for them, as well as the lake, doubly so.  
Under this cap and trade programme, farmers were responsible for the problem of water 
quality as well as the success of the solution posed. Without their cooperation, mediated 
by the TLC, reductions of N would not have been made. Again, the regulatory hammer is 
only as good as the nail. The cap and trade program is only made to ‘work’ thanks to 
farmer’s changes in on-farm practice. A change in practice may also be related to a 
change in farmer perception or subjectivity. I suggest that fitting a farming operation 
within the rules also meant a potential shift in how farmers situated themselves within the 
stories of the ‘good farmer’.  
Within the catchment, the responsible farmers are those who stay within the rules 
and those who took an active role in the policy negotiation and process. However, there 
were plenty of tensions and overlaps in how farmers articulated differing ‘good farmer’ 
subjectivities within the catchment. The good farming ‘steward’ has shifted overtime in 
the catchment to describe those who first take out trees, then farm the land ‘well’, then 
fence off waterways, then replant trees and potentially sell nitrogen to the LTPT.  Good 
farming stewardship is now partially defined by farmers’ participation in the market 
based cap and trade program. In addition, a ‘good’ agribusiness producer subjectivity has 
adjusted within the catchment. The limits on nitrogen place a significant strain on farmers’ 
ability to make a profit through increasingly intensive production. But, by being 
entrepreneurial and seeking a profit in the only way they see able, some farmers are 
creating a novel price-premium market for their beef and lamb. These farmers may not 
participate in the water quality trading market created for them, nor even consider it a 
‘true market’ (Interview with Farmer107, March 2015). However, they are working to 
create a financial reward for ‘feeding the world’ while ‘saving the world.’ 
  





6.0 Introduction:  
This concluding chapter begins by briefly outlining the Taupō case, and then 
synthesizes the arguments made in Chapters 4 and 5. In addition, I list the contributions 
the thesis makes, indicate some limitations, and draw a series of final conclusions for 
policy and research.  
Farmers in the Taupō catchment were the first in the country to be identified as 
polluters, and the first to be formally regulated for their farming activities. Their story 
and experiences are telling for what might be to come for other farmers within the nation. 
This thesis has examined these farmers’ engagement in the creation and implementation 
of the Lake Taupō catchment’s water quality trading program.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, discourses determining who the ‘good farmer’ is in 
Aotearoa New Zealand are interconnected with the political economy of the country.55 
Farmers and their businesses have been in a historically privileged position within the 
country (Rosin, 2008). This was challenged during the 1980s with the removal of 
agricultural subsidies however (Morris, 2009). Since this time, the ‘good farmer’ tends to 
be defined as an individual who has a high level of on-farm production and tends to treat 
farming first and foremost as a business rather than a lifestyle (Hunt et al., 2013).  
Given the lack of experience within the country of addressing the problem of non-
point source water pollution coming from agricultural landscapes, the Taupō case offers a 
perfect opportunity to explore how stories of the ‘good farmer’ interact with 
environmental governance. Specifically, how farmers experience and engage with a 
market based nutrient reduction policy programme, and what effects such a programme 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  See Figure 2 and Figure 3 for a schematic of the relationship between farmer 
subjectivities and the political economy of the nation. 	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may have on farmer subjectivities. Their experience can provide lessons for farmers and 
policy makers alike.  
Focusing on farmers’ experiences in the Taupō catchment helps others understand 
participants’ perspectives in a market based trading programme. Cap and trade 
programmes along with other market based policy instruments like payments for 
ecosystem services have been on the rise internationally. Yet, research investigating these 
programmes tends to be dominated by the field of environmental economics and focuses 
on the functioning of the markets rather than the logics or people within them; this is 
especially true for water quality trading markets (Mariola, 2011). This thesis pulls upon 
critical scholarship investigating how these kinds of programmes are connected to the 
‘neoliberalisation’ of nature and the rise of ‘market environmentalism’ (Castree, 2008a; 
Castree 2008b; Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010; Kallis et al. 2013; Kosoy & Corberra, 
2010).  My work provides a detailed investigation of the neoliberal environmentality56 
present within these kinds of governance tools and specifically the Taupō programme.   
My research addresses a need to examine the contextual and communal nature of 
an agri-environmental policy programme addressing non-point source water pollution 
through a market based policy approach. I have done so by answering two research 
questions grounded in a governmentality approach. First, how are new regimes of 
practices made to ‘work’ within a water quality trading programme in the Lake Taupō 
catchment of Aotearoa New Zealand? And secondly, how are farmer subjectivities 
constituted, altered, contested, and created as part of the water quality governance within 
the Lake Taupō catchment? The following section details the arguments that emerged in 
addressing these two questions set out in Chapter 4 and 5.  
6.1 Thesis Arguments 
In this thesis, I argue that farmers' experience and expectations of the market 
trading scheme is informed by a neoliberal rationale and determined the potential 
development of a novel farmer identity oriented around the management of their now 
limited resource, nitrogen. I have used a governmentality approach to determine and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 These two terms together can be explained as how governance is made and how people are governed for 
‘environmental’ purpose under a potentially neoliberal style of governance. 
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answer two research questions. In my first results chapter (see Chapter 4), I answer the 
question of: how are new regimes of practices made to ‘work’ within a water quality 
trading programme in the Lake Taupō catchment of Aotearoa New Zealand? As a result I 
focus on addressing the question of how do we govern? I outlined the what, why, who 
and how of the Taupō approach and made five arguments.  
In Chapter 4, I first argued that the object of governance within the Taupō 
catchment was ‘manageable nitrogen’ which is then converted to Nitrogen Discharge 
units and traded in the form of credits. This framing of the problem, and its focus on 
nitrogen as the object of governance, allowed the WRC to instigate land use change (and 
farmer behaviour) without directly putting into question the nature of intensive farming 
production within the catchment. Second, in the context of addressing why and what 
rationales informed the decision to implement this particular solution, I argue that the 
policy programme put forward fits within a neoliberal form of governance and set of 
governmental rationalities that privilege the market as an efficient, flexible, and viable 
governing tool. Third, I outline how this program was made to work using complex 
technologies including modelling tools, a ‘grandfathering’ allocation structure, and 
payments for nitrogen discharge allowance (NDA) reductions within the catchment. I 
argue that these technologies together comprise a regime of practice that privileged high 
intensity farming (and thus producers with higher levels of pollution), through the 
allocation of, and payment for, NDAs.  Fourth, in relation to thinking through who is 
governed, I argue that farmers have been made responsible not only for the problem, but 
also the success of the solution. Their behaviour on-farm is governed and is a form of 
disciplinary power, but farmers are not just subject to the regime, they exercise power 
through their actions and participating voice. Their compliance and acceptance of this 
program was necessary in order for the anticipated environmental goals to be realised. In 
a way, the hammering of the regulatory tool, a market in this case, is only as good as the 
nail (the participants).  In all, I argued that the use of a market based instrument is a 
governmental regime of practice, that is made to work through privileging a certain form 
of discourse and neoliberal rationality that stimulated alternative behaviours in farm 
operation.   
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Thinking about farmers and their absorption of this new reality is clearly very 
central to understanding the application of agri-environmental governance and in this 
case a market based mechanism. In Chapter 5, I answer the question: how are farmer 
subjectivities constituted, altered, contested, and created as part of the water quality 
governance within the Lake Taupō catchment? In this chapter I focused on the question 
of how are we governed and detail farmers’ engagement with the policy programme. I 
make four major arguments.  
First I argue that a cap on production not only challenged farmers’ bottom lines, 
but also their identities.  Second, I argued that farmers’ ways of questioning the solution 
put forward within the catchment relates to the stories of a ‘good farmer’ in New 
Zealand. Third, I argued that the change in production instigated under the cap and trade 
program has affected farmer subjectivities within the catchment. Taupō farmers needed a 
new story once they were identified as the ‘polluters’ and thus identified as being 
responsible for the nitrogen leaching within the catchment. I have documented a 
nonlinear shift overtime of farmers who were identified as ‘producers’, then ‘polluters’, 
and now ‘nitrogen managers’. These subject positions are tied to the policy programme 
implemented but not all farmers in the catchment have incorporated these positions into 
their farmer subjectivities or identities in the same ways. Many farmers’ livelihoods and 
businesses however now depend on how well they manage their new property right: 
nitrogen credits. Lastly, I argue that the way in which a farming operation fits within the 
rules also means an adjustment in the ‘good farmer’ subjectivity, which has unevenly 
resulted in a novel subjectivity emerging: nitrogen managers. This chapter concludes that 
farmers’ engagement and perspectives in the catchment are partially determined by ideal 
and actual farmer subjectivities present or assumed within the cap and trade policy 
program.  
6.2 Thesis contributions 
Throughout this thesis, I have used a governmentality approach and built upon 
work applying this methodology in the examination of environmental problems, 
solutions, and governance. This approach focuses on how we govern or are governed 
when implementing ‘environmental’ policy or addressing an ‘environmental’ problem. I 
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have concentrated on farmers’ perspectives in addressing freshwater nutrient pollution 
occurring from agricultural production. An understanding of polluter or participant 
subjectivities is needed when we evaluate environmental policy and address common 
pollution problems like excess nutrients in water bodies (Cooper & Rosin, 2014; Mariola, 
2011; McGuire et al., 2013). Additional understandings of the relationships between 
farmer beliefs and changes in on-farm behaviour are needed to create effective agri-
environmental policy (Greiner & Gregg, 2011; McGuire et al., 2013; Rosin et al 2008). 
The research makes four key contributions: at the level of methodology, in 
relation to environmental subjectivities, on the scale of national understandings of 
farming subjectivities, and finally for policy and practice.  
First, I contribute to research that employs governmentality to explore 
environmental governance, specifically in relation to the Taupō catchment. Although 
other research has been done in the Taupō catchment evaluating the psychological 
wellbeing of participants (Botha et al., 2013), the programme’s neoliberal characteristics 
(Bartle, 2011), the market’s function (Duhon et al., 2015), and the programme’s design 
and implementation (Barns et al., 2013), this is the first research that combines an outline 
of the policy and its effects on participant subjectivities. The field employing a 
governmentality approach to evaluate and critique the use of market based mechanisms in 
environmental policy is a young and growing (Bäckstrand, & Lövbrand, 2006; Cooper & 
Rosin 2014; McGregor et al., 2015) and to date, has limited documentation of participant 
subjectivities in relation to market based instruments and specifically cap and trade 
programs (see Cooper & Rosin, 2014 for the exception).  
Second, the work contributes to the existing body of research investigating 
environmental subjectivities. My work provides a novel contribution due to its focus on 
subjectivities under a neoliberal environmentality (Fletcher, 2010). Some within the 
literature using a governmentality approach to investigate environmental policy suggest 
that by participating in the solution to a given environmental problem, individual’s 
environmental beliefs will change due to a change in their behaviour (Agrawal, 2005; 
Haggerty, 2007). I have found that participants in the Taupō market based trading scheme, 
specifically farmers, have not become more environmentally oriented than previously. I 
suggest that the ideal subject in the market based policy tool used is motivated to reduce 
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their ecological footprint purely through economic incentives, not environmental 
protection. This finding challenges our understanding of environmental subjects and 
subjectivities under a neoliberal environmentality present within market-based policy 
mechanism.  
Third, at a national level, the work contributes to the body of literature 
investigating farmer subjectivities within New Zealand (Campbell et al., 2012; Hunt et 
al.; Morris, 2009; Rosin, 2008; Rosin, 2013; Cooper & Rosin, 2014). Subjectivities 
documented are contextual, situated, and interrelated and often contribute strongly to the 
constitution of notions of ‘good farming.’ This research highlights a potential new 
subjectivity, ‘Nitrogen Manager’, that has emerged in relation to the Taupō programme 
and that may provide a good starting point to understand and interpret other efforts 
nationally to reduce the impact of farming practices on water quality.  
Fourth, at the policy level, the research has documented the rationale and 
technical aspects of this policy programme and added a novel understanding of farmers’ 
experience. I have endeavoured to focus on the people, and their perspectives, involved in 
a market based policy program to address water quality decline. Subject’s voices in these 
policy programs tend to be left out of policy analysis and environmentality approaches 
(Barnett et al., 2008; Bakker, 2010). Attention to the stories we tell about farmers, and the 
stories farmers tell themselves enables understandings that can then inform the 
implementation and evaluation of agri-environmental programmes or policies.  
6.3 Limitations: 
	  
There are two main limitations to this study. The first concerns the nature of 
relying on a single case study and the logistics of field work. The second relates to 
Barnett et al.’s (2008) critique of governmentality, specifically in relation to my use of 
‘neoliberalism’. The Taupō case is singular world-wide and thus lessons learned must be 
taken with an understanding of the complex context in which this programme is situated. 
Not all farmers in the catchment, or in New Zealand, may present similar stories or 
subjectivities and these results are not applicable to all water quality trading programs or 
market based mechanisms. However, because the non-point source cap and trade 
Chapter 6: Conclusions    
 126 
programme is unique, but at the same time influenced by a broad trend of similar market 
based instruments, documenting such cases provides insights for the implementations of 
similar programmes in comparable (albeit not identical) situations both within New 
Zealand and abroad. This may include, for example, the potential inclusion of agriculture 
within the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme.  
There were also limitations in relation to undertaking the field work in the case 
study site. Due to time and monetary constraints, I was only able to spend 3 weeks within 
the catchment but I did interview a total of 23 participants. While I do not believe these 
participants’ experiences represent all stakeholders’ perspectives, I do feel that I was able 
to understand and hear a number of different stories. In Chapter 2, I documented how I 
conducted this case study using semi-structured interviews, and analysed data collected 
using a Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA). To do this, I open coded, interconnected 
categories found, and finally selectively coded based on my two research questions. This 
method required that I review the data multiple times and interpret data sources in 
relation to each other as well as to my governmentality approach.  As a result, the data 
collected was analysed in a thorough and established way.  
Finally, in relation to the case, the research could not be an investigation of 
farmers’ engagement over time but rather has documented of their mindset at the time of 
interviewing. To ensure that this research was true to farmers’ experiences, I returned to 
the catchment in November 2015 and presented my results to the community to seek their 
feedback.  
In relation governmentality, Barnett et al., (2008) make two arguments relevant 
here. First they argue that since there is no one way to “do” governmentality research, its 
analytical value is undermined. However, variation in approaches can also be a strength, 
in that governmentality can be adapted to suit the specific context and issues under study.  
In this research, I have built upon other applications of governmentality in settings 
similar to the Taupō case study (e.g. Haggerty, 2007; Cooper & Rosin, 2014). As a result, 
my work is comfortably situated within a growing body of literature using this approach 
within the country.  
 A second critique Barnett et al. (2008) make, questions the use of the approach in 
functionalist narratives of neoliberalism. They suggest that “the Foucauldian analytics of 
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governmentality cannot actually account for the subject-effects it ascribes to 
governmental rationalities” (p 626). In essence, they argue that a governmentality 
approach cannot fully meld preferred subject positions and governance rationalities into a 
single logic. In this research, this critique is relevant to thinking about the role of 
neoliberalism as a governmental rationality, and its effects on subjectivities. Through the 
research, I have been wary of reducing the complexities of the case to being purely 
‘neoliberal’ (see Chapter 4). Instead, I have discussed how the programme application 
and design can fit within a neoliberal rationale at specific times (Chapter 4.2) and do not 
conclude that the program is ‘neoliberal’ or that participants in the market program are 
‘neoliberal subjects’ as a result (see Chapter 5). I have not used ‘neoliberal’ as a blanket 
term for the programme and its participants or argued that participants were made into 
neoliberal subjects as a result of the participation in this ‘neoliberalising’ environmental 
policy tool. I thus paid attention to Barnett et al.’s (2008) recommendations and have 
dissected the neoliberal characteristics of the programme in a nuanced way.  
6.4 Implications for the Future  
As a young person who has never known anything other than neoliberalism, and 
as an environmental policy oriented professional working in areas where market based 
mechanisms are often a preferred option, I am conscious of the tightrope I walk when 
making any critique of neoliberal governance or tools. It is hard for me to say if market 
based mechanisms should be the preferred, or even, an answer to our water quality or 
other ‘commons’ problems like climate change.  Instead I have endeavoured to document 
the views of participants, and the neoliberal logics underpinning an experimental cap and 
trade program. 
 Within Taupō, the efforts of farmers’ required that the regional council take time, 
energy, and care to understand their perspective in managing pollution from farms. I 
admire farmers’ drive to encourage best practice on farms across the catchment as well as 
question the assumptions we make when asking farmers to pay for pollution reduction. 
Enterprises like Taupō Beef will no doubt become models for other farming groups to 
follow when working within ecological limits (see Chapter 5.3). 
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 I encourage future scholarship to focus on the broader ecological benefit of the 
water quality trading program, as well as on an examination of the purpose and 
motivations different landowners have for participating in the market. In particular, it 
would be useful to explore whether cultural identity shapes participants’ reasons for 
engaging in the programme. In addition, I also encourage a documentation of farmers' 
change in practices so as to better understand what ‘best-practice’ is within the 
catchment. Lastly, I suggest research should focus on farmers’ expectation of the state 
and specifically state-owned enterprises in the mitigation of pollutants, especially from 
agricultural sources.  
Farmers in the Taupō catchment were the first in the country to be formally 
regulated for their nutrient leaching. They were the test subjects for a market based policy 
solution that may be repeated or expanded.  These farmers are some of the first to have to 
reckon with hard, and inconvenient truths of agricultural production. Their story of 
transition from producers, to polluters, to nitrogen managers is quite telling for what may 
be in store for other New Zealand farmers. In essence, farmers are now being asked to 
feed the world and save the world at the same time.   The policy programme implemented 
in Taupō has been heralded internationally as a model for others to follow (Barns et al., 
2013; Kerr et al., 2015; Shortle, 2012). In this thesis, I have endeavored to pay special 
attention to its impact on the community. Communal voices are needed when designing 
and evaluating public policy and this thesis has documented how these changes have had 
significant effects on both how farmers are perceived, and how they perceive themselves. 
 Under a governmentality approach, the goal is neither to create an alternative nor 
provide one.  I am not saying that ‘there is no alternative’ but rather that the onus is not 
on me to provide one. Instead, environmentality, rooted in a governmentality approach, 
hopes to examine the way that things are at present, so that spaces can be created for 
questioning and then critique. An alternative to things we may dislike in the present may 
not exist, and we may not know how or what the future will become (Foucault 1991). In 
order to produce something radically other, we must first understand the way things are 
and how they came to be. An attention to the varying effects and degrees of 
neoliberalism, especially in environmental management, opens spaces to question what 
aspects may be adjusted or critiqued next (Dean, 2014; Bakker, 2009). If a response to 
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neoliberalism or neoliberal market based mechanisms is desired, we must “meet 
[neoliberalism] on its terrain: that of production of subjectivity, freedom, and possibility” 
(Read, 2010, p 14). In doing so, we must have, and give, hope of doing and being ‘other’.  
 Markets are embedded within certain logics, sets of assumptions, and ideals of the 
functioning and management of a given trading system and commodity (Harvey, 2005; 
Polanyi, 1944). Used as regulatory instruments, market based mechanisms are 
“embedded within particular cultural, social, and political conditions. Hence, they are not 
just sites of economic relations, but also of governance relations” (Cooper, 2015, p 1789). 
Fully understanding these relations is important when deciding when, how, and even if 
they should be employed within environmental governance.  
The policy approach in Taupō has been recognized as successful and is 
highlighted as a model for others to follow (Barns et al., 2013; Kerr et al., 2015; 
Greenhalgh & Selman, 2012). Measuring the ‘success’ of an environmental policy tool 
based on market efficiency however may leave behind core questions regarding 
ecological efficacy. Markets have their own problems (including from a Marxist or 
Polanyian perspective), and employing them as tools of environmental governance 
potentially creates diminishing returns with increasing complexity and opacity (Cooper, 
2015).  
Market based mechanisms, like the one in Taupō, can create positive change. 
They can create a solution that is acceptable, doable, and potentially successful in the 
reduction of an ecological harm at least cost (Lansing, 2011; Cooper, 2015). They can 
potentially address environmental problems that are the result of everyday actions, have a 
time lag between input and effect, are open-pool resource issues, and have no easy or 
singular solution; emissions trading schemes addressing climate change being one of the 
best examples (Levin, Cashore, Bernstein, & Auld, 2007). The potentially false promises 
of, and optimism in, markets may provide just the level of fever required when 
confronting these ‘wicked’ problems.57 Often, hope is required to achieve any positive 
environmental outcome at all. There is no faultless environmental policy and we must 
remember that the possibility of perfection must not be the enemy of the good. Yet, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 ‘Wicked’ problems are those that complex, open-ended, potentially reoccurring, (Churchman, 1967; 
Head, 2008) 
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accepting the good, we must understand and be wary of the trade-offs present and logics 
behind a given policy rationale and programme as well as the effects these trade-offs and 
logics may have on individual subjectivities and communities.  
Fletcher (2010) encourages researchers to place some empirical flesh on his 
theoretical skeleton and to assess its usefulness in multiple settings focusing on differing 
environmentalities expressed by different stakeholders, the multiple environmentalities of 
a given situation or policy expression, and how these actually are articulated on the 
ground. In this Masters research I have examined a singular situation (water pollution 
from agriculture) in a singular setting (Lake Taupō) with a singular stakeholder group 
(farmers). I have examined how farmers questioned the way they were governed and how 
the problem of excess Nitrogen affecting lake water clarity was governed in the first 
place. In this investigation, I have used an environmentality approach that has guided 
these questions and my process. My findings are based on the discourses present in my 
interviews with Taupō farmers and other engaged stakeholders. This research has shown 
that Taupō farmers’ subjectivities have potentially shifted over time as part of their 
engagement with the market based trading program implemented to reduce water 
pollution. The ideal farmer is now a Nitrogen manager, which builds upon and adds a 
new dimension to existing stories of the ‘good farmer’ in Aotearoa New Zealand. 





Appendix 1: WRC guide for consents  





Appendix 2: Potential Interview Questions 
Dated February 2015 
 
1. The Basics: 
a. How long have you or your family been living/farming in the catchment? 
2. Notions of Success:  
a. How do you measure success on your farm in meeting the requirements of this 
program?  
b. Do you think this program has been successful overall? Why or why not? 
c. Do you think your attitudes towards “good farming” in the catchment have 
changed as a result of this program? 
d. How do you think your perspectives on farming have changed overtime? Do 
you think this related to the program? 
3. Environmental Beliefs/attitudes 
a. Why do you think that water quality is a problem in the lake? 
b. Do you consider yourself an environmental steward? How do you define that? 
4. Market based mechanism s 
a. Have you completed a trade of NDA? Have you thought about it? Why did 
you go through with it or not? 
b. How did people decide on using a nutrient trading program?  
c. Why do you think people settled on this option? 
d. What are your attitudes towards the use of this kind of environmental 
management? 
e. What connections do you see between a nutrient trading program to solve H20 
quality and a trading program to solve global climate change?  
5. Government role/ market role/ community role/individual role? 
a. Whose responsibility do you think it is to clean up/prevent pollution? The 
polluter or the government? 
b. Do you think your answer to this question has changed over time? 
c. What is your connection to Lake Taupō Care? Do you think they represent 
your interests well? What is your involvement in this group? 
d. What do you think of the Lake Taupō Protection Trust? Is it important for you 
to have a non-government body making the decisions? 
6. The changing farming landscape 
a. Have you noticed any specific changes within the catchment or on your own 
land as a result of this trading program? 












From	  producers	  to	  polluters:	  Farmers	  participation	  in	  the	  Lake	  
Taupō	  Water	  Quality	  Trading	  program	  
INFORMATION	  SHEET	  FOR	  	  	  
PARTICIPANTS	  	  
	  
Hello,	  My	  name	  is	  Madeline	  (Maddy)	  Hall	  and	  I	  am	  a	  Masters	  Student	  at	  the	  University	  of	  
Otago.	  Thank	  you	  for	  showing	  an	  interest	  in	  this	  project.	  	  Please	  read	  this	  information	  sheet	  
carefully	  before	  deciding	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  participate.	  	  If	  you	  decide	  to	  participate	  I	  thank	  
you.	  	  If	  you	  decide	  not	  to	  take	  part	  in	  this	  research	  at	  any	  time,	  there	  will	  be	  no	  
disadvantage	  to	  you	  and	  I	  thank	  you	  for	  considering	  my	  request.	  	  	  
	  
What	  is	  the	  Project?	  
I	  am	  conducting	  research	  into	  the	  use	  of	  a	  market	  based	  policy	  instrument	  to	  reduce	  water	  
pollution	  within	  the	  Lake	  Taupō	  Basin.	  Specifically,	  I	  am	  looking	  at	  the	  Nutrient	  Trading	  
Program	  currently	  operating	  within	  the	  catchment.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  research	  is	  to	  see	  
how	  people	  who	  are	  already	  involved	  in	  a	  nutrient	  trading	  program	  to	  address	  water	  
pollution	  perceive	  this	  program.	  This	  research	  is	  being	  undertaken	  as	  part	  of	  the	  thesis	  
requirements	  for	  my	  completion	  of	  a	  Masters	  Degree	  in	  Environmental	  Sociology.	  	  
	  
What	  type	  of	  participant	  am	  I	  looking	  for?	  
As	  part	  of	  this	  research,	  I	  am	  especially	  interested	  in	  Lake	  Taupō	  landowners’	  
perceptions	  of	  the	  program.	  You	  have	  received	  this	  form	  either	  because	  you	  have	  
participated	  in	  the	  nutrient	  trading	  program,	  been	  exposed	  as	  a	  landowner	  to	  it	  as	  an	  
option	  for	  nutrient	  reduction,	  or	  have	  extensive	  knowledge	  and	  experience	  of	  it.	  If	  you	  
decide	  to	  take	  part	  in	  this	  research,	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  completed	  findings	  will	  be	  made	  
available	  to	  you	  on	  request	  at	  the	  end	  of	  my	  studies.	  	  
	  
What	  will	  participants	  be	  asked	  to	  do?	  
Should	  you	  agree	  to	  take	  part	  in	  this	  project,	  you	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  take	  part	  in	  an	  interview	  
with	  myself.	  This	  interview	  should	  take	  between	  30	  min	  to	  1	  hour	  and	  give	  you	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  tell	  your	  story	  and	  experience.	  	  
 
What	  data	  or	  information	  will	  be	  collected	  and	  what	  will	  it	  be	  used	  for?	  
As	  part	  of	  this	  research,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  record	  our	  interview	  via	  an	  audio	  recording	  device.	  
If	  you	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  be	  recorded	  for	  any	  or	  all	  of	  the	  interview,	  please	  let	  me	  know	  and	  I	  
will	  not	  record.	  This	  interview	  will	  be	  transcribed	  at	  a	  later	  date	  by	  myself	  and	  analysed	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along	  with	  other	  participants’	  interviews	  and	  submissions.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  project	  may	  be	  
published	  and	  will	  be	  available	  in	  the	  University	  of	  Otago	  Library	  (Dunedin,	  New	  Zealand).	  
To	  confirm,	  your	  personal	  information	  will	  not	  be	  seen	  by	  any	  other	  parties	  other	  than	  the	  
student	  and	  her	  supervisors.	  Your	  secure	  anonymity	  is	  paramount	  and	  your	  name	  or	  any	  
other	  identifying	  characteristics	  will	  not	  be	  published.	  Thus,	  this	  research	  can	  not	  be	  used	  
as	  part	  of	  enforcement	  or	  monitoring	  of	  your	  compliance	  with	  Regional	  Plan	  Variation	  5	  
(RPV5).	  	  
The	  data	  collected	  will	  be	  securely	  stored	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  only	  those	  mentioned	  below	  
will	  be	  able	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  it.	  Data	  obtained	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  research	  will	  be	  retained	  for	  
at	  least	  5	  years	  in	  secure	  storage.	  Any	  personal	  information	  held	  on	  the	  participants	  (such	  
as	  contact	  details,	  audio	  tapes	  transcribed	  interviews	  etc,)	  may	  be	  destroyed	  at	  the	  
completion	  of	  the	  research	  even	  though	  the	  data	  derived	  from	  the	  research	  will,	  in	  most	  
cases,	  be	  kept	  for	  much	  longer	  or	  possibly	  indefinitely.	  
Due	  to	  the	  small	  size	  of	  the	  catchment	  and	  potential	  participants,	  there	  is	  a	  higher	  risk	  of	  
your	  identity	  becoming	  known.	  However,	  every	  precautionary	  effort	  will	  be	  made	  to	  secure	  
your	  anonymity	  and	  you	  are	  welcome	  to	  disengage	  from	  the	  interview	  and	  concluding	  
research	  at	  any	  time.	  	  
Researcher	  Information	  
Part of my studies and expenses at the University of Otago have been funded by Fulbright New 
Zealand as part of a U.S. Graduate Fulbright Fellowship Grant. This scholarship does not obligate 
the student researcher to position herself in line with the views of Fulbright New Zealand or the 
U.S. Government. This research will not be evaluated by any United States agency or department. 
How	  will	  data	  be	  collected?	  
This	  project	  involves	  an	  open-­‐questioning	  technique.	  The	  general	  line	  of	  questioning	  
includes	  people’s	  perceptions	  of	  changing	  environmental	  beliefs,	  notions	  of	  farming	  success,	  
who	  should	  be	  paying	  for	  polluting	  activities,	  the	  use	  of	  market	  based	  mechanisms,	  and	  the	  
effectiveness	  of	  the	  nutrient	  trading	  program.	  	  
The	  precise	  nature	  of	  the	  questions	  which	  will	  be	  asked	  have	  not	  been	  determined	  in	  
advance,	  but	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  interview	  develops.	  	  Consequently,	  
although	  the	  University	  of	  Otago	  Human	  Ethics	  Committee	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  general	  areas	  to	  
be	  explored	  in	  the	  interview,	  the	  Committee	  has	  not	  been	  able	  to	  review	  the	  precise	  
questions	  to	  be	  used.	  
In	  the	  event	  that	  the	  line	  of	  questioning	  does	  develop	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  you	  feel	  hesitant	  or	  
uncomfortable	  you	  are	  reminded	  of	  your	  right	  to	  decline	  to	  answer	  any	  particular	  
question(s)	  and	  also	  that	  you	  may	  withdraw	  from	  the	  project	  at	  any	  stage	  without	  any	  
disadvantage	  to	  yourself	  of	  any	  kind.	  
What	  if	  Participants	  have	  any	  Questions?	  
If	  you	  have	  any	  questions	  about	  our	  project,	  either	  now	  or	  in	  the	  future,	  please	  feel	  free	  to	  
contact	  either:-­‐	  
Madeline	  (Maddy)	  Hall	   and	   	  Dr.	  Katharine	  Legun	  
Department	  of	  Sociology	   	   	   Department	  of	  Sociology	  
Phone	  Number: 03 479 5220	   	   Phone	  Number: 03 479 7666 




This	  study	  has	  been	  approved	  by	  the	  University	  of	  Otago	  Human	  Ethics	  Committee.	  If	  you	  
have	  any	  concerns	  about	  the	  ethical	  conduct	  of	  the	  research	  you	  may	  contact	  the	  Committee	  
through	  the	  Human	  Ethics	  Committee	  Administrator	  (ph	  +643	  479	  8256	  or	  email	  
gary.witte@otago.ac.nz).	  Any	  issues	  you	  raise	  will	  be	  treated	  in	  confidence	  and	  investigated	  
and	  you	  will	  be	  informed	  of	  the	  outcome.	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Appendix 4: Consent Form 
	  From	  producers	  to	  polluters:	  Farmers	  participation	  in	  the	  
Lake	  Taupō	  Water	  Quality	  Trading	  program	  
	   	   	   	   CONSENT	  	  FORM	  	  FOR	  	  	  
PARTICIPANTS	  
I	  have	  read	  the	  Information	  Sheet	  concerning	  this	  project	  and	  understand	  what	  it	  is	  
about.	  	  All	  my	  questions	  have	  been	  answered	  to	  my	  satisfaction.	  	  I	  understand	  that	  I	  
am	  free	  to	  request	  further	  information	  at	  any	  stage.	  
I	  know	  that:-­‐	  
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
 
3. Personal identifying information including audio recordings will be destroyed at the 
conclusion of the project but any raw data on which the results of the project will be 
retained in secure storage for at least five years; 
 
4.  This project involves an open-questioning technique. The general line of questioning 
includes people’s perceptions of changing environmental beliefs, notions of farming 
success, who should be paying for polluting activities, the use of market based 
mechanisms, and the effectiveness of the nutrient trading program. The precise nature of 
the questions which will be asked have not been determined in advance, but will depend 
on the way in which the interview develops and that in the event that the line of 
questioning develops in such a way that I feel hesitant or uncomfortable I may decline to 
answer any particular question(s) and/or may withdraw from the project without any 
disadvantage of any kind. 
 
5.  Part of this research is funded by the Fulbright New Zealand as part of a U.S. Graduate 
Student Fellowship award.  
 
6.. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of 
Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve my 
anonymity.  
 
I agree to take part in this project. 
 
 
.............................................................................   ............................... 




       (Printed Name) 
	  
This	  study	  has	  been	  approved	  by	  the	  University	  of	  Otago	  Human	  Ethics	  Committee.	  
If	  you	  have	  any	  concerns	  about	  the	  ethical	  conduct	  of	  the	  research	  you	  may	  contact	  
the	  Committee	  through	  the	  Human	  Ethics	  Committee	  Administrator	  (ph	  +643	  479	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8256	  or	  email	  gary.witte@otago.ac.nz).	  Any	  issues	  you	  raise	  will	  be	  treated	  in	  
confidence	  and	  investigated	  and	  you	  will	  be	  informed	  of	  the	  outcome.	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, DP DJDLQ ZULWLQJ WR \RX FRQFHUQLQJ \RXU SURSRVDO HQWLWOHG ³)URP SURGXFHUV WR SROOXWHUV
)DUPHUV SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ WKH /DNH 7DXSR :DWHU 4XDOLW\ 7UDGLQJ SURJUDP´ (WKLFV
&RPPLWWHHUHIHUHQFHQXPEHU
7KDQN \RX IRU \RXU HPDLO RI  )HEUXDU\  UHVSRQGLQJ WR WKH &RPPLWWHH DQG SURYLGLQJ
\RXU UHYLVHG ,QIRUPDWLRQ 6KHHW DQG &RQVHQW )RUP DV ZHOO DV FRUUHVSRQGHQFH IURP 1JDL
7DKX 5HVHDUFK &RQVXOWDWLRQ &RPPLWWHH :H UHFHLYHG DQ HPDLO IURP WKH 5HVHDUFK 0DQDJHU
0DRUL RQ  0DUFK  WR DGYLVH WKDW DQ\ RXWVWDQGLQJ FRQVXOWDWLRQ LVVXHV KDG QRZ EHHQ
UHVROYHG 7KDQN \RX IRU UHYLVLQJ WKH ,QIRUPDWLRQ 6KHHW WR SURYLGH DGYLFH DERXW WKH ULVN RI
EHLQJLGHQWLILDEOHGXHWRWKHVPDOOVL]HRIWKHFDWFKPHQWDQGFRPPXQLW\
2Q WKH EDVLV RI WKLV UHVSRQVH , DP SOHDVHG WR FRQILUP WKDW WKH SURSRVDO QRZ KDV IXOO HWKLFDO
DSSURYDOWRSURFHHG
$SSURYDO LV IRU XS WR WKUHH \HDUV IURP WKH GDWH RI WKLV OHWWHU ,I WKLV SURMHFW KDV QRW EHHQ
FRPSOHWHG ZLWKLQ WKUHH \HDUV IURP WKH GDWH RI WKLV OHWWHU UHDSSURYDO PXVW EH UHTXHVWHG ,I
















Tuesday, 18 November 2014. 
Ms Katharine Legun, 






Farmers’ willingness to take part in market based mechanisms 
7KH1JƗL7DKX5HVHDUFK&RQVXOWDWLRQ&RPPLWWHHWKHFRmmittee) met on Tuesday, 18 
November 2014 to discuss your research proposition. 






process is part of a number of requirements for researchers to undertake and does not cover 
other issues relating to ethics, including methodology they are separate requirements with 
other committees, for example the Human Ethics Committee, etc. 
:LWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKH3ROLF\IRU5HVHDUFK&RQVXOWDWLRQZLWK0ƗRULWKH&RPPLWWHHEDVH
consultation on that defined by Justice McGechan: 
Ǝ&RQVXOWDWLRQGRHVQot mean negotiation or agreement. It means: setting out a proposal not 
fully decided upon; adequately informing a party about relevant information upon which the 
proposal is based; listening to what the others have to say with an open mind (in that there is 
room to be persuaded against the proposal); undertaking that task in a genuine and not 
FRVPHWLFPDQQHU5HDFKLQJDGHFLVLRQWKDWPD\RUPD\QRWDOWHUWKHRULJLQDOSURSRVDOƎ 
The Committee considers the research to be of interest and importance. 
 
The Committee understands that considerable advice has been given to this project regarding 
contacting specific individuals at the 7ǌZKDUHWRD Trust Board, this submission does not 
reflect the advice given. The committee strongly encourages contact with Ngati 7ǌZKDUHWRD 
regarding this study. The Committee also suggest dissemination of results to Ngati 
7ǌZKDUHWRD. 
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